American Institutions And Their Influence

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Even in the exercise of the executive power, properly so called,
the point upon which his position seems to be almost analogous to
that of the king of France--the president labors under several
causes of inferiority. The authority of the king, in France,
has, in the first place, the advantage of duration over that of
the president: and durability is one of the chief elements of
strength; nothing is either loved or feared but what is likely to
endure. The president of the United States is a magistrate
elected for four years. The king, in France, is an hereditary
sovereign.

In the exercise of the executive power the president of the
United States is constantly subject to jealous scrutiny. He may
make, but he cannot conclude a treaty; he may designate, but he
cannot appoint, a public officer.[Footnote:

The constitution had left it doubtful whether the president was
obliged to consult the senate in the removal as well as in the
appointment of federal officers. The Federalist (No. 77) seemed
to establish the affirmative; but in 1789, congress formally
decided that as the president was responsible for his actions, he
ought not to be forced to employ agents who had forfeited his
esteem. See Kent's Commentaries, vol. i., p. 289.

] The king of France is absolute in the sphere of the executive
power.

The president of the United States is responsible for his
actions; but the person of the king is declared inviolable by the
French charter.

Nevertheless, the supremacy of public opinion is no less above
the head of one than of the other. This power is less definite,
less evident, and less sanctioned by the laws in France than in
America, but in fact exists. In America it acts by elections and
decrees; in France it proceeds by revolutions; but
notwithstanding the different constitutions of these two
countries, public opinion is the predominant authority in both of
them. The fundamental principle of legislation--a principle
essentially republican--is the same in both countries, although
its consequences may be different, and its results more or less
extensive. Whence I am led to conclude, that France with its
king is nearer akin to a republic, than the Union with its
president is to a monarchy.

In what I have been saying I have only touched upon the main
points of distinction; and if I could have entered into details,
the contrast would have been rendered still more striking.

I have remarked that the authority of the president in the United
States is only exercised within the limits of a partial
sovereignty, while that of the king, in France, is undivided. I
might have gone on to show that the power of the king's
government in France exceeds its natural limits, however
extensive they may be, and penetrates in a thousand different
ways into the administration of private interests. Among the
examples of this influence may be quoted that which results from
the great number of public functionaries, who all derive their
appointments from the government. This number now exceeds all
previous limits; it amounts to 138,000[Footnote:

The sums annually paid by the state to these officers amount to
200,000,000 francs (eight millions sterling).

] nominations, each of which may be considered as an element of
power. The president of the United States has not the exclusive
right of making any public appointments, and their whole number
scarcely exceeds 12,000.[Footnote:

This number is extracted from the "National Calendar," for 1833,
The National Calendar is an American almanac which contains the
names of all the federal officers.

It results from this comparison that the king of France has
eleven times as many places at his disposal as the president,
although the population of France is not much more than double
that of the Union.

]

[Those who are desirous of tracing the question respecting the
power of the president to remove every executive officer of the
government without the sanction of the senate, will find some
light upon it by referring to 5th Marshall's Life of Washington,
p. 196: 5 Sergeant and Rawle's Reports (Pennsylvania), 451:
Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution, vol. iv., p. 355,
contains the debate in the House of Representatives, June 16,
1799, when the question was first mooted: Report of a committee
of the senate in 1822, in Niles's Register of 29th August in that
year. It is certainly very extraordinary that such a vast power,
and one so extensively affecting the whole administration of the
government, should rest on such slight foundations, as an
_inference_ from an act of congress, providing that when the
secretary of the treasury should be removed by the president, his
assistant should discharge the duties of the office. How
congress could confer the power, even by a direct act, is not
perceived. It must be a necessary implication from the words of
the constitution, or it does not exist. It has been repeatedly
denied in and out of congress, and must be considered, as yet, an
unsettled question.--_American Editor_.]

* * * * *

ACCIDENTAL CAUSES WHICH MAY INCREASE THE INFLUENCE OF
THE EXECUTIVE.

External security of the Union.--Army of six thousand Men.--Few
Ships.--The President has no Opportunity of exercising his
great Prerogatives.--In the Prerogatives he exercises he is
weak.

If the executive power is feebler in America than in France, the
cause is more attributable to the circumstances than to the laws
of the country.

It is chiefly in its foreign relations that the executive power
of a nation is called upon to exert its skill and vigor. If the
existence of the Union were perpetually threatened, and its chief
interest were in daily connexion with those of other powerful
nations, the executive government would assume an increased
importance in proportion to the measures expected of it, and
those which it would carry into effect. The president of the
United States is the commander-in-chief of the army, but of an
army composed of only six thousand men; he commands the fleet,
but the fleet reckons but few sail; he conducts the foreign
relations of the Union, but the United States are a nation
without neighbors. Separated from the rest of the world by the
ocean, and too weak as yet to aim at the dominion of the seas,
they have no enemies, and their interests rarely come into
contact with those of any other nation of the globe.

