Chancellorsville and Gettysburg

A >> Abner Doubleday >> Chancellorsville and Gettysburg

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This order was given under the impression that Sedgwick had not
crossed with his main body, but only with Howe's division, whereas
he was at the bridge heads, three miles below Fredericksburg, on
the south side of the river. Hooker probably forgot that he had
ordered a demonstration to be made against the Bowling Green road
on the 1st, and that Sedgwick went over to make it.

CHAPTER VII.
THE BATTLE OF THE THIRD OF MAY.

The Eleventh Corps were now sent to the extreme left of the line
to reorganize. There they were sheltered behind the strong works
thrown up by Humphrey's division, and were not so liable to be
attacked.

The new line laid out by Hooker's order was on a low ridge
perpendicular to the Plank Road, and opposite and at right angles
to the right of Slocum's front. It was strongly supported by the
artillery of the Third, Twelfth, and part of the Eleventh Corps,
massed under Captain Best on the heights at Fairview, in the rear
and to the left. Sickles was ordered to fall back to it at dawn
of day, Birney to lead the way, and Whipple (Graham's brigade) to
bring up the rear. The Plank Road ran through the centre of the
position, Birney being on the left and Berry on the right, with
Whipple's division on a short line in rear, as a reserve. French's
division of Couch's corps was posted on Berry's right, the other
division (that of Hancock) remained between Mott Run and
Chancellorsville.

When the movement began, Birney's division, on the left of Whipple's,
occupied the high ground at Hazel Grove, facing the Plank Road,
Graham's brigade being on the extreme left. This was a very
aggressive position, since it took every column that advanced
against Sickles' new line directly in flank, and therefore it was
indispensable for the rebel commander to capture Hazel Grove before
he advanced against the main body of the Third Corps, which held
the Plank Road. This hill was not quite so high as that at Fairview,
but our artillery on it had great range, and the post should have
been maintained at all hazards. The cavalry who had so ably defended
it fell back, in obedience to orders, to the Chancellorsville House,
to support the batteries in that vicinity, and I think one regiment
was sent to report to Sedgwick. Whipple commenced the movement by
sending off his artillery and that of Birney. Graham's brigade
was the rear guard. Its retreat was covered by the fire of
Huntington's battery on the right. The moment the enemy saw that
Graham was retiring, Archer's brigade of A. P. Hill's division
charged, attained the top of the hill, and succeeded in capturing
four guns. Elated by his success, Archer pressed forward against
Huntington's battery, but was rudely repulsed; for Sickles opened
on him also with a battery from Fairview. He managed to hold the
four guns until Doles' brigade of Rodes' division came to his aid.
The two took the hill, for Whipple had no instructions to defend
it. He retired in perfect order to the new position assigned him.
Huntington's battery, supported by two regiments sent out by Sickles,
covered the retreat, but suffered considerable loss in doing so,
as one regiment was withdrawn and the other gave way. Ward's
brigade was then sent to the right and Hayman's brigade held in
reserve.

Stuart, who was now in command of Jackson's corps, saw at a glance
the immense importance of this capture, and did not delay a moment
in crowning the hill with thirty pieces of artillery, which soon
began to play with fatal effect upon our troops below; upon
Chancellorsville; and upon the crest occupied by Slocum, which it
enfiladed, and as McLaws' batteries also enfiladed Slocum's line
from the opposite side, it seems almost miraculous that he was able
to hold it at all.

Simultaneously with the attack against Hazel Grove came a fierce
onslaught on that part of Sickles' line to the left of the road,
accompanied by fierce yells and cries of _"Remember Jackson!"_ a
watch-word which it was supposed would excite the rebels to strenuous
efforts to avenge the fatal wound of their great leader. It was
handsomely met and driven back by Mott's brigade, which had come
up from the Ford, and now held the front on that part of the line.
A brilliant counter-charge by the 5th and 7th New Jersey captured
many prisoners and colors.

Sickles' men fought with great determination, but being assailed
by infantry in front and battered almost in flank by the artillery
posted at Hazel Grove, the line was manifestly untenable. After
an obstinate contest the men fell back to the second line, which
was but partially fortified, and soon after to the third line,
which was more strongly intrenched, and which they held to the
close of the fight.

