Formation of the Union

A >> Albert Bushnell Hart >> Formation of the Union

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The day after he reached Paris, Livingston, the resident minister, had
closed a treaty for the cession, not of West Florida, but of all
Louisiana. The inner history of this remarkable negotiation has been
brought to light by Henry Adams in his History of the Administration of
Jefferson. The check in San Domingo had dampened the colonial ardor of
Napoleon; war was about to break out again with England; Napoleon's
ambition turned toward an European empire; and he lightly offered the
province which had come to him so cheaply. Neither Livingston, Monroe, nor
Jefferson had thought it possible to acquire New Orleans; with 880,000
square miles of other territory it was tossed into the lap of the United
States as the Sultan throws a purse of gold to a favorite.

[Sidenote: Indefinite boundaries.]

The treaty, dated April 30, 1803, gave to the United States Louisiana,
"with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it
had when France possessed it." The two phrases, instead of explaining each
other, were contradictory: Louisiana as it was when France possessed it
had included settlements as far east as the Perdido River; Louisiana in
the hands of Spain had extended only to the Iberville. The United States
had therefore annexed a province without knowing its boundaries. We are
now aware that Napoleon had issued orders to occupy the country on the
north only as far as the Iberville, but on the south as far as the Rio
Grande; at the time France refused to give any information on either
point. Hence the United States gave up the claim to Texas, in which there
was reason, and insisted on the title to West Florida, which was nowhere
to be found in the treaty.

100. FEDERAL SCHEMES OF DISUNION (1803-1809).

[Sidenote: Anger of the Federalists.]
[Sidenote: Arguments for annexation.]

The annexation of Louisiana aroused a storm in both hemispheres. The
Spanish government vehemently protested, the more because the promised
kingdom of Etruria proved to be but a mock principality. In the United
States the Federalists attacked both the annexation and the method of
annexation with equal violence. The treaty promised that the people should
as soon as possible be admitted as a State into the Union; the balance of
power in the government was thus disturbed, and the Federalists foresaw
that the influence of New England must diminish. Their constitutional
arguments were just such as had been heard from the Republican writers and
legislatures in 1798: the constitution, they said, nowhere gives express
power to annex territory, and therefore there is no such power; the Union
is a partnership, and new members cannot be admitted except by unanimous
consent. The Republicans furnished themselves with arguments drawn from
the Federal arsenal: the right to annex territory, they said could be
implied from the power to make treaties, from the power to regulate
territory, and from the "necessary and proper" clause. Jefferson was not
so ready to give up his cherished principles, and proposed a
constitutional amendment to approve and confirm the cession. His party
friends scouted the idea. The treaty was duly ratified, fifteen millions
were appropriated for the purchase, and on Dec. 20, 1803, possession of
the territory was given,

[Sidenote: Intrigues with Burr.]

The cup of the Federalists was now full, and a few violent spirits, of
whom Timothy Pickering was the leader, suggested that the time had come to
withdraw from the Union. They found no hearing among the party at large.
In 1804, therefore, they tried to form a combination with a wing of the
New York Republicans controlled by Burr, who had been read out of his
party by the Jeffersonian wing. He came forward as an independent
candidate for Governor, and asked for the support of the New York
Federalists. Hamilton stood out against this movement, and wrote a letter
urging his friends not to vote for him. Burr received the Federalist vote,
but was defeated, and in his humiliation sent Hamilton a challenge, and
killed him in the duel. The affair still further weakened the Federalists;
in the national election of 1804 they cast but fourteen votes,--those of
Connecticut, Delaware, and Maryland. Even Massachusetts voted for
Jefferson.

[Sidenote: The Federalists weakened.]

Commerce was still increasing; the Union was growing in extent and
importance; neither the interests nor the principles of the people had
suffered. The Federalist predictions of danger from Jefferson had not been
fulfilled. There were still a few leaders who brooded over a plan of
separation; but the strength of the Federalists was now so broken that in
1807 John Quincy Adams, son of the ex-President, and senator from
Massachusetts, went over to the Republican party.

101. THE BURR CONSPIRACY (1806-1807).

[Sidenote: Burr's schemes.]

The election of 1804 was the last attempt of Aaron Burr to re-enter public
life. His private character, already sufficiently notorious, had been
destroyed by the murder of Hamilton, and he was a desperate man. In 1805
Burr went West, and was well received by many prominent men, including
General Wilkinson, the senior officer of the United States army, and
Andrew Jackson, then a lawyer in Nashville, Tennessee. His purposes were
vague: he planned the establishment of a colony on the new Western lands;
he had relations with certain Spanish adventurers who wished the
independence of Mexico; he hinted at securing the secession of the Western
States, with the aid of the British government. His chief purpose seems to
have been to head a revolution in the newly acquired Louisiana.

