Chancellorsville and Gettysburg

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From a prisoner captured in this skirmish Milroy learned the highly
important intelligence that he was confronted by Ewell's corps and
that Longstreet was rapidly approaching.

The most natural course under the circumstances would have been
for him to retreat at once, but McReynolds' brigade had just arrived,
exhausted by their forced march, and could go no further, without
some hours' rest. To move without them would be to sacrifice a
large part of his force. He still cherished the hope that Hooker's
army would follow Lee up closely and come to his relief.

Ewell at night directed Early's division to attack the works on
the north and west of the town at daylight the next morning, while
Johnson's division demonstrated against the east and southeast.

Early on Sunday, the 14th, Milroy sent out a detachment to see if
the enemy had established themselves on the Pughtown or Romney
roads. The party returned about 2 P.M. and reported the roads
clear, but soon after the rebels came in great force from that
direction, so that Milroy's hopes of escaping by the routes leading
to the northwest were dissipated. Immediately west of Winchester,
and parallel with Applebie Ridge, on which the main forts were
situated, there is another ridge called Flint Ridge, where rifle
pits had been commenced to command the Pughtown and Romney roads.
These were held by one regiment, and part of another under Colonel
Keifer of the 110th Ohio, together with Battery "L" of the 5th
United States Artillery. Early's division made a sudden attack
there, preliminary to which he opened fire with four batteries.
He charged into these rifle-pits and took them, but the garrison
retreated successfully, under cover of the fire, from the main
works above, which were held by Elliot's and McReynolds' brigades.
This was followed by an artillery duel, which was kept up until 8
P.M. without any special results.

Johnson's division at daybreak attacked the eastern side of the
town, held by Colonel Ely's brigade, but was gallantly met and
repulsed by the 8th Pennsylvania and 87th Pennsylvania. These two
regiments, by Milroy's order, made a bold charge against the enemy
as they were retiring, but the latter were so suddenly and strongly
reinforced that the two regiments were glad to get back to their
shelter in the fortified suburbs. They were followed up however,
and after severe fighting Johnson gained possession of a part of
the town. This apparent success proved of no avail, for the forts
above shelled him out. He therefore retired and made no further
attempt in that direction.

Darkness ended the struggle for the day. Johnson then left one
brigade to prevent Milroy from escaping toward the east and went
off with the remainder of his division to form across the Martinsburg
pike, about three miles north of Winchester, to intercept Milroy's
retreat in that direction.

While these events were going on in the Valley, Imobden's cavalry
was engaged in breaking up the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad near
Romney, to prevent Milroy from receiving any reinforcements from
the west.

The latter now found himself in a perilous situation. His cannon
ammunition was nearly exhausted, and he had but one day's rations
for his men. He resolved to give up all further attempts to defend
the place, to abandon his wagon train and artillery, and to force
his way through the hostile lines that night; taking with him only
the horses and small arms. This involved his leaving also his sick
and wounded, but it was unavoidable. He ordered all the guns
spiked, and the ammunition thrown into the cisterns.

At 1 A.M. on the 15th, he moved silently out through a ravine and
was not molested until he struck the Martinsburg road, about four
miles from the town. There Elliot, who was in the advance with
his brigade, met a rebel skirmish line, and soon ascertained that
their main body were formed, partly on high ground in a woods east
of the road, and partly in an open field east of and adjoining the
woods. The enemy were in effect sheltered by a stone fence which
bordered a railroad cut, with their reserve and artillery principally
posted on elevated ground in the rear.

The only thing to do was to break through their lines as soon as
possible. It was now about 3:30 A.M. Elliot, whose record of
long, careful, and brilliant service in the regular army is an
exemplary one, formed line of battle with his three regiments and
fought the six regiments that held the road for about an hour with
varied success, encountering a severe artillery fire and driving
back their right in disorder by a gallant charge of the 110th Ohio
and 122d Ohio; but unfortunately their left held firm, in spite of
repeated attacks made by Colonel Shawl with two regiments, reinforced
with two more and by part of Colonel Ely's brigade. Their force
in front, too, was sustained by heavy reserves both of infantry
and artillery.

