John Hicklin - "The Ladies of Llangollen"

John Burroughs - "Birds and Poets"

Georges Jacques Danton - "Discours civiques de Danton"

E. Phillips Oppenheim - "An Amiable Charlatan"

Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Chancellorsville and Gettysburg

A >> Abner Doubleday >> Chancellorsville and Gettysburg




Part of his cavalry also attacked the 5th and 6th Michigan regiments
at Littlestown, but were repulsed. He then, having no time to
spare, kept on his way toward York to find the army he had lost.
He passed within seven miles of Ewell's column on its way to
Gettysburg, and neither knew that the other was near. Had they
effected a junction it would have saved the rebel cavalry a long,
fruitless, and exhausting march, which kept them out of the battle
on the first day. It was one of those accidental circumstances
which seemed to favor us in this campaign, while almost every
incident at Chancellorsville was against us.

Finding Ewell had left York, Stuart turned and marched on Carlisle,
which he found occupied by our troops. He demanded the surrender
of the place under a threat of bombardment. General W. F. Smith,
one of the heroes of the Peninsula, was not to be affected by
menaces; and Stuart, whose time was precious and who had no ammunition
to spare, turned off in hopes of reaching Gettysburg in time to
take part in the battle. He arrived there on the afternoon of the
2d, with horses and men worn out by their extraordinary exertions;
on their way whole regiments slept in the saddle. This force when
it reached the field found Robertson's, Jones', and Jenkins'
brigades, and White's battalion ready to join it.

By evening Meade was fully apprised, by telegrams and Buford's
scouts, that the enemy were concentrating on Gettysburg. He knew
that Reynolds at Marsh Creek was only about six miles from Hill at
Cashtown, but he sent no orders that night. He simply stated that
the enemy were marching on Gettysburg, and he would issue orders
when they developed their intentions. Thus the opposing forces
were moving in directions that would necessarily bring them in
contact, and a fight or retreat was inevitable.

Reynolds had the true spirit of a soldier. He was a Pennsylvanian,
and, inflamed at seeing the devastation of his native State, was
most desirous of getting at the enemy as soon as possible. I speak
from my own knowledge, for I was his second in command, and he told
me at Poolesville soon after crossing the river, that it was
necessary to attack the enemy at once, to prevent his plundering
the whole State. As he had great confidence in his men, it was
not difficult to divine what his decision would be. He determined
to advance and hold Gettysburg. He directed the Eleventh Corps to
come up as a support to the First, and he recommended, but did not
order, the Third Corps to do the same.

Buford, with two of his cavalry brigades, reached the place that
night, but not without considerable difficulty. He left Fountaindale
Gap early in the morning and attempted to move directly to his
destination, but he came upon Pettigrew's brigade of Hill's corps,
and was obliged to fall back to the mountains again. Later in the
day he succeeded, by going around by way of Emmetsburg. Before
evening set in, he had thrown out his pickets almost to Cashtown
and Hunterstown, posting Gamble's brigade across the Chambersburg
pike, and Devin's brigade across the Mummasburg road, his main body
being about a mile west of the town.

While these great movements were going on, some minor affairs showed
great gallantry on the part of partisan officers. Captain Ulric
Dahlgren made a raid upon the rebel communications, capturing some
guns and prisoners, and gaining very important information which
will be referred to hereafter.

The two armies now about to contest on the perilous ridges of
Gettysburg the possession of the Northern States, and the ultimate
triumph of freedom or slavery, were in numbers as follows, according
to the estimate made by the Count of Paris, who is an impartial
observer, and who has made a close study of the question:

_The Army of the Potomac under General Meade_, 82,00 men and 300
guns.

_The Army of Northern Virginia under General Lee_, 73,500 men and
190 guns.

Stuart had 11,100 cavalry and 16 guns.

Pleasonton had about the same number of cavalry, and 27 guns.



CHAPTER IV.
THE FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, WEDNESDAY, JULY 1, 1863.

On the morning of the 1st of July, General Buford, as stated, held
the ridges to the west of Gettysburg, with his cavalry division,
composed of Gamble's and Devin's brigades. His vedettes were thrown
far out toward the enemy to give timely notice of any movement for
he was determined to prevent the rebels from entering the town if
possible, and knew the First Corps would soon be up to support him.
The enemy were not aware that there was any considerable force in
the vicinity, and in the morning sent forward Heth's division of
Hill's corps to occupy the place, anticipating no difficulty in
doing so. Buford in the meantime had dismounted a large part of
his force, had strengthened his line of skirmishers, and planted
his batteries at the most commanding points.