The practical part of a government must not be judged by the
theory of its constitution. The president of the United States
is in the possession of almost royal prerogatives, which he has
no opportunity of exercising; and those privileges which he can
at present use are very circumscribed: the laws allow him to
possess a degree of influence which circumstances do not permit
him to employ.

On the other hand, the great strength of the royal prerogative in
France arises from circumstances far more than from the laws.
There the executive government is constantly struggling against
prodigious obstacles, and exerting all its energies to repress
them; so that it increases by the extent of its achievements, and
by the importance of the events it controls, without, for that
reason, modifying its constitution. If the laws had made it as
feeble and as circumscribed as it is in the Union, its influence
would very soon become much greater.

* * * * *

WHY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT REQUIRE
THE MAJORITY OF THE TWO HOUSES IN ORDER TO
CARRY ON THE GOVERNMENT.

It is an established axiom in Europe that a constitutional king
cannot persevere in a system of government which is opposed by
the two other branches of the legislature. But several
presidents of the United States have been known to lose the
majority in the legislative body, without being obliged to
abandon the supreme power, and without inflicting a serious evil
upon society. I have heard this fact quoted as an instance of
the independence and power of executive government in America: a
moment's reflection will convince us, on the contrary, that it is
a proof of its extreme weakness.

A king in Europe requires the support of the legislature to
enable him to perform the duties imposed upon him by the
constitution, because those duties are enormous. A
constitutional king in Europe is not merely the executor of the
law, but the execution of its provisions devolves so completely
upon him, that he has the power of paralyzing its influence if it
opposes his designs. He requires the assistance of the
legislative assemblies to make the law, but those assemblies
stand in need of his aid to execute it: these two authorities
cannot subsist without each other, and the mechanism of
government is stopped as soon as they are at variance.

In America the president cannot prevent any law from being
passed, nor can he evade the obligation of enforcing it. His
sincere and zealous co-operation is no doubt useful, but it is
not indispensable in the carrying on of public affairs. All his
important acts are directly or indirectly submitted to the
legislature; and where he is independent of it he can do but
little. It is therefore his weakness, and not his power, which
enables him to remain in opposition to congress. In Europe,
harmony must reign between the crown and the other branches of
the legislature, because a collision between them may prove
serious; in America, this harmony is not indispensable, because
such a collision is impossible.

* * * * *

ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT.

Dangers of the elective System increase in Proportion to the
Extent of the Prerogative.--This System possible in America
because no powerful executive Authority is required.--What
Circumstances are favorable to the elective System.--Why the
Election of the President does not cause a Deviation from the
Principles of the Government.--Influence of the Election of the
President on secondary Functionaries.

The dangers of the system of election applied to the head of the
executive government of a great people, have been sufficiently
exemplified by experience and by history; and the remarks I am
about to make refer to America alone. These dangers may be more
or less formidable in proportion to the place which the executive
power occupies, and to the importance it possesses in the state;
and they may vary according to the mode of election, and the
circumstances in which the electors are placed. The most weighty
argument against the election of a chief-magistrate is, that it
offers so splendid a lure to private ambition, and is so apt to
inflame men in the pursuit of power, that when legitimate means
are wanting, force may not unfrequently seize what right denies.

It is clear that the greater the privileges of the executive
authority are, the greater is the temptation; the more the
ambition of the candidates is excited, the more warmly are their
interests espoused by a throng of partisans who hope to share the
power when their patron has won the prize. The dangers of the
elective system increase, therefore, in the exact ratio of the
influence exercised by the executive power in the affairs of
state. The revolutions of Poland are not solely attributable to
the elective system in general, but to the fact that the elected
magistrate was the head of a powerful monarchy. Before we can
discuss the absolute advantages of the elective system, we must
make preliminary inquiries as to whether the geographical
position, the laws, the habits, the manners, and the opinions of
the people among whom it is to be introduced, will admit of the
establishment of a weak and dependent executive government; for
to attempt to render the representative of the state a powerful
sovereign, and at the same time elective, is, in my opinion, to
entertain two incompatible designs. To reduce hereditary royalty
to the condition of an elective authority, the only means that I
am acquainted with are to circumscribe its sphere of action
beforehand, gradually to diminish its prerogatives, and to
accustom the people to live without its protection. Nothing,
however, is farther from the designs of the republicans of Europe
than this course: as many of them only owe their hatred of
tyranny to the sufferings which they have personally undergone,
the extent of the executive power does not excite their
hostility, and they only attack its origin without perceiving how
nearly the two things are connected.

