John Trowbridge - "The Drummer Boy"

Alexandre Dumas - "La dame de Monsoreau v.3"

Victor Hugo - "Actes et Paroles, vol. I"

J.G. Adams - "Hymns for Christian Devotion"

Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Chancellorsville and Gettysburg

A >> Abner Doubleday >> Chancellorsville and Gettysburg




The enemy made a feeble attempt about this time to occupy Harper's
Ferry, but were promptly shelled out by our batteries on Maryland
Heights.

Lee having failed, on account of the discomfiture of his cavalry,
in crossing the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry, was forced either to
remain where he was or go forward. Impelled by public opinion he
kept on his way up the Cumberland Valley. Hooker being very desirous
of keeping the invasion west of the Blue Ridge, asked Heintzelman
to co-operate with him by sending the 2,000 men which seemed to be
of no service at Poolesville to the passes of South Mountain, which
is an extension of the same range; but Heintzelman said those passes
were outside of his jurisdiction, and the men were needed in
Poolesville. Hooker replied somewhat angrily that he would try
and do without the men. The two generals had quarreled, and there
was not the best feeling between them.

All of Ewell's corps were across the river on the 22d, and Jenkins'
cavalry pushed on to Chambersburg. He was ordered to remain there
until reinforced, but failed to do so, as Union troops were
approaching from the direction of Carlisle.

Longstreet and Hill were left behind to prevent Hooker from striking
the rear of this long column. Hooker still remained quiescent,
engaged in trying to obtain 15,000 men as reinforcements. He was
but partially successful, for as soon as the New York regiments
reached Baltimore, Lockwood's brigade of Maryland troops, about
three thousand, was ordered to join the Army of the Potomac, and
was assigned to the Twelfth Corps.

The Army of the Potomac at this time was posted as follows: The
Twelfth Corps at Leesburg, supported by the Eleventh on Goose Creek,
between Leesburg and Aldie; the Fifth Corps near Aldie, and the
Second at the next pass below, both supported by the Third Corps
at Gum Springs. The First Corps was behind the Eleventh and Twelfth
Corps, near Guilford, on the Loudon and Hampshire Railroad. Our
cavalry, which had left Aldie, covered the approaches to Leesburg.
On the 23d they had a sharp engagement at Dover, on the road from
Aldie to Leesburg, with part of Stuart's force, who beat up their
quarters, but they drove off their assailants without much
difficulty.

Lee now, with a prudent regard to a possible defeat, requested the
authorities at Richmond to have a reserve army under Beauregard
assemble at Culpeper; a request which was looked upon by Davis as
one quite impossible to carry out, owing to the scarcity of troops,
and the necessity of reinforcing Johnston in the West and Beauregard
in the South.

Two of Ewell's divisions, those of Rodes and Johnson, reached the
frightened town of Chambersburg on the 23d. The other, under Early,
took the road to York, _via_ Gettysburg, and halted on that day at
Waynesborough.

By this time twenty regiments of militia were on their way from
New York to Baltimore and Harrisburg.

Longstreet crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and Hill at
Shepherdstown, on the 24th. Their columns united at Hagerstown
the next day. Thus supported, Ewell's main body resumed its march
to Carlisle, which it occupied on the 27th; gathering large supplies
there and along the road by means of foraging parties sent out to
depredate on the farmers. As soon as they reached the town, Jenkins'
brigade left for Harrisburg.

Hooker having now satisfied himself that the Capital was safe from
a _coup-de-main_, and that the main body of the rebels were still
marching up the Cumberland Valley, determined to move in a parallel
line on the east side of South Mountain, where he could occupy the
gaps at once, in case the enemy turned east, toward Washington and
Baltimore. To carry out this design his army began to cross the
Potomac at Edwards' Ferry on the 25th, and at night Reynolds' corps
was in front and Sickles' corps in rear of Middletown, in readiness
to hold either Crampton's or Turner's Gap. Howard's corps was
thrown forward to Boonsborough.

On the 26th Slocum's corps was sent to Harper's Ferry to act in
conjunction with the garrison there--supposed to be 10,000 strong
--against the enemy's line of communication with Richmond. The
Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps were advanced to Frederick, Md., as
a support to the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps. Gregg's cavalry
division remained behind to cover the crossing, which was all
completed the next day, after which they too marched to Frederick.