A signal-gun fired at Winchester showed that the enemy there were
aware of the flight and were in full pursuit. The main road being
blocked, Milroy determined to try another, and directed the troops
to fall back a short distance and turn to the right. Part of them
did so, but the greater number, through some misunderstanding,
filed to the left, and took the road to Bath. It was no longer
possible to reunite the two columns and as Milroy's horse was shot
under him about this time, he could use no personal exertions to
remedy the disaster. A portion of the command who were not pursued
reached Harper's Ferry by way of Smithfield late in the afternoon.
Those who moved out on the Bath road also made good their escape,
crossed the Potomac at Hancock, and rallied at Bloody Run. The
greater part of Colonel Ely's brigade, and Colonel McReynolds'
brigade, however, were captured. Milroy claims to have brought
off 5,000 men of the garrison, and that the 2,000 paroled by Early,
consisted principally of the sick and wounded. Early says he sent
108 officers and 3,250 enlisted men as prisoners to Richmond.
Johnson, who intercepted the retreat, says he captured 2,300
prisoners, 175 horses, and 11 battle flags.

While two-thirds of Ewell's corps were attacking Winchester, the
other division under Rodes, preceded by Jenkins' brigade of cavalry,
pursued McReynolds' wagon train to Martinsburg, arriving there late
in the afternoon of the 14th. The town was held as an outlying
post of Harper's Ferry by a small detachment of all arms under
Colonel Tyler, a subordinate of General Tyler, who formed his men
outside of the place and resisted Rodes' attack until night, when
his infantry escaped to Shepherdstown, and his artillery and cavalry
to Williamsport. In carrying out these movements, however, he lost
five guns and five caissons. He passed the river and rejoined the
main body at Harper's Ferry. The latter place is wholly indefensible
against an enemy holding the hills around it. It is like fighting
at the bottom of a well. General Tyler had therefore very wisely
moved across the river to Maryland Heights, where he had a strong
fortified post. From that commanding eminence he could very soon
shell out any force that attempted to occupy the town.

The Shenandoah valley was now clear of Union troops, and soon became
the great highway of the invasion. However disastrous Milroy's
defeat may be considered on account of the losses incurred, it was
not without its compensation. The detention of Ewell's force there
gave time to the general Government and the Governors of the loyal
States to raise troops and organize resistance, and it awakened
the entire North to the necessity of immediate action.

Hooker, having learned that Ewell had passed Sperryville, advanced
his right to prevent any crossing in his immediate vicinity, and
confine the enemy to the Valley route. He sent the Third Corps to
hold the fords opposite Culpeper, and the Fifth Corps to guard
those lower down.

On the 13th he gave up his position opposite Fredericksburg, and
started north toward Washington, giving orders to Sedgwick to
recross and follow on to Dumfries. That night the First Corps
reached Bealeton, and the Eleventh Catlett's station. Reynolds
was placed in command of the left wing of the army (the First,
Third, and Eleventh Corps) and I relieved him in command of the
First Corps. The right wing (that is the Second, Fifth, Twelfth,
and Sixth Corps) was accompanied by Hooker in person, who reached
Dumfries on the 14th.

As soon as Hill saw Sedgwick disappear behind the Stafford hills,
he broke up his camp and started for Culpeper.

Some changes in the meantime had occurred in the Army of the Potomac,
and General Hancock was assigned to the Second Corps instead of
General Couch, who had been sent to organize the department of the
Susquehanna at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

The teamsters and fugitives from Winchester, making for Chambersburg
in all haste, told the inhabitants of the towns through which they
passed that the rebels were close behind them. This created the
wildest excitement. As many cases had occurred in which negroes
had been seized, and sent South to be sold as slaves, the whole
colored population took to the woods and filled up the roads in
all directions. The appearance of Jenkins' brigade, who crossed
at Williamsport on the morning of the 15th and reached Chambersburg
the same day, added to the alarm.

Jenkins was at the head of 2,000 cavalry, and soon became a terror
to the farmers in that vicinity by his heavy exactions in the way
of horses, cattle, grain, etc. It must be confessed he paid for
what he took in Confederate scrip, but as this paper money was not
worth ten cents a bushel, there was very little consolation in
receiving it. His followers made it a legal tender at the stores
for everything they wanted. Having had some horses stolen, he
sternly called on the city authorities to pay him their full value.
They did so without a murmur--_in Confederate money._ He pocketed
it with a grim smile, evidently appreciating the joke. He boasted
greatly of his humanity and his respect for private property, but
if the local papers are to be believed, it must be chronicled to
his everlasting disgrace that he seized a great many negroes, who
were tied and sent South as slaves. Black children were torn from
their mothers, placed in front of his troops, and borne off to
Virginia to be sold for the benefit of his soldiers. There was
nothing out of character in that, he thought, for it was one of
the sacred rights for which the South was contending.

