Chancellorsville and Gettysburg

A >> Abner Doubleday >> Chancellorsville and Gettysburg

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It may not be out of place, as indicating the kind of service in
which we were engaged, to quote the following letter, written after
the retreat:

"I am so cut, scratched, and bruised that I can hardly hold a pen
in my hand. My limbs are covered with swellings from the bites of
insects and torn from forcing my way through briers and thorny
bushes; my eyes close involuntarily from lack of sleep and excessive
fatigue. My legs are cramped from so much riding, and I have not
yet succeeded in getting rid of the chill caused by sleeping on
the wet ground in the cold rain. My clothes, up to last night,
had not been taken off for a week. As I lay down every night with
my boots and spurs on, my feet are very much swollen. I ought to
be in bed at this moment instead of attempting to write."

The others must have suffered in the same way. Warren, especially,
as a medium of communication between Hooker and Sedgwick, made
almost superhuman exertions to do without sleep and perform the
important duties assigned him.

Each army now felt the need of rest and recuperation, and no military
movements of importance took place for several weeks. Soon after
the battle of Chancellorsville, Longstreet's two divisions, which
had been operating in front of Suffolk, rejoined Lee at Fredericksburg.
That portion of Stoneman's cavalry which had taken refuge at
Gloucester Point also succeeded, by great boldness and skilful
manoeuvring on the part of Colonel Kilpatrick, in outwitting the
enemy and getting to Urbanna, after crossing Dragon River, rebuilding
a bridge there, and repulsing the rebel forces who tried to prevent
them from reaching the Rappahannock. The command, when it arrived
at Urbanna, passed over on the ferry-boat, under cover of a gunboat
sent there for that purpose, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac
at Falmouth, on the 3d of June, bringing in about 200 prisoners,
40 wagons, and 1,000 contrabands, as slaves were usually styled at
that time.

CHAPTER IX.
PREPARATIONS TO RENEW THE CONFLICT.

The close of the battle of Chancellorsville found the Union army
still strong in numbers, defeated, but not disheartened, and ready,
as soon as reinforcements and supplies arrived, and a brief period
of rest and recuperation ensued, to take the field again. To resist
the effects of this defeat and recruit our armies required, however,
great determination and serious effort on the part of the
Administration; for a large and powerful party still clogged and
impeded its efforts, and were allowed full liberty to chill the
patriotism of the masses, and oppose, with tongue and pen and every
species of indirection, all efficient action which looked to national
defence. This opposition was so strong and active that the President
almost preferred the risk of losing another battle to the commotion
which would be excited by attempts to enforce the draft; for hitherto
we had relied entirely on voluntary enlistments to increase our
strength in the field. Men are chilled by disaster and do not
readily enlist after a defeat; yet the terms of service of thirty
thousand of the two years' and nine months' men were expiring, and
something had to be done. Our army, however, at the end of May
was still formidable in numbers, and too strongly posted to be
effectually assailed; especially as it had full and free communication
with Washington and the North, and could be assisted in case of
need by the loyal militia of the free States.

The rebels had obtained a triumph, rather than a substantial victory,
at Chancellorsville. It was gained, too, at a ruinous expense of
life, and when the battle was over they found themselves too weak
to follow up our retreating forces. While the whole South was
exulting, their great commander, General Lee, was profoundly
depressed. The resources of the Davis Government in men and means
were limited, and it was evident that without a foreign alliance,
prolonged defensive warfare by an army so far from its base, would
ultimately exhaust the seceding States, without accomplishing their
independence. It became necessary, therefore, for General Lee to
chose one of two plans of campaign: Either to fall back on the
centre of his supplies at Richmond, and stand a siege there, or to
invade the North. By retiring on Richmond he would save the great
labor of transporting food and war material to the frontier, and
would remove the Northern army still further from its sources of
supply and its principal depots. One circumstance, however, would
probably in any event, have impelled him to take the bolder course.
The situation in Vicksburg was becoming alarming. It was evident
the town must fall and with its surrender the Federal fleet would
soon regain possession of the Mississippi. The fall of Vicksburg,
supplemented by the retreat of Lee's army on Richmond, would
dishearten the Southern people, and stimulate the North to renewed
efforts. It was essential, therefore, to counterbalance the
impending disaster in the West by some brilliant exploit in the
East.