On the 25th, Early, leaving his division at Greenwood, went to
Chambersburg to consult Ewell, who gave him definite orders to
occupy York, break up the Central Railroad, burn the bridge over
the Susquehanna at Wrightsville, and afterward rejoin the main body
at Carlisle.

It seems strange that Lee should suppose that the Union army would
continue inactive all this time, south of Washington, where it was
only confronted by Stuart's cavalry, and it is remarkable to find
him so totally in the dark with regard to Hooker's movements. It
has been extensively assumed by rebel writers that this ignorance
was caused by the injudicious raid made by Stuart, who thought it
would be a great benefit to the Confederate cause if he could ride
entirely around the Union lines and rejoin Lee's advance at York.
He had made several of these circuits during his military career,
and had gained important advantages from them in way of breaking
up communications, capturing despatches, etc. It is thought that
he hoped by threatening Hooker's rear to detain him and delay his
crossing the river, and thus give time to Lee to capture Harrisburg,
and perhaps Philadelphia. His raid on this occasion was undoubtedly
a mistake. When he rejoined the main body, his men were exhausted,
his horses broken down, and the battle of Gettysburg was nearly
over. As cavalry are the eyes of an army, it has been said that
Stuart's absence prevented Lee from ascertaining the movements and
position of Hooker's army. Stuart has been loudly blamed by the
rebel chroniclers for leaving the main body, but this is unjust;
Lee not only knew of the movement, but approved it; for he directed
Stuart to pass between Hooker and Washington, and move with part
of his force to Carlisle and the other part to Gettysburg. Besides,
Stuart left Robertson's and Jones' brigades behind, with orders to
follow up the rear of the Union army until it crossed, and then to
rejoin the main body. In the meantime they were to hold the gaps
in the Blue Ridge, for fear Hooker might send a force to occupy
them. These two brigades, with Imboden's brigade, and White's
battalion, made quite a large cavalry force: Imboden, however,
was also detached to break up the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to
prevent forces from the West from taking Lee in rear; all of which
goes to show how sensitive the Confederate commander was in regard
to any danger threatening his communications with Richmond.

At 1 A.M. on the 25th, Stuart started on his expedition and advanced
to Haymarket, where he unexpectedly came upon Hancock's corps,
which had left Thoroughfare Gap, and was on its way to Gum Springs.
He opened fire against them but was soon driven off. He then
returned to Buckland and Gainesville; for to keep on, in presence
of our troops, would have frustrated the object of his expedition
by indicating its purpose.

This was the day in which Longstreet and Hill united their columns
at Hagerstown. Some Union spies who counted the rebel forces as
they passed through the town made their number to be 91,000 infantry,
280 guns and 1,100 cavalry. This statement, though much exaggerated,
gained great credence at the time, and added to the excitement
among the loyal people throughout the Northern States, while the
copperhead element were proportionally active and jubilant.

On the 26th, General French assumed command of the garrison at
Harper's Ferry, then posted at Maryland Heights.

On the same day the Richmond Government were much alarmed by the
unexpected appearance of Colonel Spear's 11th Pennsylvania Cavalry
within eleven miles of the city. Spear had made quite a successful
and very destructive raid on the railroads and other lines of
communication. He made, too, a very important capture by bringing
in General W. H. F. Lee, who was wounded at the battle of Brandy
Station, and who was a son of General Robert E. Lee. The Davis
Government had determined to hang one of our captains who was a
prisoner in Libby, and the fact that a son of General Robert E.
Lee was in our power prevented them from carrying out their intention
for fear he might be hanged by way of retaliation.

Early's division of Ewell's corps stopped at Gettysburg on its way
to York. The other two divisions kept on toward Carlisle.

These movements at once caused Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania to
call out 60,000 men for the defence of the State. They were styled
the emergency militia. As there was little else than shot-guns
for them, these hasty gatherings did not promise to be very
effective.

The Governor still complained of a lack of zeal in Philadelphia.
The people there, said "Isn't this awful!" but very few volunteered.
They soon awoke from their apathy, however, and took prompt measures
to defend the city.

On the 27th the commands of Longstreet and Hill reached Chambersburg,
and Ewell's two divisions occupied Carlisle, while Jenkins pushed
on to Kingston, within thirteen miles of Harrisburg. At the same
time Early was engaged in wreaking destruction upon the Northern
Central Railroad, and by night he entered York. About the only
opposition he encountered came from a militia regiment at Gettysburg,
but this was soon driven away.