Prompt measures were taken by the Northern States to meet the
emergency. Mr. Lincoln called on the Governors of West Virginia,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York to raise 120,000 men for
temporary service. It was easy to get the men, but difficult to
arm them, as nearly all serviceable muskets were already in possession
of the Army of the Potomac. As early as the 9th two new departments
had been created for Pennsylvania: That of the Monongahela, with
headquarters at Pittsburg, was assigned to Major-General W. T. H.
Brooks; and that of the Susquehanna, with headquarters at Carlisle,
to Major-General Darius N. Couch.

On the 15th Ewell reached Williamsport with a force estimated at
twelve thousand men and sixteen guns.

Before Couch could reach Carlisle it was already occupied by Jenkins'
cavalry, and the terrified farmers of that section of country were
fleeing in crowds across the Susquehanna, driving their horses and
cattle before them.

CHAPTER II.
HOOKER'S PLANS--LONGSTREET OCCUPIES THE GAPS IN THE BLUE RIDGE--
ALARM IN RICHMOND--HOOKER SUPERSEDED BY MEADE.

A shower of telegrams came to Hooker, notifying him of these untoward
events, and demanding protection; but he simply moved one step
toward the enemy. On the 15th he had three corps--the First, Sixth,
and Eleventh--grouped around Centreville, with the Third Corps at
Manassas, and the Second, Fifth, and Twelfth Corps in reserve at
Fairfax Court House. The left flank of the army was guarded by
Pleasonton's cavalry, posted at Warrenton. Hooker was not to be
drawn away from the defence at Washington by any clamorous appeal
for his services elsewhere; his plan being to move parallel to
Lee's line of advance and strike his communications with Richmond
at the first favorable opportunity. He obtained some reinforcements
at this time, Stannard's Second Vermont brigade being assigned to
my division of the First Corps, and Stahel's cavalry division,
about six thousand strong, being directed to report to General
Pleasonton for duty.

As Harrisburg lay directly in the track of the invading army,
Governor Curtin made strenuous efforts to collect a force there.
He called upon all able-bodied citizens to enroll themselves, and
complained that Philadelphia failed to respond. New York acted
promptly, and on the 15th two brigades arrived in Philadelphia on
their way to the front.

On the same day Longstreet, having been relieved by Hill, left
Culpeper with his corps and marched directly across the country
east of the Blue Ridge to occupy Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps.
Stuart's cavalry were to guard his right flank, but did not leave
until the next day. The object of Longstreet's movement was to
tempt Hooker to abandon his strong position in front of Washington
and march against the Gaps, in which case it was hoped some
opportunity might occur by which the rebels could either crush the
Army of the Potomac in the open country or possibly outmanoeuvre
it, so as to intervene between it and Washington; but Hooker remained
stationary.

Rodes' division of Ewell's corps reached Williamsport and remained
there during the 16th, 17th, and 18th, to support Jenkins, and
receive, and transmit to the rear, the cattle, horses, negroes,
and provisions, taken by him.

The commotion created by the approach of the invader was not all
one-sided. General Dix, who commanded at Fortress Monroe, received
orders to advance on Richmond, which was weakly defended at this
time. As through their manifold offences in the way of starving
our prisoners, etc., the rebel President and his cabinet were afraid
of reprisals, there was great dismay at the weakness of the garrison
there, and bitter denunciations of Lee for leaving so small a force
behind. The Union troops for this counter-invasion were landed at
Yorktown and sent on to the White House. General Getty, in command
of one column of about seven thousand men, moved on the 13th as
far as Hanover Junction to destroy the bridge over the North and
South Anna, and as much of the railroad as possible, in order to
make a break in Lee's communications. At the same time General
Keyes, with another column of about five thousand men, moved from
the White House to secure Bottom's Bridge on the Chickahominy, and
thus leave a clear road for Getty's column to advance on the city.
The Davis Government, however, called out the militia and concentrated
enough men for defence by weakening the garrisons in South Carolina
and elsewhere; but there is no doubt the fright at one time was so
serious that it was in contemplation to recall Lee's forces;
especially on the 15th of June, when it was learned that General
Keyes' column was at New Kent Court House within fifteen miles of
the city.