McGowan's, Lane's, and Heth's brigades of A. P. Hill's division
charged resolutely over this line also; but they suffered heavily
from Best's guns at Fairview, and were driven back by Colonel
Franklin's and Colonel Bowman's brigades of Whipple's division,
which made an effective counter-charge. Whipple's other brigade,
that of Graham, had been sent to relieve one of Slocum's brigades
on the left of the line, which was out of ammunition. It held its
position there for two hours.

While this attack was taking place on the left of the road, Pender's
and Thomas' brigades, also of Hill's division, charged over the
works on the right; but when the others retreated they were left
without support and were compelled to retire also. They reformed,
however; tried it again, and once more succeeded in holding temporary
possession of part of the line, but were soon driven out again.

French's division of Couch's corps was now brought up, and Carroll's
brigade struck the rebels on the left, and doubled them back on
the centre, capturing a great many prisoners and confusing and
rendering abortive Hill's attack in front. Hill sent for his
reserves to come up, and three rebel brigades were thrown against
Carroll, who was supported by the remainder of French's division
and a brigade from Humphrey's division of Meade's corps, and French's
flank movement was checked. Then another front attack was organized
by the enemy, under cover of their artillery at Hazel Grove, and
Nicholls', Iverson's, and O'Neill's brigades charged over everything,
even up to Best's batteries at Fairview, which they captured; but
our men rallied, and drove them headlong down the hill, back to
the first line Sickles had occupied at daylight. It was a combat
of giants; a tremendous struggle between patriotism on the one hand
and vengeance on the other.

French now tried to follow up this advantage by again pressing
against the Confederate left, but it was reinforced by still another
brigade, and he could make no progress.

The struggle increased in violence. The rebels were determined to
break through our lines, and our men were equally determined not
to give way. Well might De Trobriand style it "a mad and desperate
battle." Mahone said afterward: "The Federals fought like devils
at Chancellorsville." Again Rodes' and Hill's divisions renewed
the attempt and were temporarily successful, and again was the
bleeding remnant of their forces flung back in disorder. Doles'
and Ramseur's brigades of Rodes' division, managed to pass up the
ravine to the right of Slocum's works and gain his right and rear,
but were unsupported there, and Doles was driven out by a concentrated
artillery and musketry fire. Ramseur, who now found himself directly
on Sickles' left flank, succeeded in holding on until the old
Stonewall brigade under Paxton came to his aid, and then they
carried Fairview again, only to be driven out as the others had
been.

The battle had now lasted several hours, and the troops engaged,
as well as the artillery, were almost out of ammunition. There
should have been some staff officer specially charged with this
subject, but there seemed to be no one who could give orders in
relation to it.

The last line of our works was finally taken by the enemy, who
having succeeded in driving off the 3d Maryland of the Twelfth
Corps, on Berry's left, entered near the road and enfiladed the
line to the right and left. Sickles sent Ward's brigade to take
the place of the 3d Maryland, but it did not reach the position
assigned it in time, the enemy being already in possession. In
attempting to remedy this disaster, Berry was killed, and his
successor, General Mott, was wounded. The command then devolved
upon general Revere, who, probably considering further contest
hopeless, led his men out of the action without authority--an
offence for which he was subsequently tried and dismissed the
service.

As the cannon cartridges gave out, the enemy brought up numerous
batteries, under Colonel Carter, in close proximity to Fairview,
and soon overcame all resistance in that direction, driving the
troops and guns from the plain.

Anderson now made a junction with Stuart, and their combined efforts
drove the Third Corps and Williams' division of the Twelfth Corps
back, leaving only Geary and Hancock to maintain the struggle.
Geary was without support, but he still fought on. He faced two
regiments west at right angles to his original line, and by the
aid of his artillery held on for an hour longer; his right brigade
facing south, west, and north.

The Third Corps left their last position at Chancellorsville slowly
and sullenly. Hayman's brigade, not far from the Chancellorsville
House, finding the enemy a good deal disorganized, and coming
forward in a languid and inefficient manner, turned--by Sickles'
direction--and charged, capturing several hundred prisoners and
several colors, and relieving Graham, who was now holding on with
the bayonet, from a most perilous flank attack, enabling him to
withdraw in good order. Sickles himself was soon after injured by
a spent shot of piece of shell, which struck his waist-belt. His
corps and French's division had lost 5,000 out of 22,000.