There was wild commotion throughout the North, and people began to
feel that the boast of the Georgia Senator Toombs, that he would
call the roll of his slaves at the foot of Bunker Hill Monument,
might soon be realized. The enemy seemed very near and the Army
of the Potomac far away.

On the same day Stuart succeeded with great difficulty in crossing
the Potomac in the vicinity of Drainsville. He found our troops
were now all north of this river, so that one object of his expedition
--to detain them on the south side--had failed.

On the 28th he resumed his march, and as he passed close to Washington
and Baltimore, he created considerable excitement in those cities.
At Rockville he came upon a large train full of supplies, on its
way to Frederick, Maryland, and captured it with its slender escort,
after which he kept on in a northerly direction through Brookeville
and Cookesville, travelling all night.

On this day the Adjutant-General at Richmond telegraphed for troops
to be sent there at once from the Carolinas and elsewhere, for he
estimated the Union forces at the White House at thirty thousand
men, and considered the capital to be in great danger. Neither
Davis nor his cabinet had the slightest desire to have any successes
Lee might obtain at the North supplemented by their own execution
at the South, a result they felt was not wholly improbable, in the
excited state of public feeling at that time, if the city should
be taken.

Lee, ignorant that Hooker was following him up, continued his
aggressive advance. Early took prompt measures to seize the bridge
over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville. If successful, he intended
to cross over and amuse himself by destroying all direct connection
between Philadelphia and the West, by railroad and telegraph. This
done, he proposed to march along the north side of the river,
capture Harrisburg and rejoin Ewell at Carlisle. As Gordon's
brigade approached the bridge, after driving away some militia,
they found it in flames, the Union commander at Columbia, Colonel
Frick, having given orders for its destruction. Early gained some
compensation for his failure in this respect by levying a contribution
on York of one-hundred thousand dollars in cash; two hundred barrels
of flour; thirty thousand bushels of corn; one thousand pairs of
shoes, etc.

The Union army still remained in Frederick, with the left wing
(three corps) under Reynolds thrown out toward the enemy, the
Eleventh Corps under Howard at Boonsborough, the First Corps under
my command at Middletown, supported by the Third Corps under Birney,
two or three miles in rear, with Buford's division of cavalry
holding the passes of South Mountain, the remainder of the cavalry
being at Frederick.

Hooker thought it useless to keep a garrison of 10,000 men in a
passive attitude at Harper's Ferry. I think he was quite right,
for the war could not be decided by the possession of military
posts or even of cities, for hostilities would never cease until
one army or the other was destroyed. He therefore applied to
Washington for permission to add this force to that of Slocum, in
order that the two might act directly against Lee's communications
by following up his rear while preserving their own line of retreat.
Slocum had been already ordered there, for this purpose, but Halleck
would not consent that the garrison of Harper's Ferry should be
withdrawn under any circumstances, and positively refused Hooker's
request. Hooker then considering himself thwarted in all his plans
by the authorities at Washington, offered his resignation. It was
promptly accepted, and Major-General George G. Meade, then the
commander of the Fifth Corps, was assigned to the command of the
Army of the Potomac. He was a general of fine intellect, of great
personal bravery, and had had a good deal of experience in the war
in handling troops, but had never achieved any brilliant success,
or met with any serious reverse.

Upon ascertaining that the enemy were at York and Carlisle, Hooker
had determined to throw out his different corps in a fan shape
toward the Susquehanna, and advance in that direction with three
corps on the left to defend that flank, in case Longstreet and Hill
should turn East, instead of keeping on toward the North. At the
same time it was his intention to have Slocum follow up Lee's
advance, by keeping in his rear, to capture his trains and couriers,
and to cut off his retreat should he be defeated.

General Meade's first order was for all the troops to concentrate
in Frederick, where he proposed to have a grand review; but at the
urgent remonstrance of General Butterfield, who had been Hooker's
Chief of Staff, and who stated that this delay would give Lee time
to cross the Susquehanna, and capture Harrisburg and Philadelphia,
Hooker's orders were allowed to stand, with some exceptions. Meade
appears to have disapproved all movements against Lee's line of
retreat, for he ordered Slocum to rejoin the main army, and had
the hardihood to break up the post at Harper's Ferry, in spite of
the fact that Hooker had just been relieved from command for
requesting permission to do so. The bulk of the garrison, under
Major-General French, was directed to take post as a reserve at
Frederick, when our forces moved forward. The general idea of our
advance was to interpose between the enemy and Philadelphia if he
went north, or between him and Baltimore and Washington in case he
turned back. The orders at night were for Buford's division of
cavalry to take post on the left flank, in the direction of Fairfield;
Gregg's division on the right flank at Westminster; and Kilpatrick's
division in advance of the centre, at Littlestown, the different
corps to be posted between New Windsor and Emmetsburg.

