Chancellorsville and Gettysburg

A >> Abner Doubleday >> Chancellorsville and Gettysburg

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[* When Spear's column was broken, the 82d Pennsylvania, under
Colonel Bassett, came forward in support, but was crushed with the
same fire. Colonel Shaler's remaining regiment, the 67th New York,
followed by the remnant of Bassett's regiment, forced their way
over the crest to the right of Colonel Johns' column.]

The coveted heights, which Burnside had been unable to take with
his whole army, were in our possession, together with about a
thousand prisoners; but the loss of the Sixth Corps was severe,
for nearly a thousand men were killed, wounded, and missing in less
than five minutes. The attack was over so soon that Early did not
get back Hays' brigade, which had been detached to oppose Gibbon,
in time to assist in the defence. Newton says if there had been
a hundred men on Marye's Hill we could not have taken it.

The rebel force was now divided, and thrown off toward Richmond in
eccentric directions.

All that remained for Sedgwick to do was to keep straight on the
Plank Road toward Chancellorsville. Had he done so at once he
would have anticipated the enemy in taking possession of the strong
position of Salem Church, and perhaps have captured Wilcox's and
Hays' brigades. But it was not intended by Providence that we
should win this battle, which had been commenced by a boasting
proclamation of what was to be accomplished; and obstacles were
constantly occurring of the most unexpected character. After
directing Gibbon to hold the town and cover the bridges there,
Sedgwick, instead of pushing on, halted to reform his men, and sent
back for Brooks' division, which was still at its old position
three miles below Fredericksburg, to come up and take the advance.
It was full 3 P.M. before the final start was made. This delay
gave Hays time to rejoin Early by making a detour around the head
of Sedgwick's column, and Wilcox took advantage of it to select a
strong position at Guest's House, open fire with his artillery,
and detain Sedgwick still longer. Wilcox then retreated toward
the river road, but finding he was not pursued, and that Sedgwick
was advancing with great caution, he turned back and occupied for
a short time the Toll Gate, half a mile from Salem Church, where
McLaws' division was formed with one of Anderson's brigades on his
left. When Sedgwick advanced Wilcox fell back and joined the main
body at the church.

The other brigades of Anderson's were sent to hold the junction of
the Mine road and the River road.

When the pursuit ceased, Early reassembled his command near Cox's
house and made immediate arrangements to retake the Fredericksburg
heights, and demonstrate against Sedgwick's rear.

McLaws formed his line about 2 P.M. in the strip of woods which
runs along the low ridge at Salem Church; two brigades being posted
on each side of the road about three hundred yards back. Wilcox's
brigade, when driven in, was directed to take post in the church
and an adjacent school-house, which were used as citadels. This
was a strong position, for the rebels were sheltered by the woods,
while our troops were forced to advance over an open country, cut
up by ravines parallel to McLaws' front, which broke up their
organization to some extent, and destroyed the _elan_ of the attack.
After a brief artillery contest, which soon ended, as the enemy
were out of ammunition, Brooks' division went forward about 4 P.M.,
and made a gallant charge, in which Bartlett's brigade, aided by
Willston's battery, captured the buildings and drove in part of
Wilcox's line. The New Jersey brigade charged at the same time on
his right, and Russell's brigade on his left. Wilcox placed himself
at the head of his reserve regiments, and aided by Semmes' brigade,
made a fierce counter-charge. The combat for the school-house
raged with great fury, each party breaking the other's line and
being broken in turn. Finally, after much desperate fighting,
Bartlett was obliged to yield the portion of the crest he had held
which was a key to the position; for as he was not strongly and
promptly reinforced, as he should have been, his withdrawal from
the church and school-house made a gap which forced the other
portions of the line to retreat to avoid being taken in flank.
Brooks was therefore driven back to the shelter of the guns at the
Toll House. Then Newton's division came up and formed on his right
and part of Howe's division on the left.

The Union artillery was well served and destructive, and as Newton
had arrived, McLaws found his farther progress checked and was glad
to get back to the ridge. Bartlett's attack should have been
deferred until Newton's division was near enough to support it.
In that case it would undoubtedly have succeeded.

Sedgwick's left now rested on a point nearly a mile from Salem
Church, while his right under Wheaton was somewhat advanced.