Hitherto no citizen has shown any disposition to expose his honor
and his life, in order to become the president of the United
States; because the power of that office is temporary, limited,
and subordinate. The prize of fortune must be great to encourage
adventurers in so desperate a game. No candidate has as yet been
able to arouse the dangerous enthusiasm or the passionate
sympathies of the people in his favor, for the very simple
reason, that when he is at the head of the government he has but
little power, but little wealth, and but little glory to share
among his friends; and his influence in the state is too small
for the success or the ruin of a faction to depend upon the
elevation of an individual to power.

The great advantage of hereditary monarchies is, that as the
private interest of a family is always intimately connected with
the interests of the state, the executive government is never
suspended for a single instant; and if the affairs of a monarchy
are not better conducted than those of a republic, at least there
is always some one to conduct them, well or ill, according to his
capacity. In elective states, on the contrary, the wheels of
government cease to act, as it were of their own accord, at the
approach of an election, and even for some time previous to that
event. The laws may indeed accelerate the operation of the
election, which may be conducted with such simplicity and
rapidity that the seat of power will never be left vacant; but,
notwithstanding these precautions, a break necessarily occurs in
the minds of the people.

At the approach of an election the head of the executive
government is wholly occupied by the coming struggle; his future
plans are doubtful; he can undertake nothing new, and he will
only prosecute with indifference those designs which another will
perhaps terminate. "I am so near the time of my retirement from
office," said President Jefferson on the 21st of January, 1809
(six weeks before the election), "that I feel no passion, I take
no part, I express no sentiment. It appears to me just to leave
to my successor the commencement of those measures which he will
have to prosecute, and for which he will be responsible."

On the other hand, the eyes of the nation are centred on a single
point; all are watching the gradual birth of so important an
event. The wider the influence of the executive power extends,
the greater and the more necessary is its constant action, the
more fatal is the term of suspense; and a nation which is
accustomed to the government, or, still more, one used to the
administrative protection of a powerful executive authority,
would be infallibly convulsed by an election of this kind. In
the United States the action of the government may be slackened
with impunity, because it is always weak and circumscribed.

One of the principal vices of the elective system is, that it
always introduces a certain degree of instability into the
internal and external policy of the state. But this disadvantage
is less sensibly felt if the share of power vested in the elected
magistrate is small. In Rome the principles of the government
underwent no variation, although the consuls were changed every
year, because the senate, which was an hereditary assembly,
possessed the directing authority. If the elective system were
adopted in Europe, the condition of most of the monarchical
states would be changed at every new election. In America the
president exercises a certain influence on state affairs, but he
does not conduct them; the preponderating power is vested in the
representatives of the whole nation. The political maxims of the
country depend therefore on the mass of the people, not on the
president alone; and consequently in America the elective system
has no very prejudicial influence on the fixed principles of the
government. But the want of fixed principles is an evil so
inherent in the elective system, that it is still extremely
perceptible in the narrow sphere to which the authority of the
president extends.

The Americans have admitted that the head of the executive power,
who has to bear the whole responsibility of the duties he is
called upon to fulfil, ought to be empowered to choose his own
agents, and to remove them at pleasure: the legislative bodies
watch the conduct of the president more than they direct it. The
consequence of this arrangement is, that at every new election
the fate of all the federal public officers is in suspense.
Mr. Quincy Adams, on his entry into office, discharged the
majority of the individuals who had been appointed by his
predecessor; and I am not aware that General Jackson allowed a
single removeable functionary employed in the federal service to
retain his place beyond the first year which succeeded his
election. It is sometimes made a subject of complaint, that in
the constitutional monarchies of Europe the fate of the humbler
servants of an administration depends upon that of the ministers.
But in elective governments this evil is far greater. In a
constitutional monarchy successive ministers are rapidly formed;
but as the principal representative of the executive power does
not change, the spirit of innovation is kept within bounds; the
changes which take place are in the details rather than in the
principles of the administrative system; but to substitute one
system for another, as is done in America every four years by
law, is to cause a sort of revolution. As to the misfortunes
which may fall upon individuals in consequence of this state of
things, it must be allowed that the uncertain situation of the
public officers is less fraught with evil consequences in America
than elsewhere. It is so easy to acquire an independent position
in the United States, that the public officer who loses his place
may be deprived of the comforts of life, but not of the means of
subsistence.