[Sidenote: Burr's expedition.]

To the rumors that Burr had some desperate and treasonable intention
Jefferson paid no attention. In December, 1806, Burr mustered a party of
men at Blennerhasset's Island, in the Ohio River, and with them floated
down the river. Twice attempts were made by local authorities to stop him
and prosecute him, but he was allowed to continue, with about a hundred
men, till in January, 1807, while on the lower Mississippi, he learned
from a newspaper that the President had issued a proclamation directing
his capture. He abandoned his men, and shortly afterwards fell into the
hands of the authorities, and was sent to Washington for trial.

[Sidenote: Wilkinson's treachery.]
[Sidenote: Burr's Trial.]

Meanwhile steps had been taken to prevent the expected rising in
Louisiana. Wilkinson was then on the extreme western frontier. He received
a cipher message from Burr, and after waiting for some hours to make up
his mind, concluded to betray him, sent the letters to the government,
went to New Orleans, and there arrested several of Burr's adherents, by
military authority. The danger to the Union had been slight, the laxity on
Jefferson's part unpardonable. Having Burr in his power, he now
relentlessly pursued him with a prosecution for treason. The trial was
held in Richmond, Chief Justice Marshall presiding, and ended on Sept. 1,
1807. The indictment had set forth the mustering of the men at
Blennerhasset's Island: since the only acts which could be called
treasonable had occurred elsewhere, the court declared the evidence
insufficient, and there was nothing for the jury to do but to bring him in
not guilty. The President had shown that he could use force, if necessary;
and the courts had again shown their independence of the President. Burr
disappeared from public notice.

102. AGGRESSIONS ON NEUTRAL TRADE (1803-1807).

[Sidenote: American trade.]
[Sidenote: Admiralty decisions.]

The renewal of the war between England and France in May, 1803, at first
was advantageous to the United States; it precipitated the cession of
Louisiana and it gave new employment for American shipping. French West
Indian products were freely imported, re-shipped, and exported, thus
avoiding the rule of 1756 (sec. 85); as a result, the customs revenue leaped
in one year from fourteen to twenty millions. In 1805 these favorable
conditions were reversed. In May the British admiralty courts decided that
goods which had started from French colonies could be captured, even
though they had been landed and re-shipped in the United States. Captures
at once began; English frigates were stationed outside the port of New
York, and vessels coming in and going out were insolently stopped and
searched; impressments were revived. In 1804 thirty-nine vessels had been
captured by the British; in 1805 one hundred and sixteen were taken; and
probably a thousand American seamen were impressed.

[Sidenote: Continental System.]

On Oct. 21, 1805, the combined French and Spanish fleets were overwhelmed
at Trafalgar. Thenceforward England had the mastery of the seas, while
France remained supreme on land. Napoleon, who had in 1804 taken the title
of Emperor, was determined to destroy English trade with the Continent,
and had no scruples against ruining neutrals in the attempt. He resolved
upon a "Continental System,"--to shut against the importation of English
goods the ports of France and her dependencies and allies, including, as
the result of recent conquests, almost the whole northern coast of the
Mediterranean, and a considerable part of the coast of the German Ocean
and the Baltic Sea.

[Sidenote: Orders and decrees.]

The English retaliated with an Order in Council, dated May 16, 1806, by
which the whole coast from Brest to the river Elbe was declared blockaded.
There was no blockading squadron; yet American vessels were captured as
they left their own ports bound for places within the specified limit.
Napoleon retorted with the Berlin Decree of Nov. 21, 1806, in which he
declared the whole British Islands in a state of blockade; the trade in
English merchandise was forbidden, and no vessel that had touched at a
British port could enter a French port. These measures were plainly
intended to cut off the commerce of neutrals; and as the European wars had
now swept in almost every seafaring power, on one side or the other, the
Americans were the great neutral carriers. In January, 1807, Great Britain
announced that neutral vessels trading from one port under French
influence to another were subject to capture, and that all French ports
were blockaded. The Milan Decree of December, 1807, completed the
structure of injustice by ordering the capture of all neutral vessels
which had been searched by an English vessel. In 1806 the Jay Treaty
expired, and the Americans lost its slight protection. The effect of this
warfare of proclamations was at once seen in the great increase of
captures: one hundred and ninety-four American vessels were taken by
England in 1807, and a large number by the French.