Ewell's corps, as stated, were at Carlisle and York, Lee and
Longstreet's at Chambersburg, and Hill's corps at Fayetteville.

Lee was startled to learn from a countryman who came in on the 28th
that Hooker was at Frederick, and not south of the Potomac, as he
had supposed. He saw at once that his communications with Richmond,
about which he was so solicitous, were greatly endangered, for the
Union army could be formed to interpose between him and Williamsport,
and still keep a safe line of retreat open to Washington. This
might not be so great a misfortune to the enemy as regards food
and forage; for he could probably live on the country for some
time, by making predatory excursions in different directions, but
when it came to obtaining fresh supplies of ammunition, the matter
would become very serious. An army only carries a limited amount
of this into the field and must rely upon frequent convoys to keep
up the supply, which is constantly decreasing from the partial
engagements and skirmishes, so prevalent in a hostile country.

The wisdom of Hooker's policy in desiring to assail the rebel
communications is demonstrated by the fact the Lee immediately
turned back. The head of the serpent faced about as soon as its
tail was trodden upon. He came to the conclusion to prevent an
attack against his rear by threatening Baltimore with his whole
force. This would necessarily cause the Union army to march further
east to confront him, and thus prevent it from operating in heavy
force in the Cumberland Valley. Accordingly on the night of the
28th, Lee sent expresses to all his corps commanders to concentrate
at Gettysburg. If he had known that Meade was about to withdraw
all the troops acting against his line of retreat he would probably
have gone on and taken Harrisburg.

As the new commander of the Union army was a favorite of General
Halleck, no notice was taken of his disregard of instructions in
detaching the garrison of Harper's Ferry. General Couch, who
commanded the Department of the Susquehanna, was also placed under
his orders, a favor which had been denied to Hooker. The troubles
of the latter were not quite over, for on his appearing in Washington
to explain his action, he was immediately put under arrest for
visiting the Capital without his (Halleck's) permission; a piece
of petty persecution which might have been spared under the
circumstances. It was, however, a short and easy method of settling
all complaints that were inconvenient to answer.



CHAPTER III.
STUART'S RAID--THE ENEMY IN FRONT OF HARRISBURG--MEADE'S PLANS.

At dawn of day on the 29th, Stuart's command, after riding all
night, reached the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and commenced
disabling it, so far as the limited time at their disposal would
allow, by burning a bridge at Sykesville and tearing up a portion
of the track at Hood's Mill. They remained at the latter place
during the day to rest, but started again in the afternoon, and
reached Westminster about 5 P.M. At this place they were gallantly
attacked by the 1st Delaware Cavalry, which Stuart says was driven
off after hard fighting and pursued some distance toward Baltimore,
adding very much to the panic there. At night the head of his
column halted at Union Mills, half way between Westminster and
Littlestown. It may as well be stated here that Stuart found
himself greatly embarrassed by attempting to hold on to the long
train he had captured at Rockville. It lengthened out his column
to such an extent that it became difficult to defend all parts of
the line without scattering and weakening his command. As Kilpatrick's
division was waiting to intercept him at Littlestown, this
consideration became a matter of considerable importance. Gregg's
division also moved in the morning to head him off at Westminster,
but owing to the roads being very much blocked up by our infantry
and trains marching in that direction, Gregg did not succeed in
reaching his destination until some hours after Stuart had passed.

At night two brigades of Buford's division of cavalry covered the
left flank of the Union army near Fairfield, with one brigade at
Mechanicstown. The First and Eleventh Corps were at Emmetsburg,
the Third and Twelfth at Middleburg, the Fifth Corps at Taneytown,
the Second Corps at Uniontown, and the Sixth Corps at New Windsor.

The advance of the rebel cavalry under Jenkins were now within
sight of Harrisburg, and skirmishing only four miles from the town.
Jenkins' object was to make a thorough reconnoissance in order to
ascertain the best positions to be taken for an attack. There was
a perfect exodus from the city. All business was suspended, too,
in Philadelphia, and the authorities there busied themselves in
hastening the work on the fortifications in the suburbs of the
city. They were active enough now, and large numbers were enrolled.
Pleasonton, who was under general orders to guard the flank nearest
the enemy, directed Buford on the 29th to occupy Gettysburg the
next day, and hold it until the Army of the Potomac came to his
relief. He realized the importance of the position to the future
success of our arms.