General Reynolds, in consequence of the duties devolving upon him
as commander of the Left Wing of the army, that is of the First,
Third, and Eleventh Corps, had turned over the command of the First
Corps to me. He now made immediate dispositions to go forward to
assist Buford.

As my corps was largely engaged in the first day's operations, I
must be excused for having a good deal to say in the first person
in relation to them. Reynolds sent for me about six o'clock in
the morning, read to me the various despatches he had received from
Meade and Buford, and told me he should go forward at once with
the nearest division--that of Wadsworth--to aid the cavalry. He
then instructed me to draw in my pickets, assemble the artillery
and the remainder of the corps, and join him as soon as possible.
Having given these orders, he rode off at the head of the column,
and I never saw him again.

The position of the two armies on the morning of the 1st of July,
was as follows: The First Corps at Marsh Creek; the Second and
Third Corps at Taneytown; the latter being under orders to march
to Emmetsburg, to relieve the Eleventh Corps, which was directed
to join the First Corps at Gettysburg; the Twelfth Corps was at
Two Taverns; the Fifth Corps at Hanover, and the Sixth Corps about
thirty-five miles off to the right at Manchester. Kilpatrick's
and Gregg's divisions of cavalry were also at Hanover. The
Confederate army was advancing on Gettysburg from the west and
north. The concentration of their troops and the dispersion of
ours are indicated on the map.

It must be remembered that the enemy had but _three_ corps, while
the Union army had _seven_. Each of their corps represented a
_third_, and each of ours a _seventh_, of our total force. The
same ratio extended to divisions and brigades.

Heth's division, which started early in the morning to occupy the
town, soon found itself confronted by Buford's skirmishers, and
formed line of battle with Archer's and Davis' brigades in front,
followed by those of Pettigrew and Brockenborough. At 9 A.M. the
first gun was heard. Buford had three cannon-shots fired as a
signal for his skirmish line to open on the enemy, and the battle
of Gettysburg began.*

[* Lt.-Col. Kress, of General Wadsworth's staff, entered Gettysburg
about this time and found General Buford surrounded by his staff
in front of the tavern there. Buford turned to him and said, "What
are you doing here, sir?" Kress replied that he came on to get
some shoes for Wadsworth's division. Buford told him that he had
better return immediately to his command. Kress said, "Why, what
is the matter, general?" At that moment the far off sound of a
single gun was heard, and Buford replied, as he mounted his horse
and galloped off, _"That's the matter."_]

As the rebels had had several encounters with militia, who were
easily dispersed, they did not expect to meet any serious resistance
at this time, and advanced confidently and carelessly. Buford gave
way slowly, taking advantage of every accident of ground to protract
the struggle. After an hour's fighting he felt anxious, and went
up into the steeple of the Theological Seminary from which a wide
view could be obtained, to see if the First Corps was in sight.
One division of it was close at hand, and soon Reynolds, who had
preceded it, climbed up into the belfry to confer with him there,
and examine the country around. Although there is no positive
testimony to that effect, his attention was doubtless attracted to
Cemetery Ridge in his rear, as it was one of the most prominent
features of the landscape. An aide of General Howard--presumably
Major Hall--soon after Reynolds descended from the belfry, came up
to ask if he had any instructions with regard to the Eleventh Corps.
Reynolds, in reply, directed that General Howard bring his corps
forward at once and _form them on Cemetery Hill_ as a reserve.
General Howard has no recollection of having received any such
orders, but as he did get orders to come forward, and as his corps
was to occupy _some place_ in rear, as a support to the First Corps,
nothing is more probable than that General Reynolds directed him
to go there; for its military advantages were obvious enough to
any experienced commander. Lieutenant Rosengarten, of General
Reynolds' staff, states positively that he was present and heard
the order given for Howard to post his troops on Cemetery Ridge.
The matter is of some moment, as the position in question ultimately
gave us the victory, and Howard received the thanks of Congress
for selecting it. It is not to be supposed that either Howard or
Rosengarten would mistake the matter. It is quite probable that
Reynolds chose the hill simply as a position upon which his force
could rally if driven back, and Howard selected it as a suitable
battle-field for the army. It has since been universally conceded
that it was admirably adapted for that purpose.