Up to this time the fight had been between Brooks' division and
McLaws' mixed command. It was now decided that a second attempt
should be made by Newton's division, but Newton states that the
design was abandoned because Howe's division, which was to support
him, had gone into camp without orders, and was not immediately
available. Before new arrangements could be made darkness came
on, and both armies bivouacked on the ground they occupied. Brooks'
division in the assault just made had lost 1,500 men, and Sedgwick
no longer felt confident of forcing his way alone through the
obstacle that beset him. Nevertheless, trusting to the speedy and
hearty co-operation of Hooker, he stood ready to renew the attempt
on the morrow, although he foresaw the enemy would fortify their
line during the night and make it truly formidable.

When Wilcox left Banks' Ford to aid in the defence of Salem Church,
General H. W. Benham of the United States Engineer Corps, who
commanded an engineer brigade there, threw over a bridge at Scott's
dam, about a mile below Banks' Ford, to communicate with Sedgwick,
enable him to retreat in case of disaster, and connect his headquarters
with those of Hooker by telegraph.

Hooker disapproved the laying of the bridges, which he thought
superfluous, as Sedgwick's orders were to keep on to Chancellorsville.
Warren took advantage of this new and short route to return to the
main army, in order to give Hooker information as to Sedgwick's
position. He promised to send back full instructions for the
guidance of the latter.

As soon as the bridge was laid, General J. T. Owens with his brigade
of the Second Corps, which had been guarding the ford, crossed over
and reported to Sedgwick.

Warren found Hooker in a deep sleep, and still suffering from the
concussion that took place in the morning. He gathered from the
little he did say, that Sedgwick must rely upon himself, and not
upon the main body for deliverance, and he so informed Sedgwick.

CHAPTER VIII.
MAY FOURTH.--ATTACK ON SEDGWICK'S FORCE.

As Hooker seemed disposed to be inactive, Lee thought he might
venture to still further augment the force in front of Sedgwick,
with a view to either capture the Sixth Corps or force it to recross
the river. He therefore directed Anderson to reinforce McLaws with
the remainder of his division, leaving only what was left of
Jackson's old corps to confront Hooker. Anderson had gone over to
the right, opposite the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, and had opened
with a battery upon the wagon trains which were parked in that
vicinity, creating quite a stampede, until his guns were driven
away by the Twelfth Corps. In this skirmish, General Whipple,
commanding the Third Division of Sickles' corps, was killed. In
the meantime, Early had retaken the heights of Fredericksburg,
which were merely held by a picket guard of Gibbon's division, so
that, when Anderson arrived and took post on the right of McLaws,
parallel to the Plank Road, Sedgwick found himself environed on
three sides by the enemy; only the road to Banks' Ford remained
open, and even that was endangered by bands of rebels, who roamed
about in rear of our forces. At one time it is said they could
have captured him and his headquarters. Fortunately the tents
which constituted the latter were of so unpretending a character,
that they gave no indication of being tenanted by the commanding
general.

Hooker had resumed the command, although manifestly incapable of
directing affairs; for the concussion must have affected his brain.
At all events, although he had almost thirty-seven thousand fresh
men, ready and desirous of entering into the combat, and probably
only had about seventeen thousand worn out men in front of him, he
failed to do anything to relieve Sedgwick's force, which was now
becoming seriously compromised. A feeble and ineffectual reconnoissance
was indeed attempted, and as that was promptly resisted, Hooker
gave up the idea of any advance, and left Sedgwick to get out of
the difficulty the best way he could. At 11 A.M., Sedgwick wrote,
stating the obstacles which beset him, and requesting the active
assistance of the main army. He was directed, in reply, not to
attack, unless the main body at Chancellorsville did the same.
All remained quiet until 4 P.M. The Sixth Corps were then formed
on three sides of a square inclosing Banks' Ford, with the flanks
resting on the river. Howe's division faced east toward Fredericksburg,
against Early, who confronted him in that direction, and his left
stretched out to Taylor's Hill on the Rappahannock. Newton's
division, together with Russell's brigade of Brooks' division,
faced McLaws on the west, and Brooks' other two brigades--those of
Bartlett and Torbert--were opposed to Anderson on the south. The
entire line was very long and thin.

Early and McLaws had been skirmishing on their fronts all day, but
it was 6 P.M. before everything was in readiness for the final
advance. An attempt had, however, been made by Early to turn Howe's
left and cut Sedgwick off from the river; but it was promptly met
and the enemy were repulsed with a loss of two hundred prisoners
and a battle-flag.