I remarked at the beginning of this chapter that the dangers of
the elective system applied to the head of the state, are
augmented or decreased by the peculiar circumstances of the
people which adopts it. However the functions of the executive
power may be restricted, it must always exercise a great
influence upon the foreign policy of the country, for a
negotiation cannot be opened or successfully carried on otherwise
than by a single agent. The more precarious and the more
perilous the position of a people becomes, the more absolute is
the want of a fixed and consistent external policy, and the more
dangerous does the elective system of the chief magistrate
become. The policy of the Americans in relation to the whole
world is exceedingly simple; and it may almost be said that no
country stands in need of them, nor do they require the
co-operation of any other people. Their independence is never
threatened. In their present condition, therefore, the functions
of the executive power are no less limited by circumstances, than
by the laws; and the president may frequently change his line of
policy without involving the state in difficulty or destruction.

Whatever the prerogatives of the executive power may be, the
period which immediately precedes an election, and the moment of
its duration, must always be considered as a national crisis,
which is perilous in proportion to the internal embarrassments
and the external dangers of the country. Few of the nations of
Europe could escape the calamities of anarchy or of conquest,
every time they might have to elect a new sovereign. In America
society is so constituted that it can stand without assistance
upon its own basis; nothing is to be feared from the pressure of
external dangers; and the election of the president is a cause of
agitation, but not of ruin.

* * * * *

MODE OF ELECTION.

Skill of the American Legislators shown in the Mode of Election
adopted by them.--Creation of a special electoral
Body.--Separate Votes of these Electors.--Case in which the
House of Representatives is called upon to choose the
President.--Results of the twelve Elections which have taken
Place since the Constitution has been established.

Beside the dangers which are inherent in the system, many other
difficulties may arise from the mode of election, which may be
obviated by the precaution of the legislator. When a people met
in arms on some public spot to choose its head, it was exposed to
all the chances of civil war resulting from so martial a mode of
proceeding, beside the dangers of the elective system in itself.
The Polish laws, which subjected the election of the sovereign to
the veto of a single individual, suggested the murder of that
individual, or prepared the way to anarchy.

In the examination of the institutions, and the political as well
as the social condition of the United States, we are struck by
the admirable harmony of the gifts of fortune and the efforts of
man. That nation possessed two of the main causes of internal
peace; it was a new country, but it was inhabited by a people
grown old in the exercise of freedom. America had no hostile
neighbors to dread; and the American legislators, profiting by
these favorable circumstances, created a weak and subordinate
executive power, which could without danger be made elective.

It then only remained for them to choose the least dangerous of
the various modes of election; and the rules which they laid down
upon this point admirably complete the securities which the
physical and political constitution of the country already
afforded. Their object was to find the mode of election which
would best express the choice of the people with the least
possible excitement and suspense. It was admitted in the first
place that the _simple_ majority should be decisive; but the
difficulty was to obtain this majority without an interval of
delay which it was most important to avoid. It rarely happens
that an individual can at once collect the majority of the
suffrages of a great people; and this difficulty is enhanced in a
republic of confederate states, where local influences are apt to
preponderate. The means by which it was proposed to obviate this
second obstacle was to delegate the electoral powers of the
nation to a body of representatives. The mode of election
rendered a majority more probable; for the fewer the electors
are, the greater is the chance of their coming to a final
decision. It also offered an additional probability of a
judicious choice. It then remained to be decided whether this
right of election was to be intrusted to the legislative body,
the habitual representative assembly of the nation, or whether an
electoral assembly should be formed for the express purpose of
proceeding to the nomination of a president. The Americans chose
the latter alternative, from a belief that the individuals who
were returned to make the laws were incompetent to represent the
wishes of the nation in the election of its chief magistrate; and
that as they are chosen for more than a year, the constituency
they represented might have changed its opinion in that time. It
was thought that if the legislature was empowered to elect the
head of the executive power, its members would, for some time
before the election, be exposed to the manoeuvres of corruption,
and the tricks of intrigue; whereas, the special electors would,
like a jury, remain mixed up with the crowd till the day of
action, when they would appear for the sole purpose of giving
their votes.

It was therefore established that every state should name a
certain number of electors,[Footnote:

As many as it sends members to congress. The number of electors
at the election of 1833 was 288. (See the National Calendar,
1833.)

] who in their turn should elect the president; and as it had
been observed that the assemblies to which the choice of a chief
magistrate had been intrusted in elective countries, inevitably
became the centres of passion and of cabal; that they sometimes
usurped an authority which did not belong to them: and that their
proceedings, or the uncertainty which resulted from them, were
sometimes prolonged so much as to endanger the welfare of the
state, it was determined that the electors should all vote upon
the same day, without being convoked to the same place.[Footnote:

The electors of the same state assemble, but they transmit to the
central government the list of their individual votes, and not
the mere result of the vote of the majority.