Our front gradually melted away and passed to the new line in rear
through Humphrey's division of the Fifth Corps, which was posted
about half a mile north of the Chancellorsville House in the edge
of the thicket, to cover the retreat. At last only indomitable
Hancock remained, fighting McLaws with his front line, and keeping
back Stuart and Anderson with his rear line.

The enemy, Jackson's Corps, showed little disposition to follow up
their success. The fact is, these veterans were about fought out,
and became almost inert. They did not, at the last, even press
Hancock, who was still strong in artillery, and he withdrew his
main body in good order, losing however, the 27th Connecticut
regiment, which was posted at the apex of his line on the south,
and was not brought back in time, in consequence of the failure of
a subordinate officer to carry out his orders.

Before Hancock left, his line was taken in reverse, and he was
obliged to throw back part of his force to the left to resist
Anderson, who was trying to force the passage of Mott Run. The
line in that direction was firmly held by Colonel Miles of the 61st
New York, who was shot through the body while encouraging his men
to defend the position.

Stuart's command had lost 7,500 in his attack, and it could hardly
have resisted a fresh force if it had been thrown in. General
William Hays, of the Second Corps, who was taken prisoner, says
they were worn out, and Rodes admits in his report that Jackson's
veterans clung to their intrenchments, and that Ramseur and others
who passed them, urged them to go forward in vain.

Before the close of the action Hooker was importuned for reinforcements,
but to no avail. Perhaps he intended to send them, for about this
time he rushed out and made a passionate appeal to Geary's men to
charge and retake the works they had lost; promising to aid them
by throwing in a heavy force on the enemy's left flank. At this
appeal the exhausted troops put their caps on their bayonets, waved
them aloft, and with loud cheers charged on the rebels and drove
them out once more; but sixty guns opened upon them at close range
with terrible effect; the promised reinforcements did not come;
they were surrounded with ever increasing enemies, and forced to
give up everything and retreat. Stuart and Anderson then formed
their lines on the south of and parallel to the Plank Road, facing
north, and began to fortify the position.

Had they been disposed to follow up the retreat closely they would
have been unable to do so, for now a new and terrible barrier
intervened; the woods on each side of the Plank Road had been set
on fire by the artillery and the wounded and dying were burning in
the flames without a possibility of rescuing them. Let us draw a
veil over this scene, for it is pitiful to dwell upon it.

There was no further change in Stuart's line until the close of
the battle; but Anderson's division was soon after detached against
Sedgwick.

The new line taken up by the Union Army was a semi-ellipse, with
the left resting on the Rappahannock and the right on the Rapidan.
Its centre was at Bullock's House, about three-fourths of a mile
north of Chancellorsville. The approaches were well guarded with
artillery, and the line partially intrenched. The enemy did not
assail it. They made a reconnoissance in the afternoon, but Weed's
artillery at the apex of the line was too strongly posted to be
forced, and Lee soon found other employment for his troops, for
Sedgwick was approaching to attack his rear.

In the history of lost empires we almost invariably find that the
cause of their final overthrow on the battle-field may be traced
to the violation of one military principle, which is that _the
attempt to overpower a central force of converging columns, is
almost always fatal to the assailants_, for a force in the centre,
by the virtue of its position, has nearly double the strength of
one on the circumference. Yet his is the first mistake made by
every tyro in generalship. A strong blow can be given by a sledge-
hammer, but if we divide it into twenty small hammers, the blows
will necessarily be scattering and uncertain. Let us suppose an
army holds the junction of six roads. It seems theoretically
possible that different detachments encircling it, by all attacking
at the same time, must confuse and overpower it; but in practice
the idea is rarely realized, for no two routes are precisely alike,
the columns never move simultaneously, and therefore never arrive
at the same time. Some of this is due to the character of the
commanders. One man is full of dash, and goes forward at once;
another is timid, or at least over-cautious, and advances slowly;
a third stops to recall some outlying detachments, or to make
elaborate preparations. The result is, the outer army has lost
its strength and is always beaten in detail. One portion is sure
to be defeated before the others arrive. We shall have occasion
to refer to this principle again in reference to the battle of
Gettysburg. The history of our own war shows that an attack against
the front and rear of a force is not necessarily fatal. Baird's
division at Chickamauga defended itself successfully against an
assault of this kind, and Hancock faced his division both ways at
Chancellorsville and repelled every attempt to force his position.
But Hooker thought otherwise. He felt certain that if Sedgwick
assailed Lee in rear, while he advanced in front, the Confederate
army was doomed. When the time came, however, to carry out this
programme, if we may use a homely simile borrowed from General De
Peyster, Hooker did not hold up his end of the log, and the whole
weight fell upon Sedgwick.

