American Institutions And Their Influence

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] but in general the prominent feature of the administration in
the United States is its excessive local independence.

* * * * *

OF THE STATE.

I have described the townships and the administration: it now
remains for me to speak of the state and government. This is
ground I may pass over rapidly, without fear of being
misunderstood; for all I have to say is to be found in written
forms of the various constitutions, which are easily to be
procured.[Footnote:

See the constitution of New York.

] These constitutions rest upon a simple and rational theory;
their forms have been adopted by all constitutional nations, and
are become familiar to us.

In this place, therefore, it is only necessary for me to give a
short analysis; I shall endeavor afterward to pass judgment upon
what I now describe.

* * * * *

LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATE.

Division of the Legislative Body into two Houses.--Senate.--House
of Representatives.--Different functions of these two Bodies.

The legislative power of the state is vested in two assemblies,
the first of which generally bears the name of the senate.

The senate is commonly a legislative body; but it sometimes
becomes an executive and judicial one. It takes a part in the
government in several ways, according to the constitution of the
different states;[Footnote:

In Massachusetts the Senate is not invested with any
administrative functions.

] but it is in the nomination of public functionaries that it
most commonly assumes an executive power. It partakes of
judicial power in the trial of certain political offences, and
sometimes also in the decision of certain civil cases.[Footnote:

As in the state of New York.

] The number of its members is always small. The other branch
of the legislature, which is usually called the house of
representatives, has no share whatever in the administration, and
only takes a part in the judicial power inasmuch as it impeaches
public functionaries before the senate.

The members of the two houses are nearly everywhere subject to
the same conditions of election. They are chosen in the same
manner, and by the same citizens.

The only difference which exists between them is, that the term
for which the senate is chosen, is in general longer than that of
the house of representatives. The latter seldom remain in office
longer than a year; the former usually sit two or three years.

By granting to the senators the privilege of being chosen for
several years, and being renewed seriatim, the law takes care to
preserve in the legislative body a nucleus of men already
accustomed to public business, and capable of exercising a
salutary influence upon the junior members.

The Americans, plainly, did not desire, by this separation of the
legislative body into two branches, to make one house hereditary
and the other elective; one aristocratic and the other
democratic. It was not their object to create in the one a
bulwark to power, while the other represented the interests and
passions of the people. The only advantages which result from
the present constitution of the United States, are, the division
of the legislative power, and the consequent check upon political
assemblies; with the creation of a tribunal of appeal for the
revision of the laws.

Time and experience, however, have convinced the Americans that
if these are its only advantages, the division of the legislative
power is still a principle of the greatest necessity.
Pennsylvania was the only one of the United States which at first
attempted to establish a single house of assembly; and Franklin
himself was so far carried away by the necessary consequences of
the principle of the sovereignty of the people, as to have
concurred in the measure; but the Pennsylvanians were soon
obliged to change the law, and to create two houses. Thus the
principle of the division of the legislative power was finally
established, and its necessity may henceforward be regarded as a
demonstrated truth.

This theory, which was nearly unknown to the republics of
antiquity--which was introduced into the world almost by
accident, like so many other great truths--and misunderstood by
several modern nations, is at length become an axiom in the
political science of the present age.

* * * * *

THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE STATE.

Office of Governor in an American State.--The Place he occupies
in relation to the Legislature.--His Rights and his
Duties.--His Dependence on the People.

The executive power of the state may with truth be said to be
_represented_ by the governor, although he enjoys but a
portion of its rights. The supreme magistrate, under the title
of governor, is the official moderator and counsellor of the
legislature. He is armed with a suspensive veto, which allows
him to stop, or at least to retard, its movements at pleasure.
He lays the wants of the country before the legislative body, and
points out the means which he thinks may be usefully employed in
providing for them; he is the natural executor of its decrees in
all the undertakings which interest the nation at
large.[Footnote:

Practically speaking, it is not always the governor who executes
the plans of the legislature; it often happens that the latter,
in voting a measure, names special agents to superintend the
execution of it.

] In the absence of the legislature, the governor is bound to
take all necessary steps to guard the state against violent
shocks and unforeseen dangers.

The whole military power of the state is at the disposal of the
governor. He is commander of the militia and head of the armed
force. When the authority, which is by general consent awarded
to the laws, is disregarded, the governor puts himself at the
head of the armed force of the state, to quell resistance and to
restore order.

Lastly, the governor takes no share in the administration of
townships and counties, except it be indirectly in the nomination
of justices of the peace, which nomination he has not the power
to revoke.[Footnote:

In some of the states the Justices of the peace are not nominated
by the governor.

]

The governor is an elected magistrate, and is generally chosen
for one or two years only; so that he always continues to be
strictly dependent on the majority who returned him.