Sedgwick felt his position to be a precarious one. His line was
six miles long, and he had but about twenty thousand men with which
to hold it against twenty-five thousand of the enemy. He thought,
too, that reinforcements had come up from Richmond and that the
enemy's force far exceeded his own. It was evident he could not
recross the river in broad daylight without sacrificing a great
part of his corps, and he determined to hold on until night. Benham
took the precaution to throw over a second bridge, and this prudent
measure, in Sedgwick's opinion, saved his command. Lee, after
personally reconnoitring the position, gave orders to break in the
centre of the Sixth Corps so as to defeat the two wings, throw them
off in eccentric directions, and scatter the whole force. When
this was attempted, Sedgwick detached Wharton's brigade from Newton's
right, and sent it to reinforce that part of the line. At 6 P.M.
three guns were fired as a signal from Alexander's battery and the
Confederate forces pressed forward to the attack. Newton's front
was not assailed, and the right of Brooks' division easily repulsed
the enemy who advanced in that direction, with the fire of the
artillery and the skirmish line alone.

The main effort of the evening was made by Early's division, which
advanced in columns of battalions, to turn Howe's left, and cut
that flank off from the river. Howe's artillery, under charge of
Major J. Watts de Peyster, a mere youth, was admirably posted and
did great execution on these heavy columns. De Peyster himself
rode out and established a battery, a considerable distance in
advance of the main line, and the enemy pressed forward eagerly to
capture it; after doing so they were suddenly confronted by several
regiments in ambush, which rose up and delivered a fire which threw
Hays' and Hoke's brigades into great confusion, and caused them to
make a precipitate retreat. An attack against Howe's right was
also repulsed. In the ardor of pursuit, Howe swung that flank
around and captured the 8th Louisiana Regiment, but in doing so,
he exposed his rear to Gordon, who came down a ravine behind him,
so that he was compelled to fall back and take up a new line. Howe
had carefully selected a reserve position and made dispositions to
hold it. Fresh assaults on his left finally forced General Neill
to retreat to it with his brigade. The enemy followed him up
promptly, but were driven back in disorder by Grant's Vermont
brigade, two regiments of Newton's division and Butler's regular
battery of the 2d United States Artillery. Newton thinks this last
attack on Howe was local and accidental, for as the other divisions
were not assailed, a concentrated attack on Howe would have destroyed
him.

Darkness at last put an end to the strife. Newton, being an engineer
officer by profession, had previously been sent by Sedgwick to
select a new line to cover the bridges, and the army was ordered
to fall back there. It did so without confusion, the roads having
been carefully picketed. Brooks took position on Newton's left,
after which Howe's division, whose right flank for a time had been
"in the air," withdrew also an hour later than the others, and
prolonged the line to the left. Howe complained that he was deserted
by Sedgwick, but the latter appears to have sent Wheaton's brigade
and other reinforcements to aid his retreat. The movement to the
rear was favored by the darkness and a thick fog, which settled
over the valleys, but did not extend to the high ground. As Benham
and Sedgwick, who were classmates at West Point, walked on the
slope of the hill where the men were lying--the crest above being
held by thirty-four guns on the opposite side of the river--Benham
cautioned Sedgwick not to recross under any circumstances without
his entire command, nor without Hooker's express sanction, advice
which Sedgwick was wise enough to follow.

The enemy did not assail the new position or attempt to interfere
with the crossing which soon after took place. When it was nearly
concluded, an order came from Hooker countermanding it, but it was
then too late to return.

Howe thinks Sedgwick should not have crossed, as the last attack
on the left, which was the vital point, had been repulsed. This
may be so, in the light of after-consideration, but it was very
doubtful at the time, and as Sedgwick had lost a fraction under
five thousand men in these operations, and was acting under the
false information that additional forces had come up from Richmond,
he felt that he had fully borne his share of the burden, and that
it was better to place his corps beyond the risk of capture, than
to run the chances of renewing the battle. It would, undoubtedly,
have been of immense advantage to the cause if he could have
continued to hold Taylor's Hill, which dominated the country round,
and was the key of the battle-field; for in that case Hooker might
have withdrawn from Lee's front and joined Sedgwick, which would
have been attaining the object for which our main army left Falmouth,
and made the turning movement. He would thus have gained a strategic
if not a tactical victory; his shortcomings would have been forgotten,
and he would have been regarded as one of the greatest strategists
of the age. Hooker, however, had left so many things undone, that
it is by no means certain he would have carried out this policy,
although he expressed his intention to do so. Sedgwick's movement,
in my opinion, added another example to the evil effects of converging
columns against a central force.