103. POLICY OF NON-RESISTANCE (1805-1807).

[Sidenote: Prosperity of American trade.]

The wholesale seizure of American property was exasperating to the last
degree. The disdainful impressment of American seamen, and still more the
unofficial blockade of the ports, would have justified war. Yet
notwithstanding the loss of American shipping, trade continued to prosper,
and vessels engaged in foreign commerce increased; freights were so high
that an annual loss by capture of ten per cent could be made up out of the
profits. The New Englanders, therefore, who suffered most were not most
anxious for war, nor could Jefferson bear to give up his policy of debt-
reduction and of peaceful trade. Toward France, indeed, he showed
remarkable tenderness, because that power controlled Spain, from which
Jefferson was eagerly seeking the cession of West Florida.

[Sidenote: Gunboat system.]

Some American policy must be formulated. War seemed to Jefferson
unnecessary, and he therefore attempted three other remedies, which in a
measure neutralized each other. The first was to provide some kind of
defence. To build new vessels seemed to him an invitation to the English
navy to swoop down and destroy them. To fortify the coasts and harbors
properly would cost fifty millions of dollars. He proposed, therefore, to
lay up the navy and to build a fleet of gunboats, to be hauled up under
sheds in time of peace, but if war came, to be manned by a naval militia
and to repel the enemy. Between 1806 and 1812 one hundred and seventy-six
gunboats were built. They never rendered any considerable service, and
took $1,700,000 out of Gallatin's surplus.

[Sidenote: Pinkney treaty.]

The second part of Jefferson's policy was to negotiate with England for a
new treaty. The conditions upon which he insisted were impossible, and
Pinkney and Monroe, therefore, in December, 1806, made the best terms they
could: there was no article against impressment; they surrendered the
principle that free ships make free goods; they practically accepted the
rule of 1756. The treaty was so unacceptable that Jefferson never
submitted it to the Senate; and thenceforward to the War of 1812 we had
only such commercial privileges as England chose to grant.

[Sidenote: Non-importation act.]

The only remaining arrow in Jefferson's quiver was the policy of
commercial restriction. On April 18, 1806, an act was Passed by which,
after November 15, the importation of manufactured goods from England and
English colonies was forbidden. Even this was suspended on December 29.

[Sidenote: "Leopard" and "Chesapeake."]
[Sidenote: The Americans aroused.]

The effect of these feeble efforts to secure fair treatment was seen on
June 27, 1807. The only excuse for the impressment of American seamen was
that sailors from the British men-of-war were apt to desert when they
reached an American port, and frequently shipped on board American
vessels. The chief reason was the severity of naval discipline and the low
wages paid by the British government. The American frigate "Chesapeake,"
about leaving Norfolk for a Mediterranean cruise, had several such
deserters on board without the commander's knowledge. When outside the
capes the British frigate "Leopard" suddenly bore down on her, hailed her,
and her captain announced that he was about to search the ship for these
deserters. Commander Barron was taken by surprise; his guns were not ready
for action, his crew was not yet trained. He refused to permit the search,
was fired upon, and was obliged to surrender. Four men were taken off, of
whom three were American citizens, and the "Chesapeake" carried back the
news of this humiliation. The spirit of the nation was aflame. Had
Jefferson chosen, he might have gone to war upon this issue, and would
have had the country behind him. The extreme point which he reached was a
proclamation warning British armed vessels out of American waters; he
preferred a milder sort of warfare.

104. THE EMBARGO (1807-1808).

[Sidenote: Jefferson's recommendations.]

The Non-importation Act, which up to this time had had no force, finally
went into effect Dec. 14, 1807. Two days later news was received that the
king had ordered British naval officers to exercise their assumed right of
impressment. Forthwith Jefferson sent a message to Congress, hinting that
England was about to prohibit American commerce altogether, and
recommending an embargo so as to prevent the loss of our ships and seamen.
The Senate hurried a bill through all its stages in a single day; and the
House, by nearly two to one, accepted it. No foreign merchant vessel could
leave an American port, except in ballast, or with a cargo then on board;
no American merchantman could leave for a foreign port on any terms.

[Sidenote: The embargo evaded.]