* * * * *

POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE SYSTEM OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION
IN THE UNITED STATES.

Necessary Distinction between the general Centralisation of
Government. and the Centralisation of the local
Administration.--Local Administration not centralized in the
United States; great general Centralisation of the
Government.--Some bad Consequences resulting to the United
States from the local Administration.--Administrative
Advantages attending the Order of things.--The Power which
conducts the Government is less regular, less enlightened, less
learned, but much greater than in Europe.--Political Advantages
of this Order of things.--In the United States the Interests of
the Country are everywhere kept in View.--Support given to the
Government by the Community.--Provincial Institutions more
necessary in Proportion as the social Condition becomes more
democratic.--Reason of this.

Centralisation is become a word of general and daily use, without
any precise meaning being attached to it. Nevertheless, there
exist two distinct kinds of centralisation, which it is necessary
to discriminate with accuracy.

Certain interests are common to all parts of a nation, such as
the enactment of its general laws, and the maintenance of its
foreign relations. Other interests are peculiar to certain parts
of the nation; such, for instance, as the business of different
townships. When the power which directs the general interests is
centred in one place, or in the same persons, it constitutes a
central government. The power of directing partial or local
interests, when brought together, in like manner constitutes what
may be termed a central administration.

Upon some points these two kinds of centralisation coalesce; but
by classifying the objects which fall more particularly within
the province of each of them, they may easily be distinguished.

It is evident that a central government acquires immense power
when united to administrative centralisation. Thus combined, it
accustoms men to set their own will habitually and completely
aside; to submit, not only for once or upon one point, but in
every respect, and at all times. Not only, therefore, does the
union of power subdue them by force, but it affects them in the
ordinary habits of life, and influences each individual, first
separately, and then collectively.

These two kinds of centralisation mutually assist and attract
each other: but they must not be supposed to be inseparable. It
is impossible to imagine a more completely central government
than that which existed in France under Louis XIV.; when the same
individual was the author and the interpreter of the laws, and
being the representative of France at home and abroad, he was
justified in asserting that the state was identified with his
person. Nevertheless, the administration was much less
centralized under Louis XIV., than it is at the present day.

In England the centralisation of the government is carried to
great perfection; the state has the compact vigor of a man, and
by the sole act of its will it puts immense engines in motion,
and wields or collects the efforts of its authority. Indeed, I
cannot conceive that a nation can enjoy a secure or prosperous
existence without a powerful centralisation of government. But I
am of opinion that a central administration enervates the nations
in which it exists by incessantly diminishing their public
spirit. If such an administration succeeds in condensing at a
given moment on a given point all the disposable resources of a
people, it impairs at least the renewal of those resources. It
may ensure a victory in the hour of strife, but it gradually
relaxes the sinews of strength. It may contribute admirably to
the transient greatness of a man, but it cannot ensure the
durable prosperity of a people.

If we pay proper attention, we shall find that whenever it is
said that a state cannot act because it has no central point, it
is the centralisation of the government in which it is deficient.
It is frequently asserted, and we are prepared to assent to the
proposition, that the German empire was never able to bring all
its powers into action. But the reason was, that the state has
never been able to enforce obedience to its general laws, because
the several members of that great body always claimed the right,
or found the means, of refusing their co-operation to the
representatives of the common authority, even in the affairs
which concerned the mass of the people; in other words, because
there was no centralisation of government. The same remark is
applicable to the middle ages; the cause of all the confusion of
feudal society was that the control, not only of local but of
general interests, was divided among a thousand hands, and broken
up in a thousand different ways; the absence of a central
government prevented the nations of Europe from advancing with
energy in any straightforward course.

We have shown that in the United States no central
administration, and no dependent series of public functionaries,
exist. Local authority has been carried to lengths which no
European nation could endure without great inconvenience, and
which have even produced some disadvantageous consequences in
America. But in the United States the centralisation of the
government is complete; and it would be easy to prove that the
national power is more compact than it has ever been in the old
monarchies of Europe. Not only is there but one legislative body
in each state; not only does there exist but one source of
political authority; but numerous district assemblies and county
courts have in general been avoided, lest they should be tempted
to exceed their administrative duties and interfere with the
government. In America the legislature of each state is supreme;
nothing can impede its authority; neither privileges, nor local
immunities, nor personal influence, nor even the empire of
reason, since it represents that majority which claims to be the
sole organ of reason. Its own determination is, therefore, the
only limit to its action. In juxtaposition to it, and under its
immediate control, is the representative of the executive power,
whose duty it is to constrain the refractory to submit by
superior force. The only symptom of weakness lies in certain
details of the action of the government. The American republics
have no standing armies to intimidate a discontented minority;
but as no minority has as yet been reduced to declare open war,
the necessity of an army has not been felt. The state usually
employs the officers of the township or the county, to deal with
the citizens. Thus, for instance, in New England the assessor
fixes the rate of taxes; the collector receives them; the town
treasurer transmits the amount to the public treasury; and the
disputes which may arise are brought before the ordinary courts
of justice. This method of collecting taxes is slow as well as
inconvenient, and it would prove a perpetual hindrance to a
government whose pecuniary demands were large. In general it is
desirable that in what ever materially affects its existence, the
government should be served by officers of its own, appointed by
itself, removable at pleasure, and accustomed to rapid methods of
proceeding. But it will always be easy for the central
government, organized as it is in America, to introduce new and
more efficacious modes of action proportioned to its wants.