On the 16th Stuart's cavalry left the Rappahannock--with the
exception of the 15th Virginia, which remained with Hill--and
bivouacked at Salem with Fitz Lee's brigade at Piedmont. Their
orders were to keep along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge, and
guard the front of Longstreet's corps in the Gaps.

Our own cavalry were concentrated at Warrenton and Catlett's.

On the 17th Fitz Lee's brigade was sent forward from Piedmont to
Aldie, via Middleburg, to anticipate our troops in holding the Gap
there; it being considered important to occupy the Bull Run range
of mountains as a screen for Lee's further operations. Fitz Lee's
brigade was supported by that of Robertson which was moved to
Rectortown, where it was also available as a reserve to W. H. F.
Lee's brigade which had gone forward to occupy Thoroughfare Gap.
No opposition was anticipated in the latter place, Pleasonton having
moved to Centreville, with his main body. Stuart made his headquarters
at Middleburg on the 17th.

Fitz Lee halted near Dover to close up his command, and sent his
pickets on to Aldie Gap. Pleasonton, who was scouting in the
vicinity, had no orders to go through the pass, but felt prompted
to do so by one of those presentiments which rarely deceive. He
pushed on, therefore, with Gregg's division until about 2.30 P.M.,
when he came upon the rebel pickets, who fell back on the main
body. The latter had made a march of forty miles to reach the Gap,
and Fitz Lee chose a strong position on a hill directly west of
Aldie, in which to fight a defensive battle. His line covered the
road to Snicker's Gap, but could be turned by the road to Middleburg
and Ashby's Gap.

A sanguinary contest ensued, which, including the pursuit, lasted
until 9 P.M. The rebel front was strengthened by a ditch and a
line of hay-stacks. After fighting for three hours the battle was
finally decided by a gallant charge of the 1st Maine Cavalry, who,
after our line had been broken and driven back, were led by Kilpatrick
in person, against a regiment of mounted infantry on the Ashby's
Gap road, capturing four guns. The Harris Light Cavalry had been
in disfavor for having failed in an attack at Brandy Station, but
on the present occasion they redeemed themselves, made several
brilliant charges, and greatly contributed to the success of the
day.

The rebels claim to have taken 134 prisoners, and some flags in
this affair, and state that they only fell back to Middleburg in
obedience to Stuart's orders. Ascertaining that Colonel Duffie
was advancing on that place with his division, Stuart thought, by
concentrating his entire force there, he could overwhelm him. This
may account for the retreat, but it is very certain that the loss
of the pass at Aldie was a serious blow to the rebel cause. This,
supplemented by Colonel Duffie's operations, which will be described
hereafter, gave Hooker possession of Loudon County, and threw the
invading column far to the west. If the enemy had succeeded in
posting forces in the gaps of the Bull Run range of mountains, and
in occupying the wooded country between Thoroughfare Gap and
Leesburg, they would not only have hidden all their own movements
from view, but would have had command of the Potomac from Harper's
Ferry to within thirty miles of Washington, so that they could have
operated on either side of the river.

While Gregg's division were thus engaged, Colonel Duffie started
under orders with his regiment from Centreville for Middleburg, by
way of Thoroughfare Gap. The enemy (W. H. F. Lee's brigade) were
already there, but he forced them out, and kept on to Middleburg,
which was reached about 9.30 A.M. He found Stuart's rear guard or
escort there, and drove them out. Stuart fell back to Rector's
Cross Roads, and sent word to all his forces to concentrate against
Duffie. Duffie barricaded the streets of the town and prepared to
hold it until reinforcements could reach him from Aldie, not being
aware that there was any impediment in that direction. At 7 P.M.
the different rebel brigades advanced on him from the direction of
Aldie, Union, and Upperville. By sheltering his men behind stone
walls and barricades, he repelled several assaults, but at last
was surrounded by overwhelming forces, and compelled to retreat by
the road upon which he had advanced in the morning. He fell back
until he crossed Little River, picketed the stream and halted there
to get some rest. This gave time to the enemy to surround him,
and by half past one the next morning all the roads in the neighborhood
were full of cavalry; an entire brigade being formed on that which
led to Aldie. He tried to force his way through the latter, but
was received with heavy volleys on both flanks, and with loud calls
to surrender. He directed Captain Bliss and Captain Bixby, who
were in advance, to charge through everything in front of them,
and the way was cleared for the main body, which at last gained
the junction of the Aldie road with that which leads to White
Plains. He then retreated on the latter, with his men all intermixed
with those of the enemy and fighting every step of the way. He
finally disengaged his force from this _melee_ and made his way
through Hopewell Gap back to Centreville, losing two-thirds of his
command.