There was perhaps another reason for this great forward movement,
founded on the relation of the Confederacy to the principal European
powers. England still made a pretence of neutrality, but the
aristocracy and ruling classes sided with the South, and a large
association of their most influential men was established at
Manchester to aid the slaveholding oligarchy. The rebels were
fighting us with English guns and war material, furnished by blockade
runners; while English Shenandoahs and Alabamas, manned by British
seamen, under the Confederate flag, burned our merchant vessels
and swept our commercial marine from the ocean. The French Government
was equally hostile to us, and there was hardly a kingdom in Europe
which did not sympathize with the South, allied as they were by
their feudal customs to the deplorable system of Southern slavery.
Russia alone favored our cause, and stood ready, if need be, to
assist us with her fleet; probably more from antagonism to England
and France, than from any other motive. The agents of the Confederate
Government stated in their official despatches that if General Lee
could establish his army firmly on Northern soil England would at
once acknowledge the independence of the South; in which case ample
loans could not only be obtained on Southern securities, but a
foreign alliance might be formed, and perhaps a fleet furnished to
re-open the Southern ports.

While thus elated by hopes of foreign intervention, the Confederate
spies and sympathizers who thronged the North greatly encouraged
the Davis Government by their glowing accounts of the disaffection
there, in consequence of the heavy taxation, rendered necessary by
the war, and by the unpopularity of the draft, which would soon
have to be enforced as a defensive measure. They overrated the
influence of the _Copperhead_ or anti-war party, and prophesied
that a rebel invasion would be followed by outbreaks in the principal
cities, which would paralyze every effort to reinforce the Federal
forces in the field.

These reasons would have been quite sufficient of themselves to
induce Lee to make the movement, but he himself gives an additional
one. He hoped by this advance to draw Hooker out, where he could
strike him a decisive blow, and thus ensure the permanent triumph
of the Confederacy. He was weary of all this marching, campaigning,
and bloodshed, and was strongly desirous of settling the whole
matter at once. Having been reinforced after the battle of
Chancellorsville by Longstreet's two divisions and a large body of
conscripts, he determined to advance. On May 31st, his force,
according to rebel statements, amounted to 88,754, of which 68,352
were ready for duty. Recruits, too, were constantly coming in from
the draft, which was rigidly enforced in the Southern States.

Hooker having learned from his spies that there was much talk of
an invasion, wrote to the President on May 28th, that the enemy
was undoubtedly about to make a movement of some kind. On June
3d, McLaws' and Hood's divisions of Longstreet's corps started for
the general rendezvous at Culpeper. A change in the encampment on
the opposite side of the river was noted by the vigilant Union
commander, who at once ordered Sedgwick to lay two bridges at the
old crossing place, three miles below Fredericksburg, pass over
with a division, and press the enemy to ascertain if their main
body was still there. Fresh indications occurred on the 4th, for
Ewell's corps followed that of Longstreet. The bridges being
completed on the 5th, Howe's division of the Sixth Corps was thrown
over and Hill's corps came out of their intrenchments to meet it.
Some skirmishing ensued, and Sedgwick reported, as his opinion,
that the greater portion of the enemy's force still held their old
positions. Hooker, however, was determined to be prepared for all
contingencies, and therefore, on the same day, detached the Fifth
Corps to be in readiness to meet the enemy should they attempt to
force a passage anywhere between United States Ford and Banks'
Ford. Resolved to obtain certain information at all hazards, on
the 7th of June he ordered Pleasonton to make a forced reconnoissance
with all the available cavalry of the army, in the direction of
Culpeper, to ascertain whether the Confederate forces were really
concentrating there, with a view to an invasion of the North.

Should this prove to be the case, Hooker desired to cross the river,
to envelop and destroy Hill's corps, and then follow up the main
body as they proceeded northward, thus intercepting their communications
with Richmond. The authorities at Washington, however, did not
look with much equanimity upon the possibility of finding Lee's
army interposed between them and the Army of the Potomac, so they
refused to sanction the plan and it was abandoned.