The embargo was not really intended to save American shipping, for the
owners were willing to run their own risks. The restriction was so new, so
sweeping so little in accordance with the habits of the people, and so
destructive to the great interests of commerce that it was systematically
evaded. Vessels left port on a coasting voyage, and slipped into a West
Indian port, and perhaps returned with a West Indian cargo. Severe
supplementary acts were therefore necessary. A great trade sprang up
across the border into Canada, followed by new restrictions, with severe
penalties and powers of search hitherto unknown in the law of the United
States. On Lake Champlain, on June 13, 1808, a band of sixty armed men
fired upon United States troops, and carried a raft in triumph over the
border. A prosecution for treason against one of the men involved was a
failure.

[Sidenote: No settlement with England.]

The expectation was that the President, backed up by the embargo, would
now succeed in a negotiation with England, that atonement would be made
for the "Chesapeake" outrage, and that a commercial treaty would at last
be gained. Mr. George Rose came over as British minister in December,
1807; but he took the unfortunate attitude that the American government
owed England an apology for action growing out of the "Chesapeake"
outrage, and he returned in March without accomplishing anything: the two
countries remained in an attitude of hostility throughout the year.

105. REPEAL OF THE EMBARGO (1809).

[Sidenote: Effect on England.]

When Congress assembled in December, 1808, the effect of the embargo was
manifest. English merchants engaged in the American trade protested, and
asked the British government to withdraw its Orders in Council. Lord
Castlereagh declared that the embargo was "operating at present more
forcibly in our favor than any measure of hostility we could call forth,
without war actually declared;" English trade to the amount of $25,000,000
was, indeed, cut off; but notwithstanding this loss, the total exports of
England increased. "The embargo," says Henry Adams, "served only to lower
the wages and the moral standard of the laboring classes throughout the
British empire, and to prove their helplessness."

[Sidenote: Effect on France.]

The reception of the embargo by France was even more humiliating. On April
17, 1808, Napoleon issued a decree at Bayonne directing that all American
vessels which might enter the ports of France, Italy, and the Hanse towns
should be seized, "because no vessels of the United States can now
navigate the seas without infracting the law of the said States." "The
Emperor applauds the embargo," said the French foreign minister.

[Sidenote: Effect on the United States.]

In America the embargo, which was intended to cut off the profits of
foreign merchants and the provisions needed in foreign countries, had
crippled the shipping interests, had destroyed the export trade, and had
almost ruined the farmers. Exports dropped in one year from one hundred
and ten millions to twenty-two millions; import duties were kept up during
1808 by returning vessels, but in 1809 sank from sixteen millions to seven
millions; shipbuilding fell off by two-thirds; shipping in foreign trade
lost 100,000 tons; wheat fell from two dollars to seventy-five cents a
bushel. The South, from which the majority in favor of the embargo had
been drawn, suffered most of all: tobacco could not be sold, and Virginia
was almost bankrupt.

[Sidenote: The embargo a failure.]
[Sidenote: The embargo repealed.]

The money loss did not measure the injury to the country. New England
ingenuity was devoted to new methods of avoiding the law of the land, and
a passionate feeling of sectional injury sprang up. In the election of
1808 the Federalists carried all New England except Vermont, and had a few
Southern votes; and the Republican majority in Congress was much cut down.
The embargo had plainly failed, and the only alternative seemed to be war.
Even Jefferson was obliged to admit that the embargo must end a few months
later; "But I have thought it right," he wrote, "to take no part myself in
proposing measures, the execution of which will devolve on my successor."
It became known that Madison, the President-elect, favored the repeal of
the embargo in June, and that Jefferson was only anxious that it should
last out his administration. The discontent of New England was so manifest
that a South Carolina member said: "You have driven us from the embargo.
The excitement in the East renders it necessary that we should enforce the
embargo with the bayonet, or repeal it. I will repeal it,--and I could
weep over it more than over a lost child." On Feb. 2, 1809, the House, by
a vote of 70 to 40, decided upon immediate repeal. The only question now
was what policy should be substituted. On February 28 an agreement was
reached: the embargo was replaced by a non-intercourse law which forbade
British or French vessels to enter American ports; but there was no threat
against the captors of American vessels.

[Sidenote: Jefferson humiliated.]

Throughout his whole administration Jefferson had never before been
confronted with an offensive bill. He had been practically the leader in
both houses of Congress, and until this moment his followers had never
deserted him. He could not end his administration with a veto, and he
signed the act, although it was a tacit condemnation of his whole policy
with reference to neutral trade. The defence of the embargo was that it
prevented war: but it had inflicted on the country the material losses and
excited the factional spirit which would have resulted from war; and the
danger of war was greater at the end than at the beginning of the
experiment.