There is little more to add in relation to Hooker's operations.
On the night of the 4th, he called a council of war, and after
stating the situation to them, absented himself, in order that they
might have full liberty to discuss the subject. Reynolds was
exhausted, and went to sleep, saying that his vote would be the
same as that of Meade. Meade voted to remain, because he thought
it would be impossible to cross in the presence of the enemy.
Sickles and Couch voted to retreat. Howard voted to remain, without
reference to the situation of the army, because in his opinion his
corps had behaved badly, and he wished to retrieve its reputation.
Slocum was not present. The final result was that Hooker determined
to cross, although the majority of votes were against it. The
votes of Meade and Howard, however, were qualified in such a way
as to give the impression they were in favor of a retreat.

Owing to a sudden rise in the river the bridges became too short,
and there was some doubt as to the practicability of passing over
them, but by taking down one, and piecing the others with it, the
difficulty was overcome and the army retired, without being followed
up, under cover of thirty-two guns posted on the heights on the
opposite bank. Meade's corps acted as rear guard.

Hooker left his killed and wounded behind, and had lost 14 guns
and 20,000 stand of arms.

It only remains to give a brief statement of the operations of
Stoneman's cavalry. These were of no avail as regard the battle
of Chancellorsville, for our army was defeated and in full retreat
before Lee's main line of communication with Richmond was struck,
and then all the damage was repaired in three or four days. There
seems to have been a lack of information as to where to strike;
for the principal depot of the rebel army was at Guiney's station
on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. The supplies there
were but slightly guarded, and could easily have been captured.
Had this been done, Lee would have been seriously embarrassed,
notwithstanding his victory, and forced to fall back to obtain
subsistence.

Stoneman, upon setting out on the expedition, left one division of
4,000 men under Averell to do the fighting, and dispose of any
force that might attempt to interfere with the movements of the
main body. Averell accordingly followed W. H. F. Lee's two regiments
to Rapidan Station, and remained there skirmishing on the 1st of
May. His antagonist then burned the bridge, and fell back on
Gordonsville. As Averell was about to ford the river and follow,
he received orders from Hooker to return; he came back to Elley's
Ford on the 2d, which he reached at half past ten at night. As
his return was useless and unnecessary, he has been severely
censured, but it was not made of his own volition. Soon after Fitz
Hugh Lee made a dash at his camp, but was repulsed. On the 3d
Averell made a reconnoissance on Hooker's right, with a view to
attack the enemy there, but finding the country impracticable for
cavalry, returned to Elley's Ford. Hooker, who was not in the best
of humor at the time, became dissatisfied with his operations,
relieved him from command, and appointed Pleansonton to take his
place.

In the meantime, the main body under Stoneman pressed forward, and
reached Louisa Court House early on the morning of the 2d. Parties
were at once ordered out to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad
above and below that point. One of W. H. F. Lee's regiments drove
back a detachment of Union cavalry which was moving on Gordonsville,
but reinforcements went forward and Lee was driven back in his turn.

In the evening Stoneman made his headquarters at Thompson's Cross
Roads, and from there despatched regiments in different directions
to burn and destroy.

One party under Colonel Wyndham, 1st New Jersey, was engaged all
day on the 3d in injuring the canal at Columbia, and in attempts
to blow up the aqueduct over the Rivanna.

Colonel Kilpatrick moved with his regiment, the 2d New York, across
the country, passing within two miles and a half of Richmond, and
creating great consternation there. He struck and destroyed a
portion of the Fredericksburg Railroad--Lee's main line of supply
--on the 4th, at Hungary Station, ten miles from Richmond, and
burned Meadow Bridge, over the Chickahominy at the railroad crossing.
He then turned north again, crossed the Pamunkey, and ended his
long ride at Gloucester Point, which was garrisoned by our troops.

Another regiment--the 12th Illinois, under Colonel Davis--went to
Ashland and moved up and down the railroad, doing a good deal of
damage. It captured a train full of Confederate wounded and paroled
them. After a brief encounter with an infantry and artillery force
at Tunstall's Station, it also turned north, and made its way over
the Pamunkey and Mattapony rivers to Gloucester Point.

Two regiments, the 1st Maine and 1st Maryland, under General Gregg,
started down the South Anna River, burning bridges over common
roads and railroads. After destroying Hanover Junction, it returned
to headquarters.

One of two other small parties were sent on flying excursions to
assist in the work of destruction.