Nevertheless, in my opinion it was about the best method that could
have been devised to check the invasion, provided that Hooker did
not lose his water-base; for Lee always showed himself very sensitive
whenever his communications with Richmond was threatened. If that
was severed no more _ammunition_ or military supplies would reach
him. The amount of cartridges on hand was necessarily limited.
It would soon be expended in constant skirmishes and engagements,
and then he would be helpless and at the mercy of his antagonist.
Consequently, the moment he heard that a portion of the Sixth Corps
had crossed and confronted Hill, he directed Ewell and Longstreet
to halt at Locust Grove, near Chancellorsville, and be in readiness
to return to Fredericksburg to assist Hill in case there was any
danger of his being overpowered. Finding Sedgwick's advance was
a mere reconnoissance, the two rebel corps resumed their march to
Culpeper.

Hooker deemed it essential to success, that all troops connected
with the theatre of invasion should be placed under his command,
so that they could act in unison. In his opinion most of their
strength was wasted in discordant expeditions, which were useless
as regards the general result. He referred more particularly to
General Dix's command at Old Point Comfort, General Heintzelman's
command in Washington, and General Schenck's troops posted at
Baltimore, along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and in the Valley
of the Shenandoah. This request was reasonable and should have
been granted. Hooker's demands, however, were not considered
favorably. There was no very good feeling between General Halleck,
who was commander of the army, and himself; and as he felt that
his efforts were neither seconded nor approved at headquarters, he
soon after resigned the command.

The main body of the Union cavalry at this time was at Warrenton
and Catlett's Station. Hooker, having been dissatisfied with the
result of the cavalry operations during the Chancellorsville
campaign, had displaced Stoneman in favor of Major-General Alfred
Pleasonton.

CHAPTER X.
BATTLE OF BRANDY STATION (FLEETWOOD).

The 8th of June was a day of preparation on both sides. Pleasonton
was engaged in collecting his troops and getting everything in
readiness to beat up the enemy's quarters the next morning, and
Stuart was preparing to cross for the purpose of either making a
raid on the railroad, as Pleasonton states, or to take up a position
to guard the right flank of the invading force as it passed by our
army. Major McClellan, Stuart's adjutant-general, asserts the
latter. Pleasonton's information was founded on captured despatches,
and on interviews held by some of our officers with the Confederates
under a flag of truce.

The four batteries of Jones' cavalry brigade moved down near the
river opposite Beverly Ford on the 7th, to cover the proposed
crossing. They were imperfectly supported by the remainder of
Stuart's force. Jones' brigade was posted on the road to Beverly
Ford, that of Fitz Lee* on the other side of Hazel River; that of
Robertson along the Rappahannock below the railroad; that of W. H.
F. Lee on the road to Melford Ford, and that of Hampton in reserve,
near Fleetwood Hill--all too far off to be readily available. In
fact, the batteries were entirely unsuspicious of danger, although
they were a quarter of a mile from the nearest support and there
was only a thin line of pickets between their guns and the river.

[* A familiar abbreviation for Fitz Hugh Lee, adopted in the rebel
reports.]

In the meantime Pleasonton's three divisions, "stiffened"--to use
one of Hooker's expressions--by two brigades of infantry, stole
down to the fords and lay there during the night, quietly, and
without fires, ready at the first dawn of day to spring upon their
too-confident adversaries and give them a rude awakening.

Pleasonton in person remained with Buford's division--the First--
which was lying near Beverly Ford with Ames' infantry brigade.

The other two divisions, the Second, under Colonel Duffie, and the
Third, under General Gregg--supported by Russell's infantry brigade,
were in bivouac opposite Kelly's Ford.

As each commander is apt to overstate the enemy's force and underrate
his own, it is not always easy to get at the facts. Pleasonton
claims that the rebels had about twelve thousand cavalry and twelve
guns. Major McClellan of Stuart's staff, puts the number at nine
thousand three hundred and thirty-five men, on paper, and twenty
guns; but states there were nearly three thousand absentees.

General Gregg estimates the Union cavalry at about nine thousand
men and six batteries, but--as will be seen hereafter--a third of
this force was detached toward Stevensburg, and their operations
had little or no effect on the general result. The batteries do
not seem to have been brought forward in time to be of much service.

At daybreak Pleasonton's troops began to cross; Buford's division
and Ames' infantry at Beverly Ford; the other two divisions, under
Gregg and Duffie, with Russell's infantry at Kelly's Ford, six
miles below. Each division was accompanied by two light batteries.