It will be seen from the above map, that there are two roads coming
to Gettysburg from the west, making a considerable angle with each
other. Each is intersected by ridges running north and south. On
that nearest to the town, and about three-fourths of a mile from
the central square, there is a large brick building, which was used
as a Lutheran Theological Seminary. A small stream of water called
Willoughby's Run winds between the next two ridges. The battle on
the first day was principally fought on the heights on each side
of this stream.

Buford being aware that Ewell's corps would soon be on its way from
Heidlersburg to the field of battle, was obliged to form line facing
north with Devin's brigade, and leave Gamble's brigade to keep back
the overpowering weight of Hill's corps advancing from the west.

While this fighting was going on, and Reynolds and Wadsworth were
pressing to the front, I was engaged in withdrawing the pickets
and assembling the other two divisions, together with the corps
artillery. As soon as I saw that my orders were in process of
execution, I galloped to the front, leaving the troops to follow,
and caught up with Meredith's brigade of Wadsworth's division,
commonly called "The Iron Brigade," just as it was going into
action.

In the meantime the enemy approaching from the west were pressing
with great force against Buford's slender skirmish line, and Reynolds
went forward with Cutler's brigade to sustain it. He skilfully
posted Hall's 2d Maine battery in the road, and threw forward two
regiments, the 14th Brooklyn and the 95th New York, a short distance
in advance on the left. At the same time he directed General
Wadsworth to place the remaining three regiments of the brigade,
the 147th New York, the 76th New York, and the 56th Pennsylvania,
on the right of the road. When this formation was completed the
cavalry brigade under Gamble, which had been fighting there, withdrew
and formed in column on the left of the infantry; but the other
cavalry brigade, under Devin, which was not facing in that direction,
still held the position, awaiting the advance of Ewell's corps from
the north.

As Davis' rebel brigade of Heth's division fronting Wadsworth were
hidden behind an intervening ridge, Wadsworth did not see them at
first, but formed his three regiments perpendicularly to the road,
without a reconnoissance. The result was that Davis came over the
hill almost directly on the right flank of this line, which being
unable to defend itself was forced back and directed by Wadsworth
to take post in a piece of woods in rear on Seminary Ridge. The
two regiments on the right accordingly withdrew, but the 147th New
York, which was next to the road, did not receive the order, as
their Colonel was shot down before he could deliver it. They were
at once surrounded and very much cut up before they could be rescued
from their perilous position.

The two regiments on the right, which were forced back, were
veterans, conspicuous for gallantry in every battle in which the
Army of the Potomac had been engaged since the Peninsula campaign.
As Wadsworth withdrew them without notifying Hall's battery in the
road, or the two regiments posted by Reynolds on the left, both
became exposed to a disastrous flank attack on the right. Hall
finding a cloud of skirmishers launched against his battery which
was now without support, was compelled to retreat. The horses of
the lost gun were all shot or bayonetted. The non-military reader
will see that while a battery can keep back masses of men it cannot
contend with a line of skirmishers. To resist them would be very
much like fighting mosquitoes with musket-balls. The two regiments
posted by Reynolds, the 14th Brooklyn and 95th New York, finding
their support gone on the right, while Archer's rebel brigade was
advancing to envelop their left, fell back leisurely under Colonel
Fowler of the 14th Brooklyn, who assumed command of both as the
ranking officer present.

I reached the field just as the attack on Cutler's brigade was
going on, and at once sent my adjutant-general, Major Halstead,
and young Meredith L. Jones, who was acting as aide on my staff,
to General Reynolds to ask instructions. Under the impression that
the enemy's columns were approaching on both roads, Reynolds said,
"Tell Doubleday I will hold on to this road," referring to the
Chambersburg road, "and he must hold on to that one;" meaning the
road to Fairfield or Hagerstown. At the same time he sent Jones
back at full speed to bring up a battery.

The rebels, however, did not advance on the Fairfield road until
late in the afternoon. They must have been in force upon it some
miles back, for the cavalry so reported, and this caused me during
the entire day to give more attention than was necessary to my
left, as I feared the enemy might separate my corps from the Third
and Eleventh Corps at Emmetsburg. Such a movement would be equivalent
to interposing between the First Corps and the main army.