CHAPTER X.

THE UNION IN DANGER (1809-1815).

106. REFERENCES.

BIBLIOGRAPHIES.--W. E. Foster, _References to Presidential
Administrations_, 12-15; J. Winsor, _Narrative and Critical History_, VII.
320-323, 341-343, 420-437, 457-460, 522-524; Channing and Hart, _Guide_,
secs. 170-173.

HISTORICAL MAPS.--Nos. 1 and 4, this volume (_Epoch Maps_, Nos. 7 and
9); T. MacCoun, _Historical Geography_; Henry Adams, _United States_, VI,
VII., VIII., _passim_; Anderson, _Canada_ (1814); Arrowsmith, _Map of the
United States_ (1813); Scribner, _Statistical Atlas_, Plate 14; school
histories of Channing, Johnston, Scudder, and Thomas.

GENERAL ACCOUNTS--R. Hildreth, _United States_, VI. 149-674; H. Von
Hoist, _Constitutional History_, I 226-272; J. Schouler, _United States_,
II. 194-444; J. B. McMaster, _United States_, III. 339-560 (to 1812), IV.;
Bryant and Gay, _Popular History_, IV. 185-244; Geo. Tucker, _United
States_, II. 349-515, III. 21-145; Bradford, _Constitutional History_, I.
330-410.

SPECIAL HISTORIES.--Henry Adams, _History of the United States_, V.-
IX.; C. Schurz, _Henry Clay_, I. 38-137; S. H. Gay, _James Madison_, 283-
337; C. J. Ingersoll, _Historical Sketch of the Second War_; T. Roosevelt,
_Naval War of 1812_; J. Armstrong, _Notices of the War of 1812_; B. J.
Lossing, _Pictorial Field-book of the War of 1812_; H. M Brackenridge,
_History of the Late War_; William Jones, _Military Occurrences_ and
_Naval Occurrences_; E. S. Maclay, _United States Navy_.

CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS--J. Q. Adams, _Memoirs_, II, III. (ch. ix); S.
G Goodrich, _Recollections_, I. 435-514, II. 9-60; Dolly Madison,
_Memoirs and Letters_; John Randolph, _Letters to a Young Relative_; S.
Leech, _Thirty Years from Home_ (by a seaman of the Macedonian); W.
Cobbett, _Pride of Britannia Humbled_(1815); Coggeshall, _History of the
American Privateers_; William Sullivan, _Familiar Letters on Public
Characters_, 290-355; Timothy Dwight, _History of the Hartford
Convention_. Works of Jefferson, Madison, Gallatin, Dallas, Clay.--
Reprints in M. Carey, _Olive Branch_; A. Johnston, _American Orations_, I,
_American History told by Contemporaries_, III.

107. NON-INTERCOURSE LAWS (1809, 1810).

[Sidenote: Madison's administration.]

James Madison, who became President March 4, 1809, felt that his
administration was to be a continuation of that of Jefferson; and he took
over three members of Jefferson's cabinet, including Gallatin. The
Secretary of State, Robert Smith, was incapable, and Madison was
practically his own foreign minister.

[Sidenote: The situation abroad.]

The condition of European affairs was, on the whole, favorable to America.
In 1807 Russia had formed an alliance with France and had accepted the
Continental System, thus cutting off American trade; but in 1808 the
French lost ground in Spain, and the Spanish and Portuguese ports were
thus opened to American commerce. Nevertheless a hundred and eight
merchantmen were captured by England in 1808.

[Sidenote: Non-intercourse Act.]
[Sidenote: Favorable trade.]

To defend American commerce and the national honor, the administration
possessed but three weapons,--war, retaliatory legislation, and diplomacy.
War meant both danger and sacrifice; there was already a deficit in the
Treasury. Congress, therefore, continued to legislate, while at the same
time attempts were made to negotiate with both France and England. The
Non-intercourse Act continued in force throughout 1809, and hardly impeded
American commerce; trade with England and France went on through a few
intermediary ports such as Lisbon and Riga, and there was a brisk direct
trade under special license of one or the other of the powers. The
shipping engaged in foreign trade now reached a higher point than ever
before. The profits of American vessels were so great that forged American
papers were openly sold in England. The defection of New England was
stayed, and the President was supported by a fair majority in both Houses.
It remained to be seen whether non-intercourse would have any effect in
securing a withdrawal of the offensive orders and decrees.

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