The absence of a central government will not, then, as has often
been asserted, prove the destruction of the republics of the New
World; far from supposing that the American governments are not
sufficiently centralized, I shall prove hereafter that they are
too much so. The legislative bodies daily encroach upon the
authority of the government, and their tendency, like that of the
French convention, is to appropriate it entirely to themselves.
Under these circumstances the social power is constantly changing
hands, because it is subordinate to the power of the people,
which is too apt to forget the maxims of wisdom and of foresight
in the consciousness of its strength: hence arises its danger;
and thus its vigor, and not its impotence, will probably be the
cause of its ultimate destruction.

The system of local administration produces several different
effects in America. The Americans seem to me to have outstepped
the limits of sound policy, in isolating the administration of
the government; for order, even in second-rate affairs, is a
matter of national importance.[Footnote:

The authority which represents the state ought not, I think, to
waive the right of inspecting the local administration, even when
it does not interfere more actively. Suppose, for instance, that
an agent of the government was stationed at some appointed spot,
in the county, to prosecute the misdemeanors of the town and
county officers, would not a more uniform order be the result,
without in any way compromising the independence of the township?
Nothing of the kind, however, exists in America; there is nothing
above the county courts, which have, as it were, only an
accidental cognizance of the offences they are meant to repress.

[This note seems to have been written without reference to the
provision existing, it is believed in every state of the Union,
by which a local officer is appointed in each county, to conduct
all public prosecutions at the expense of the state. And in each
county, a grand-jury is assembled three or four times at least in
every year, to which all who are aggrieved have free access, and
where every complaint, particularly those against public
officers, which has the least color of truth, is sure to be heard
and investigated.

Such an agent as the author suggests would soon come to be
considered a public informer, the most odious of all characters
in the United States; and he would lose all efficiency and
strength. With the provision above mentioned, there is little
danger that a citizen, oppressed by a public officer, would find
any difficulty in becoming his own informer, and inducing a rigid
inquiry into the alleged misconduct.--_American Editor_.]

] As the state has no administrative functionaries of its own,
stationed on different parts of its territory, to whom it can
give a common impulse, the consequence is that it rarely attempts
to issue any general police regulations. The want of these
regulations is severely felt, and is frequently observed by
Europeans. The appearance of disorder which prevails on the
surface, leads them at first to imagine that society is in a
state of anarchy; nor do they perceive their mistake till they
have gone deeper into the subject. Certain undertakings are of
importance to the whole state; but they cannot be put in
execution, because there is no national administration to direct
them. Abandoned to the exertions of the towns or counties, under
the care of elected or temporary agents, they lead to no result,
or at least to no durable benefit.

The partisans of centralisation in Europe maintain that the
government directs the affairs of each locality better than the
citizens could do it for themselves: this may be true when the
central power is enlightened, and when the local districts are
ignorant; when it is as alert as they are slow; when it is
accustomed to act, and they to obey. Indeed, it is evident that
this double tendency must augment with the increase of
centralisation, and that the readiness of the one, and the
incapacity of the others, must become more and more prominent.
But I deny that such is the case when the people is as
enlightened, as awake to its interests, and as accustomed to
reflect on them, as the Americans are. I am persuaded, on the
contrary, that in this case the collective strength of the
citizens will always conduce more efficaciously to the public
welfare than the authority of the government. It is difficult to
point out with certainty the means of arousing a sleeping
population, and of giving it passions and knowledge which it does
not possess; it is, I am well aware, an arduous task to persuade
men to busy themselves about their own affairs; and it would
frequently be easier to interest them in the punctilios of court
etiquette than in the repairs of their common dwelling. But
whenever a central administration affects to supersede the
persons most interested, I am inclined to suppose that it is
either misled, or desirous to mislead. However enlightened and
however skilful a central power may be, it cannot of itself
embrace all the details of the existence of a great nation. Such
vigilance exceeds the powers of man. And when it attempts to
create and set in motion so many complicated springs, it must
submit to a very imperfect result, or consume itself in bootless
efforts.