There was a piece of woods between the two roads, with open ground
on each side. It seemed to me this was the key of the position,
for if this woods was strongly held, the enemy could not pass on
either road without being taken in flank by the infantry, and in
front by the cavalry. I therefore urged the men as they filed past
me to hold it at all hazards. Full of enthusiasm and the memory
of their past achievements they said to me proudly, _"If we can't
hold it, where will you find men who can?"_

As they went forward under command of Colonel Morrow* of the 24th
Michigan Volunteers, a brave and capable soldier, who, when a mere
youth, was engaged in the Mexican War, I rode over to the left to
see if the enemy's line extended beyond ours, and if there would
be any attempt to flank our troops in that direction. I saw,
however, only a few skirmishers, and returned to organize a reserve.
I knew there was fighting going on between Cutler's brigade and
the rebels in his front, but as General Reynolds was there in
person, I only attended to my own part of the line; and halted the
6th Wisconsin regiment as it was going into the action, together
with a hundred men of the Brigade Guard, taken from the 149th
Pennsylvania, to station them in the open space between the Seminary
and the woods, as a reserve, the whole being under the command of
Lieut.-Colonel R. R. Dawes, of the 6th Wisconsin.

[* I sent orders to Morrow under the supposition that he was the
ranking officer of the brigade. Colonel W. W. Robinson, 7th
Wisconsin, was entitled to the command, and exercised it during
the remainder of the battle.]

It is proper to state that General Meredith, the permanent commander
of the brigade, was wounded as he was coming up, some time after
its arrival, by a shell which exploded in front of his horse.

Both parties were now trying to obtain possession of the woods.
Archer's rebel brigade, preceded by a skirmish line, was crossing
Willoughby's Run to enter them on one side as the Iron Brigade went
in on the other. General Reynolds was on horseback in the edge of
the woods, surrounded by his staff. He felt some anxiety as to
the result, and turned his head frequently to see if our troops
would be up in time. While looking back in this way, a rebel
sharpshooter shot him through the back of the head, the bullet
coming out near the eye. He fell dead in an instant, without a
word. The country sustained great loss in his death. I lamented
him as almost a life-long companion. We were at West Point together,
and had served in the same regiment--the old 3d Artillery--upon
first entering service, along with our present Commander-in-Chief,
General Sherman, and General George H. Thomas. When quite young
we had fought in the same battles in Mexico. There was little
time, however, to indulge in these recollections. The situation
was very peculiar. The rebel left under Davis had driven in Cutler's
brigade and our left under Morrow had charged into the woods,
preceded by the 2d Wisconsin under Colonel Fairchild, swept suddenly
and unexpectedly around the right flank of Archer's brigade, and
captured a large part of it, including Archer himself. The fact
is, the enemy were careless and underrated us, thinking, it is
said, that they had only militia to contend with. The Iron Brigade
had a different head-gear from the rest of the army and were
recognized at once by their old antagonists. Some of the latter
were heard to exclaim: "There are those d----d black-hatted fellows
again! 'Taint no militia. It's the Army of the Potomac."

Having captured Archer and his men, many of the Iron Brigade kept
on beyond Willoughby's Run, and formed on the heights on the opposite
side.

The command now devolved upon me, with its great responsibilities.
The disaster on the right required immediate attention, for the
enemy, with loud yells, were pursuing Cutler's brigade toward the
town. I at once ordered my reserve under Lieutenant-Colonel Dawes
to advance against their flank. If they faced Dawes, I reasoned
that they would present their other flank to Cutler's men, so that
I felt quite confident of the result. In war, however, unexpected
changes are constantly occurring. Cutler's brigade had been
withdrawn by order of General Wadsworth, without my knowledge, to
the suburbs of Gettysburg. Fortunately, Fowler's two regiments
came on to join Dawes, who went forward with great spirit, but who
was altogether too weak to assail so large a force. As he approached,
the rebels ceased to pursue Cutler, and rushed into the railroad
cut to obtain the shelter of the grading. They made a fierce and
obstinate resistance, but, while Fowler confronted them above,
about twenty of Dawes' men were formed across the cut by his
adjutant, E. P. Brooks, to fire through it. The rebels could not
resist this; the greater number gave themselves up as prisoners,
and the others scattered over the country and escaped.

This success relieved the 147th New York, which, as I stated, was
surrounded when Cutler fell back, and it also enabled us to regain
the gun which Hall had been obliged to abandon.

The enemy having vanished from our immediate front, I withdrew the
Iron Brigade from its advanced position beyond the creek, reformed
the line on the ridge where General Reynolds had originally placed
it, and awaited a fresh attack, or orders from General Meade. The
two regiments of Cutler's brigade were brought back from the town,
and, notwithstanding the check they had received, they fought with
great gallantry throughout the three days' battle that ensued.