About this time a pillar of the Chancellorsville House was struck
by a cannon-ball, and Hooker, who was leaning against it at the
moment, was prostrated and severely injured. He revived in a few
minutes, mounted his horse and rode to the rear, but it was some
time before he turned over the command to Couch, who was second in
rank. After this stroke he suffered a great deal from paroxysms
of pain, and was manifestly unfit to give orders, although he soon
resumed the command.

The historian almost refuses to chronicle the startling fact that
37,000 men were kept out of the fight, most of whom had not fired
a shot, and all of whom were eager to go in. The whole of the
First Corps and three-fourths of the Fifth Corps had not been
engaged. These, with 5,000 of the Eleventh Corps, who desired to
retrieve the disaster of the previous day and were ready to advance,
made a new army, which had it been used against Stuart's tired men
would necessarily have driven them off the field; for there were
but 26,000 of them when the fight commenced. To make the matter
worse, a large part of this force--the First and Fifth Corps--stood
with arms in their hands, as spectators, almost directly on the
left flank of the enemy; so that their mere advance would have
swept everything before it. Hancock, too, says that his men were
fresh enough to go forward again.

Couch succeeded to the command after Hooker was wounded, and made
dispositions for the final stand around the Chancellorsville House,
where the battle lasted some time longer, and where a battery of
the Fifth Corps was sacrificed to cover the retreat of the troops.
He did not, however, take the responsibility of renewing the contest
with fresh troops, perhaps deterred by the fact that Anderson's
and McLaws' divisions had now effected a junction with Stuart's
corps; so that the chances were somewhat less favorable than they
would have been had Sickles and French had been reinforced before
the junction took place. He says, at the close of the action, that
fifty guns posted to the right and front of the Chancellorsville
House would have swept the enemy away.

I think Hooker was beset with the idea of keeping back a large
portion of his force to be used in case of emergency. It appears
from a statement made by General Alexander S. Webb, who had made
a daring personal reconnoissance of the enemy's movement, that he
was present when Meade--acting on his (Webb's) representations,
and speaking for himself and Reynolds--asked Hooker's permission
to let the First and Fifth Corps take part in the battle. It is
fair, however, to state that Hooker, having been injured and in
great pain, was hardly accountable for his want of decision at this
time. Indeed, General Tremaine, who was a colonel on Sickles'
staff, says that Hooker did intend to use his reserve force as soon
as the enemy were utterly exhausted. President Lincoln seems to
have had a presentiment of what would occur, for his parting words
to Hooker and Couch were, to use all the troops and not keep any
back.

I have stated that both Meade and Reynolds wished to put their
corps in at the vital point, but were not allowed to do so. General
Tremaine also states that, subsequently, when Hooker was suffering
a paroxysm of pain, he was the bearer of a communication to him
requesting reinforcements, which Hooker directed to be handed to
General Meade, who was present, for his action. Meade would not
take the responsibility thus offered him at so late a period in
the action, though strongly urged to do so both by Tremaine and
Colonel Dahlgren, without the express order of General Hooker, or
the sanction of General Couch, who was his superior officer, and
who was absent. Perhaps he was afraid that Hooker might resume
the command at any moment and leave him to shoulder the responsibility
of any disaster that might occur, without giving him the credit in
case of success. Still he should have put the men in, for the
success of the cause was above all personal considerations. A
single division thrown in at this time would have retrieved the
fortunes of the day. The delay of finding Couch would have been
fatal; for immediate action was demanded.

Reynolds, indeed, considered himself obliged to wait for orders,
but was so desirous to go in that he directed me to send Colonel
Stone's brigade forward to make a reconnoissance, in the hope the
enemy would attack it and thus bring on a fresh contest; for he
intended to reinforce Stone with his whole corps. Stone went close
enough to the rebels to overhear their conversation. He made a
very successful reconnoissance and brought back a number of prisoners,
but as no hint was given him of the object of the movement, he did
not bring on a fight. Had he received the slightest intimation
that such was Reynolds' wish, he would not have hesitated a moment,
for his reputation for dash and gallantry was inferior to none in
the army.