On the 5th, Stoneman started to return, and the entire command with
the exception of that portion which was at Gloucester Point,
recrossed at Kelly's Ford on the 8th.

The losses in each army were heavy. An extract is here given from
the official reports, but it is said the Confederate statement is
far from being accurate.

LOSSES AT CHANCELLORSVILLE.

UNION.
Killed and
Wounded. Missing. Total.
First Corps (Reynolds). . . . . 192 100 292
Second Corps (Couch). . . . . . 1,525 500 2,025
Third Corps (Sickles) . . . . . 3,439 600 4,089
Fifth Corps (Meade) . . . . . . 399 300 699
Sixth Corps (Sedgwick). . . . . 3,601 1,000 4,601
Eleventh Corps (Howard) . . . . 568 2,000 2,508
Twelfth Corps (Slocum). . . . . 2,383 500 2,883
Cavalry, etc. . . . . . . . . . 150 150

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,197 5,000 17,197

CONFEDERATE.
Killed and
Wounded. Missing. Total.
Early's Division . . . . . . . 851 500 1,351
A. P. Hill's Division . . . . . 2,583 500? 3,083
Colston's Division . . . . . . 1,868 450? 2,318
Rodes' Division . . . . . . . . 2,178 713 2,891
Anderson's Division . . . . . . 1,180 210 1,390
McLaws' Division . . . . . . . 1,379 380 1,759
Artillery and Cavalry . . . . . 227 227

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,266 2,753 13,019

The following extract from Harpers' "History of the Great Rebellion"
states the causes of Hooker's defeat in a very able manner, but I
do not agree with the author in his estimate of the great danger
Lee ran from the converging columns of Sedgwick and Hooker. It is
true Lee tried the same system, and succeeded, by sending Jackson
around to attack Hooker's right, but the success was due solely to
the utter lack of all preparations on the part of Howard to meet
the emergency, and to Hooker's failure to make use of the ample
means at his disposal to prevent the junction of Stuart and
Anderson.

Mr. Alden, the author of the work in question, says:

"There was not, in fact, any moment between Thursday afternoon and
Tuesday morning when success was not wholly within the grasp of
the Union army. The movement by which Chancellorsville was reached,
and the Confederate position rendered worthless, was brilliantly
conceived and admirably executed. The initial error, by which
alone all else was rendered possible, was that halt at Chancellorsville.
Had the march been continued for an hour longer, or even been
resumed early in the following morning, the army would have got
clear of the Wilderness without meeting any great opposing force,
and then it would have been in a position where its great superiority
of numbers would have told. The rout of Howard's corps was possible
only from the grossest neglect of all military precautions. Jackson,
after a toilsome march of ten hours, halted for three hours in open
ground, not two miles from the Union lines. A single picket, sent
for a mile up a broad road would have discovered the whole movement
in ample time for Howard to have strengthened his position, or to
have withdrawn from it without loss. The blame of this surprise
can not, however, fairly be laid upon Hooker. He had a right to
presume that whoever was in command there would have so picketed
his lines as to prevent the possibility of being surprised in broad
daylight. But even as it was, the disaster to the Eleventh Corps
should have had no serious effect upon the general result. That
was fully remedied when the pursuit was checked. On Sunday morning
Hooker was in a better position than he had been on the evening
before. He had lost 3,000 men and had been strengthened by 17,000,
and now had 78,000 to oppose to 47,000. The Confederate army was
divided, and could reunite only by winning a battle or by a day's
march. The only thing which could have lost the battle of that
day was the abandonment of the position at Hazel Grove, for from
this alone was it possible to enfilade Slocum's line. But surely
it is within the limits of military forethought that a general who
has occupied a position for two days and three nights should have
discovered the very key to that position, when it lay within a mile
of his own headquarters. The disabling of Hooker could not, indeed,
have been foreseen; but such an accident might happen to any
commander upon any field; and there should have been somewhere some
man with authority to have, within the space of three hours, brought
into action some of the more than 30,000 men within sound, and
almost within sight, of the battle then raging. How the hours from
Sunday noon till Monday night were wasted has been shown. Hooker,
indeed, reiterates that he could not assail the Confederate lines
through the dense forests. But Lee broke through those very woods
on Sunday, and was minded to attempt it again on Wednesday, when
he found that the enemy had disappeared. The golden opportunity
was lost, never to be recovered, and the Confederate Army of Northern
Virginia gained a new lease of life."

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