Pleasonton's plan was founded on the erroneous supposition that
the enemy were at Culpeper. He used the infantry to keep the lines
of retreat open, and directed the cavalry to rendezvous at Brandy
Station. They were to arrive there at the same time, and attack
together. Duffie's column was to make a circuit by way of Stevensburg.
Unfortunately, Stuart was not at Culpeper, but at Brandy Station;
that is, he occupied the point where they were to rendezvous, and
the plan therefore appertained practically to the same vicious
system of converging columns against a central force. What happened
may be briefly stated as follows: The First Division, under Buford,
came upon the enemy between Brandy Station and Beverly Ford. A
battle ensued at St. James' Church, and as their whole force
confronted him, and they had twenty pieces of artillery, he was
unable to break their line. After fighting some hours he was
obliged to turn back with a portion of his command to repel an
attempt against his line of retreat. Gregg next appeared upon the
scene, and succeeded in getting in Stuart's rear before the rebel
general knew he was there. Buford having gone back toward Beverly
Ford, as stated, Gregg in his turn, fought the whole of Stuart's
force without the co-operation of either Buford or Duffie. It can
hardly be said that Duffie's column took any part in the action,
for he did not reach Brandy Station until late in the day. And
then, as the rebel infantry were approaching, Pleasonton ordered
a retreat.

For the future instruction of the reader it may be well to state
that every cavalry charge, unless supported by artillery or infantry,
is necessarily repulsed by a counter-charge; for when the force of
the attack is spent, the men who make it are always more or less
scattered, and therefore unable to contend against the impetus of
a fresh line of troops, who come against them at full speed and
strike in mass.

Stuart's headquarters were twice taken by Gregg's division, and a
company desk captured with very important despatches, but the enemy
had the most men, and most artillery near the point attacked, and
therefore always regained, by a counter-charge, the ground that
had been lost.

Stuart claims to have repulsed the last attack of Pleasonton against
Fleetwood Hill, and to have taken three guns, besides driving our
cavalry back across the river.

Pleasonton claims to have fully accomplished the object of his
reconnoissance, to have gained valuable information which enabled
Hooker to thwart Lee's plans; and to have so crippled the rebel
cavalry that its efficiency was very much impaired for the remainder
of the campaign; so that Lee was forced to take the indirect route
of the valley, instead of the direct one along the eastern base of
the Blue Ridge, behind his cavalry as a screen; his original
intention having been to enter Maryland at Poolesville and Monocacy.

GETTYSBURG.

CHAPTER I.
THE INVASION OF THE NORTH.

An invasion of the North being considered as both practicable and
necessary, it only remained to select the most available route.

There was no object in passing east of Hooker's army, and it would
have been wholly impracticable to do so, as the wide rivers to be
crossed were controlled by our gunboats.

To attempt to cross the Rappahannock to the west, and in the
immediate vicinity of Fredericksburg, would have been hazardous,
because when an army is crossing, the portion which is over is
liable to be crushed before it can be reinforced.

It would seem that Lee's first intention was to move along the
eastern base of the Blue Ridge directly toward Washington.* The
appearance of his army on Hooker's flank would be a kind of taunt
and threat, calculated to draw the latter out of his shell, and
induce him to make an attack. In such a case, as the rebels were
in the highest spirits, in consequence of their recent victory at
Chancellorsville, their commander had little doubt of the result.
This plan was feasible enough, provided his cavalry could beat back
that of Pleasonton and act as a screen to conceal his movements.
This they were not in a condition to do after the battle of Brandy
Station, and Lee was thus forced to take the route down the Shenandoah
Valley, which had many advantages. The mountain wall that intervened
between the two armies, was a sure defence against our forces, for
it was covered by dense thickets, and the roads that lead through
the gaps, and the gaps themselves, were easy to fortify and hold
against a superior force. If Hooker had attempted to assail these
positions, one corps could have held him in check, while the other
two captured Washington.

[* See map facing page 1.]

The movement also favored the subsistence of the troops, for the
valley being a rich agricultural region, Lee was enabled to dispense
with much of his transportation and feed his army off the country.

There was one serious obstacle, however, to his further progress
in that direction, and that was the presence of a gallant soldier,
Milroy, with a very considerable Union garrison intrenched at
Winchester.