Sedgwick being on the south side of the river, three miles below
the town, was farther off than Hooker supposed, and did not meet
the expectations of the latter by brushing aside Early's 9,000 men
from the fortified heights, and coming on in time to thunder on
Lee's rear at daylight, and join hands with the main body at
Chancellorsville.

The Sixth Corps started soon after midnight to carry out the order.
General John Newton's division led the way, with General Shaler's
brigade in advance. They were somewhat delayed by a false alarm
in rear, and by the enemy's pickets in front, but made their way
steadily toward Fredericksburg. When they reached Hazel Run they
found a considerable body of the enemy on the Bowling Green Road
at the bridge in readiness to dispute the passage. Colonel Hamblin,
who was in charge of Newton's skirmish line, left a few of his men
to open an energetic fire in front, while he assembled the others
and made a charge which took the bridge and secured the right of
way. The command reached Fredericksburg about 3 A.M. As the
atmosphere was very hazy, Newton found himself almost on the enemy
before he knew it; near enough in fact to overhear their conversation.
He fell back quickly to the town and occupied the streets which
were not swept by the fire from the works above. He then waited
for daylight to enable him to reconnoitre the position in his front,
previous to making an attack; and that was the hour Hooker had set
for Sedgwick to join him in attacking Lee at Chancellorsville.

As soon as it was light Gibbon laid bridges, crossed over, and
reported to Sedgwick with his division.

At dawn Newton deployed Wharton's brigade and made a demonstration
to develop the enemy's line. As the fortified heights commanded
the Plank Road by which Sedgwick was to advance, it became necessary
to attack immediately. The plan of assault which was devised by
General Newton, and approved by General Sedgwick, was to attenuate
the rebel force by attacking it on a wide front, so that it could
not be strong anywhere, and to use the bayonet alone. Accordingly,
Gibbon was directed to advance on the right to turn their flank
there if possible, while Newton was to demonstrate against the
centre and Howe to act against the left. Newton deployed Wharton's
brigade, opened fire along his front and kept the enemy employed
there, but Gibbon was unable to advance on the right, because a
canal and a railway lay between him and the rebels, and they had
taken up the flooring of the bridges over the latter. Howe did
not succeed any better on the left, as in attempting to turn the
first line of works he encountered the fire of a second line in
rear and in _echelon_ to the first, which took him directly in
flank. A concentrated artillery fire was brought to bear on Gibbon,
Early sent Hays' brigade from Marye's Hill to meet him, and Wilcox's
brigade came up from Banks' Ford for the same purpose, so that he
was obliged to fall back.

It was now 10 A.M., and there was no time to be lost. General
Warren, who was in camp to represent Hooker, urged an immediate
assault. This advice was followed. Newton formed two columns of
assault and one deployed line in the centre, and Howe three deployed
lines on the left.

Colonel Johns, of the 7th Massachusetts, who was a graduate of West
Point, led one of these columns directly against Marye's Hill, with
two regiments of Eustis' brigade, supported by the other two
regiments, deployed, while another column, consisting of two
regiments under Colonel Spear, of the 61st Pennsylvania, supported
by two regiments (the 82d Pennsylvania and 67th New York) in column,
under Colonel Shaler, was directed to act farther to the right,
and the Light Division, under Colonel Burnham of the 5th Massachusetts,
attached to Newton's command, was ordered to deploy on the left
against the intrenchments at the base of the hill. Spear's column,
advancing through a narrow gorge, was broken and enfiladed by the
artillery--indeed almost literally swept away--and Spear himself
was killed. Johns had an equally difficult task, for he was
compelled to advance up a broken stony gulch swept by two rebel
howitzers. The head of his column was twice broken, but he rallied
it each time. He was then badly wounded, and there was a brief
pause, but Colonel Walsh, of the 36th New York, rallied the men
again, and they kept straight on over the works. Burnham with his
Light Brigade captured the intrenchments below, which had been so
fatal to our troops in the previous battle of Fredericksburg, and
went into the works above with the others.* The fortified heights
on the right of Hazel Run, held by Barksdale's brigade, being now
occupied by our troops, those to the left were necessarily taken
in reverse, and therefore Sedgwick thought it useless to attack
them in front. Howe, nevertheless, carried them gallantly, but
with considerable loss of life.

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