Hill's corps was at Fayetteville on the 29th, but one division,
that of Heth, was thrown forward on that day to Cashtown, within
eight miles of Gettysburg. The object of the movement was to join
Ewell at York, and co-operate with him in the destruction of the
railroads on the other side of the Susquehanna, etc. This plan,
as I have already stated, was suddenly changed on the evening of
the 28th, when Lee found his communications endangered, and now
all the advanced troops under his command turned back to concentrate
at Gettysburg. Longstreet left Chambersburg and marched to
Fayetteville, leaving Pickett's division behind to guard the trains.
Early received the order to return in the afternoon of the 28th,
recalled Gordon's brigade from Wrightsville, and made preparations
to start the next morning. Rodes' and Johnson's divisions left
Carlisle and marched on Gettysburg; the former by the direct route,
and the latter by way of Greenwood, to convoy the trains full of
stolen property.

A number of partisan skirmishes took place during the day, which
were creditable to our troops, particularly that at McConnellsburg,
to the west of Chambersburg.

The raid against Richmond ended by the return of Colonel Spear's
regiment to the White House. Hooker had urged that General Dix
assume command of all his available troops, march against Richmond,
and plant himself firmly on Lee's line of communication, but his
recommendations were slighted by Halleck. There was much disappointment
in the North at this failure to make a serious attack on the rebel
capital, for it was generally believed that it might have been
captured by a _coup de main_.

On the 30th General Meade advanced his army still nearer the
Susquehanna. At evening his extreme left, the First Corps, was at
Marsh Creek, on the Emmetsburg road, while the extreme right, the
Sixth Corps, was away off at Manchester. The intermediate corps
were posted, the Eleventh at Emmetsburg; the Second at Uniontown;
the Third at Taneytown; the Fifth at Union Mills, and the Twelfth
at Frizzelburg. General French moved from Harper's Ferry with the
bulk of the garrison and occupied Frederick. The First Corps was
ordered to Gettysburg, but General Reynolds halted it at Marsh
Creek, as the enemy were reported to be coming from the direction
of Fairfield.

Meade now resolved to take up a defensive position on Pipe Creek.
He threw out his forces as before in a fan shape, but any corps
encountering the enemy was expected to fight in retreat until it
reached the new line, where all the corps were to assemble. This
line as laid out was a long one, extending from Manchester to
Middleburg, a distance of about twenty-five miles. Falling back
to fight again, is hardly to be commended, as it chills the ardor
of the men; nor is it certain that Lee would have attacked the
intrenchments at Pipe Creek. If he found them formidable he might
have preferred to fight on the defensive with two corps, while the
Third Corps took Harrisburg, and broke up the railroad lines to
the west, or marched directly against Philadelphia; or, as Pipe
Creek did not interfere with his communications in any way he might
have chosen to let it severely alone, and have kept on depredating
in Pennsylvania, after capturing Harrisburg. This would have forced
Meade sooner or later to attack him.

On the night of the 30th Ewell's corps had reached Heidlersburg,
nine miles from Gettysburg, with the exception of Johnson's division,
which was at Greenwood. Rodes' division had marched direct from
Carlisle by way of Petersburg. Longstreet with two divisions was
at Fayetteville; the other division, that of Pickett, was left at
Chambersburg to guard the trains. Hill's corps had reached Cashtown
and Mummasburg, except Anderson's division, which was still back
at the mountain pass on the Chambersburg road.

Stuart, ascertaining that Early was no longer at York, and not
knowing that the army was concentrating on Gettysburg, turned toward
Carlisle. He had bivouacked half way between Westminster and
Littlestown, but having ascertained that Kilpatrick was waiting
for him at the latter place, attempted to avoid the encounter by
going through cross roads to Hanover. He found Farnsworth's brigade
of cavalry there, however, and charged their rear, driving them
back and capturing some prisoners and ambulances. The 5th New York
made a counter-charge under Major Hammond and drove him out again.
He claims to have taken the town by the aid of Hampton's brigade,
which arrived in time to reinforce him. Custer's brigade then came
up from Abbotstown. The battle lasted until night, when Stuart
gave up the contest and retreated, leaving Kilpatrick in possession.

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