In this affair at Middleburg, Stuart states that he was unable with
his entire force to drive the 1st Rhode Island regiment from a
position it had chosen, and speaks with admiration of the gallantry
it displayed.

On the 18th, Stuart took post outside of that town with Robertson
and W. H. F. Lee's brigade. Fitz Lee's brigade was on his left at
Union, and Jones' brigade was ordered up as a reserve.

Pleasonton moved forward with all his available force and occupied
Middleburg and Philemont on the road to Snicker's Gap; releasing
some of Duffie's men who had been captured the day before. Gregg's
division encountered the enemy a short distance beyond Middleburg
and drove them five miles in the direction of Ashby's Gap. There
was no regular line formation, but the Indian mode of fighting was
adopted on both sides, by taking advantage of every stone, fence,
bush, or hollow, to shelter the men. Before the action was over
Kilpatrick's command came up and took a prominent part.

Buford's division, which had advanced beyond Philemont on the
Snicker's Gap road, also became warmly engaged. They turned the
left flank of the rebels and pressed on successfully, but the
squadron left to guard the bridge over Goose Creek was overpowered
by numbers and the bridge was burned. Part of Pleasonton's force
made a reconnoissance toward Warrenton and engaged Hampton's brigade
there.

On the 19th Pleasonton held the positions he had gained and sent
back for an infantry support.

As there were indications that the whole of Stuart's cavalry would
be thrown on Gregg's division at Upperville, Pleasonton went forward
with his entire force and a brigade of infantry to support it.
After a series of brilliant engagements he drove Start steadily
back into Ashby's Gap, where he took refuge behind Longstreet's
Corps, a portion of which came up. Pleasonton then returned to
Upperville and next day to Aldie. The object of these movements--
to gain possession of Loudon County--having been attained, Hooker
was wary, and did not propose to be lured away from his strong
position, to take part in cavalry battles at a distance without a
definite object. He still found it difficult to realize that Lee
would still further lengthen out his long line from Richmond, and
endanger his communications, by invading Pennsylvania; and he
therefore waited for further developments. Lee, however, impelled
by public opinion behind him, which it was hardly safe to brave,
still went forward, and directed Ewell to cross the Potomac with
his main body and Longstreet to fall back behind the Shenandoah to
act in conjunction with Hill, who had relieved Ewell at Winchester
on the 17th, against any attempt to strike the rear of his long
column. Like Achilles he felt that he was only vulnerable in his
heel.

Several small skirmishes occurred about this time between detachments
of General Schenck's command, which picketed the north bank of the
Potomac, and bands of rebel partisans. The former were surprised
and captured in two or three instances. In one of these expeditions
a locomotive and twenty-three cars were disabled on the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad. Imboden, too, who occupied Cumberland on the
17th, in order to favor the general plan of invasion, tore up some
miles of the track west of that town, with a view to prevent any
reinforcements coming from that direction.

It would have been much better for the interests of the Southern
Confederacy if Lee, instead of making a downright invasion, had
been content to remain in the valley and threaten Hooker with two
corps, while he used the third to procure unlimited supplies in
Pennsylvania, and to sever all connection between the East and
West, by breaking up the railroads and cutting the telegraph wires.
Such a result, however, would hardly have been sufficient to meet
the expectations of the Southern people, who were bent upon nothing
else than the entire subjugation of the North and the occupation
of our principal cities.

Pleasonton's operations having cleared the way, Hooker moved forward
promptly on the 18th to occupy the gaps. The Twelfth Corps were
sent to Leesburg, the Fifth to Aldie, and the Second to Thoroughfare
Gap. The other corps formed a second line in reserve. This covered
Washington and gave Hooker an excellent base of operations.

In answer to his demand for reinforcements, Crawford's division of
Pennsylvania Reserves, and Abercrombie's division were sent to him.
As the latter was just going out of service, it was of no use.
Hooker contended that his army constituted the proper defence of
Washington, and that it was not necessary to keep a large force
inactive there, who could be of much more service at the front.
The authorities were timid, however, did not see the force of this
reasoning and therefore refused to place Schenck's and Heintzelman's
commands under his orders.

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