Centralisation succeeds more easily, indeed, in subjecting the
external actions of men to a certain uniformity, which at last
commands our regard, independently of the objects to which it is
applied, like those devotees who worship the statue and forget
the deity it represents. Centralisation imparts without
difficulty an admirable regularity to the routine of business;
rules the details of the social police with sagacity; represses
the smallest disorder and the most petty misdemeanors; maintains
society in a _statu quo_, alike secure from improvement and
decline; and perpetuates a drowsy precision in the conduct of
affairs, which is hailed by the heads of the administration as a
sign of perfect order and public tranquillity;[Footnote:

China appears to me to present the most perfect instance of that
species of well-being which a completely central administration
may furnish to the nations among which it exists. Travellers
assure us that the Chinese have peace without happiness, industry
without improvement, stability without strength, and public order
without public morality. The condition of society is always
tolerable, never excellent. I am convinced that, when China is
opened to European observation, it will be found to contain the
most perfect model of a central administration which exists in
the universe.

] in short, it excels more in prevention than in action. Its
force deserts it when society is to be disturbed or accelerated
in its course; and if once the co-operation of private citizens
is necessary to the furtherance of its measures, the secret of
its impotence is disclosed. Even while it invokes their
assistance, it is on the condition that they shall act exactly as
much as the government chooses, and exactly in the manner it
appoints. They are to take charge of the details, without
aspiring to guide the system; they are to work in a dark and
subordinate sphere, and only to judge the acts in which they have
themselves co-operated, by their results. These, however, are
not conditions on which the alliance of the human will is to be
obtained; its carriage must be free, and its actions responsible,
or (such is the constitution of man) the citizen had rather
remain a passive spectator than a dependent actor in schemes with
which he is unacquainted.

It is undeniable, that the want of those uniform regulations
which control the conduct of every inhabitant of France is not
unfrequently felt in the United States. Gross instances of
social indifference and neglect are to be met with; and from time
to time disgraceful blemishes are seen, in complete contrast with
the surrounding civilisation. Useful undertakings, which cannot
succeed without perpetual attention and rigorous exactitude, are
very frequently abandoned in the end; for in America, as well as
in other countries, the people is subject to sudden impulses and
momentary exertions. The European who is accustomed to find a
functionary always at hand to interfere with all he undertakes,
has some difficulty in accustoming himself to the complex
mechanism of the administration of the townships. In general it
may be affirmed that the lesser details of the police, which
render life easy and comfortable, are neglected in America; but
that the essential guarantees of man in society are as strong
there as elsewhere. In America the power which conducts the
government is far less regular, less enlightened, and less
learned, but a hundredfold more authoritative, than in Europe.
In no country in the world do the citizens make such exertions
for the common weal; and I am acquainted with no people which has
established schools as numerous and as efficacious, places of
public worship better suited to the wants of the inhabitants, or
roads kept in better repair. Uniformity or permanence of design,
the minute arrangement of details,[Footnote:

A writer of talent, who, in the comparison which he has drawn
between the finances of France and those of the United States,
has proved that ingenuity cannot always supply the place of a
knowledge of facts, very justly reproaches the Americans for the
sort of confusion which exists in the accounts of the expenditure
in the townships; and after giving the model of a departmental
budget in France, he adds: "We are indebted to centralisation,
that admirable invention of a great man, for the uniform order
and method which prevail alike in all the municipal budgets, from
the largest town to the humblest commune." Whatever may be my
admiration of this result, when I see the communes of France,
with their excellent system of accounts, plunged in the grossest
ignorance of their true interests, and abandoned to so
incorrigible an apathy that they seem to vegetate rather than to
live; when, on the other hand, I observe the activity, the
information, and the spirit of enterprise which keeps society in
perpetual labor, in those American townships whose budgets are
drawn up with small method and with still less uniformity, I am
struck by the spectacle; for to my mind the end of a good
government is to ensure the welfare of a people, and not to
establish order and regularity in the midst of its misery and its
distress. I am therefore led to suppose that the prosperity of
the American townships and the apparent confusion of their
accounts, the distress of the French communes and the perfection
of their budget, may be attributable to the same cause. At any
rate I am suspicious of a benefit which is united to so many
evils, and I am not averse to an evil which is compensated by so
many benefits.

] and the perfection of an ingenious administration, must not be
sought for in the United States; but it will be easy to find, on
the other hand, the symptoms of a power, which, if it is somewhat
barbarous, is at least robust; and of an existence, which is
checkered with accidents indeed, but cheered at the same time by
animation and effort.