There was now a lull in the combat. I was waiting for the remainder
of the First Corps to come up, and Heth was reorganizing his
shattered front line, and preparing to bring his two other brigades
forward. The remnant of Archer's brigade was placed on the right,
and made to face south against Buford's cavalry, which, it was
feared, might attack that flank. What was left of Davis' brigade
was sent to the extreme left of the line, and Pegram's artillery
was brought forward and posted on the high ground west of Willoughby's
Run.

Thus prepared, and with Pender's strong division in rear, ready to
cover his retreat if defeated, or to follow up his success if
victorious, Heth advanced to renew the attack.

As I had but four weak infantry brigades at this time against eight
larger brigades which were about to assail my line, I would have
been justified in falling back, but I determined to hold on to the
position until ordered to leave it. I did not believe in the
system, so prevalent at that time, of avoiding the enemy. I quite
agreed with Reynolds that it was best to meet him as soon as
possible, for the rebellion, if reduced to a war of positions,
would never end so long as the main army of the Confederates was
left in a condition to take the field. A retreat, too, has a bad
effect on the men. It gives them the impression that their generals
think them too weak to contend with the enemy. I was not aware,
at this time, that Howard was on the ground, for he had given me
no indication of his presence, but I knew that General Meade was
at Taneytown; and as, on the previous evening, he had informed
General Reynolds that the enemy's army were concentrating on
Gettysburg, I thought it probable he would ride to the front to
see for himself what was going on, and issue definite orders of
some kind. As Gettysburg covered the great roads from Chambersburg
to York, Baltimore, and Washington, and as its possession by Lee
would materially shorten and strengthen his line of retreat, I was
in favor of making great sacrifices to hold it.

While we were thus temporarily successful, having captured or
dispersed all the forces in our immediate front, a very misleading
despatch was sent to General Meade by General Howard. It seems
that General Howard had reached Gettysburg in advance of his corps,
just after the two regiments of Cutler's brigade, which had been
outflanked, fell back to the town by General Wadsworth's order.
Upon witnessing this retreat, which was somewhat disorderly, General
Howard hastened to send a special messenger to General Meade with
the baleful intelligence that the First Corps had fled from the
field at the first contact with the enemy, thus magnifying a forced
retreat of two regiments, acting under orders, into the flight of
an entire corps, two-thirds of which had not yet reached the field.
It is unnecessary to say that this astounding news created the
greatest feeling against the corps, who were loudly cursed for
their supposed lack of spirit and patriotism.

About 11 A.M., the remainder of the First Corps came up, together
with Cooper's, Stewart's, Reynolds', and Stevens' batteries. By
this time the enemy's artillery had been posted on every commanding
position to the west of us, several of their batteries firing down
the Chambersburg pike. I was very desirous to hold this road, as
it was in the centre of the enemy's line, who were advancing on
each side of it, and Calef--exposed as his battery was--fired over
the crest of ground where he was posted, and notwithstanding the
storm of missiles that assailed him, held his own handsomely, and
inflicted great damage on his adversaries. He was soon after
relieved by Reynolds' Battery "L" of the 1st New York, which was
sustained by Colonel Roy Stone's brigade of Pennsylvania troops,
which I ordered there for that purpose. Stone formed his men on
the left of the pike, behind a ridge running north and south, and
partially sheltered them by a stone fence, some distance in advance,
from which he had driven the rebel skirmish line, after an obstinate
contest.

It was a hot place for troops; for the whole position was alive
with bursting shells, but the men went forward in fine spirits and,
under the impression that the place was to be held at all hazards,
they cried out, _"We have come to stay!"_ The battle afterward
became so severe that the greater portion did stay, laying down
their lives there for the cause they loved so well. Morrow's
brigade remained in the woods where Reynolds was killed, and Biddle's
brigade was posted on its left in the open ground along the crest
of the same ridge, with Cooper's battery in the interval. Cutler's
brigade took up its former position on the right of the road.
Having disposed of Wadsworth's division and my own division, which
was now under the command of Brigadier General Rowley, I directed
General Robinson's division to remain in reserve at the Seminary,
and to throw up a small semicircular rail intrenchment in the grove
in front of the building. Toward the close of the action this
defence, weak and imperfect as it was, proved to be of great
service.

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