It was essential to Lee's advance that the valley should be cleared
of Union troops, otherwise they would sally forth after he passed
and capture his convoys.

With this object in view, on the 10th Ewell's corps passed through
Gaines' Cross Roads, and halted near Flint Hill on their way to
Chester Gap and Front Royal.

The possibility of an invasion had been discussed for some days in
Washington, and Halleck had come to the conclusion that it was
better to withdraw the stores and ammunition from Winchester, and
retain the post there merely as a lookout, to give warning of the
enemy's approach. Accordingly, on the 11th, Milroy received orders
from his department commander, General Schenck, to send his armament
and supplies back to Harper's Ferry. Milroy remonstrated, saying
that he could hold the place against any force that would probably
attack him, and that it would be cruel to sacrifice the Union men
who looked to him for protection.

In reply to this Schenck telegraphed him that he might remain, but
must be in readiness to retreat whenever circumstances made it
necessary.

Milroy, in answer to another inquiry, reported that he could move
in six hours.

On the 12th he sent out two scouting parties, and learned there
was a considerable force at Cedarsville, which he thought might
form part of Stuart's raid, information of which had been communicated
to him.

He could not believe it possible that an entire rebel corps was
near him, for he supposed Lee's army was still at Fredericksburg.
His superiors had not informed him, as they should have done by
telegraph, that a large part of it had moved to Culpeper. He
thought if Lee left Hooker's front at Fredericksburg, the Army of
the Potomac would follow and he would receive full information and
instructions. He telegraphed General Schenck late that night for
specific orders, whether to hold his post or to retreat on Harper's
Ferry, stating there appeared to be a considerable force in front
of him. As the enemy soon after cut the wires, he never received
any answer. He sent a messenger the same night to notify Colonel
McReynolds, at Berryville, that there was a large body of the enemy
on the Front Royal road, and directed him to send out scouts to
Millwood, and keep himself advised of its approach, in order that
he might prepare to fall back on Winchester the moment he was
attacked by superior numbers.

On the 13th Ewell marched with two divisions directly on Winchester,
while he sent the third--that of Rodes--to take Berryville. Thanks
to the timely warning McReynolds had received, his brigade got off
in time, his rear being covered by Alexander's battery, the 6th
Maryland Infantry, and part of the 1st New York (Lincoln) Cavalry.
These detained the enemy two hours, and then caught up with the
main body. Jenkins' cavalry came upon the retreating force at
Opequan Creek, where he made a fierce attack, which was promptly
repulsed by the rear guard, aided by the artillery with canister.
After this there was no further molestation, and McReynolds' command
reached Winchester at 10 P.M.--a march of thirty miles.

Soon after the affair at the Opequan, Major Morris, with 200 men,
was attacked at Bunker Hill, an outlying post of Winchester. He
occupied a fortified church, but moved out to meet the enemy, under
the impression it was only a small raiding party. When he found
two thousand men in line of battle he retreated, fighting, to the
church again. There, as the doors were barricaded, and the walls
loopholed, the rebels could make no impression, and were obliged
to fall back to a respectful distance. In the night Morris managed
to steal away, and soon rejoined the main body at Winchester.

The arrival of these reinforcements seriously embarrassed Milroy;
and it will be seen hereafter that it would have been much better
for all concerned if they had retreated to Harper's Ferry at once.
They acted, however, strictly in obedience to orders.

Rodes' division, after the taking of Berryville, kept on towards
Martinsburg, and bivouacked at a place called Summit Point.

On the morning of the 13th Milroy had sent out a detachment under
General Elliot on the Strasburg road, and another under Colonel
Ely on the Front Royal road, to reconnoitre. Eliott found no enemy,
and returned. An attempt was made to cut him off from the town,
but it was repulsed. His troops were then massed on the south side
behind Mill Creek and a mill-race which ran parallel to it, and
were protected by stone fences. Colonel Ely had a brisk artillery
skirmish with Ewell's advance, and then fell back to Winchester,
taking post at the junction of the Front Royal and Strasburg roads.
The enemy did not attempt to cross the creek that night, but at 5
P.M. they advanced and captured a picket-post which commanded the
Strasburg road, but were soon driven out.

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