Chancellorsville and Gettysburg

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An officer of the Eleventh Corps who was present informed General
Wainwright, formerly Colonel of the 76th New York, that he was
playing cards in the ditch, and the first notice he had of the
enemy was seeing them looking down upon him from the parapet above.

As for Devens, who was nearest the enemy, it is quite probable that
any attempt by him to change front to the west previous to the
attack would have been looked upon by Howard as a reflection upon
his own generalship and would have been met with disfavor, if not
with a positive reprimand. The only semblance of precaution taken,
therefore, was the throwing out two regiments to face Jackson's
advance. Devens could not disgarnish his main line without Howard's
permission, and it is not fair, therefore, to hold him responsible
for the disaster. As it was, he was severely wounded in attempting
to rally his men. The only pickets thrown out appear to have been
_two companies of the 17th Connecticut Infantry._

Just as Jackson was about to attack, a furious assault was made at
the other end of the line, where Meade was posted. This was repulsed
but it served to distract Hooker's attention from the real point
of danger on the right.

It would seem from all accounts that nothing could vanquish Howard's
incredulity. He appeared to take so little interest in Jackson's
approach that when Captain George E. Farmer, one of Pleasonton's
staff, reported to him that he had found a rebel battery posted
directly on the flank of the Eleventh Corps, he was, to use his
own language, _"courteously received, but Howard did not seem to
believe there was any force of the enemy in his immediate front."_
Sickles and Pleasonton were doing all they could to ascertain
Jackson's position, for at this time a small detachment of the
Third Corps were making a reconnoissance on the Orange Court House
Plank Road, and Rodes states that our cavalry was met there and
skirmished with Stuart's advance. Farmer said _he saw no Union
pickets,_ but noticed on his return that Howard's men were away
from their arms, which were stacked, and that they were playing
cards, etc., utterly unsuspicious of danger and unprepared for a
contest. Notwithstanding the reports of Jackson's movement from
spies and scouts, Howard ordered no change in his lines.

An attempt has been made to hold Colonel Farmer responsible for
this surprise, on the ground that he should have charged the battery
and brought in some prisoners, who would give full information;
but there had been warnings enough, and prisoners enough, and as
Colonel Farmer had but forty men, he would have had to dismount
half of them to make the assault, and with part of his force holding
the horses, he could only have used about twenty men in the attack,
which is rather too few to capture guns supported by an army.
Besides, Farmer was sent out by General Pleasonton with specific
instructions, and was not obliged to recognize the authority of
other officers who desired him to make a Don Quixote of himself to
no purpose.

If the two wings of the rebel army had been kept apart, the small
force left under Lee could easily have been crushed, or driven off
toward Richmond. The commander of the Eleventh Corps, however,
far from making any new works, did not man those he had, but left
his own lines and went with Barlow's brigade to see what Sickles
was doing.

The subsequent investigation of this sad business by the Congressional
Committee on the Conduct of the War was very much of a farce, and
necessarily unreliable; for so long as both Hooker and Howard were
left in high command, it was absurd to suppose their subordinates
would testify against them. Any officer that did so would have
soon found his military career brought to a close.

Howard was in one or two instances mildly censured for not keeping
a better lookout, but as a general thing the whole blame was thrown
on the Germans. Hooker himself attributed the trouble to the fact
that Howard did not follow up Jackson's movements, and allowed his
men to stray from their arms.

A great French military writer has said, "It is permissible for an
officer to be defeated; but never to be surprised."

It is, of course, only fair to hear what Howard himself has to say
in relation to this matter.

He writes in his official report of the battle as follows:

"Now as to the cause of the disaster to my corps.

"_First_.--Though constantly threatened, and apprised of the moving
of the enemy, yet the woods were so dense that he was able to move
a large force, whose exact whereabouts neither patrols, reconnoissances,
nor scouts ascertained.

"He succeeded in forming a column opposite to and outflanking my
right.

"_Second_.--By the panic produced by the enemy's reverse fire,
regiments and artillery were thrown suddenly upon those in position.

"_Third_.--The absence of General Barlow's brigade, which I had
previously located in reserve, and in _echelon_ with Colonel Von
Gilsa's, so as to cover his right flank."

The first proposition implies that Howard did not know Jackson
intended to attack his right, and therefore did not prepare for
him in that direction, but as his front was well fortified, and
his flank unprotected, it was plainly his duty to strengthen the
weak part of his line. To suppose that Jackson would run a great
risk, and spend an entire day in making this long circuit for the
purpose of assailing his enemy in front, is hardly reasonable; for
he could have swung his line around against it at once, had he
desired to do so.

The fierce rush of the rebels, who came in almost simultaneously
with the pickets, first struck General Von Gilsa's two small
regiments and the two guns in the road, the only force that actually
fronted them in line.

Von Gilsa galloped at once to Howard's Headquarters at Dowdall's
Tavern to ask for immediate reinforcements. He was told, "he must
hold his post with the men he had, and trust to God;" information
which was received by the irate German with objurgations that were
not at all of an orthodox character.

Devens' division, thus taken in flank, was driven back upon Schurz's
division, and the being unable to form, was heaped up after some
resistance on Steinwehr's division, in the uttermost confusion and
disorder. Steinwehr had only Buschbeck's brigade with him; the
other--that of Barlow--having been sent out to reinforce Sickles;
but he formed line promptly, behind a weak intrenchment, which had
been thrown across the road, and with the aid of his artillery kept
Jackson at bay for three-quarters of an hour. Howard exerted
himself bravely then, and did all he could to rally the fugitives;
but Rodes' division, which attacked him, was soon reinforced by
that of Colston, and the two together folded around his flanks,
took his line in reverse, and finally carried the position with a
rush; and then Buschbeck's brigade retired in good order through
the flying crowd, who were streaming in wild disorder to the rear
past Hooker's headquarters.

And now, with the right of our line all gone, with a yawning gap
where Sickles' corps and Williams' division had previously been
posted, with Lee thundering against the centre and left, and Jackson
taking all our defences in reverse, his first line being close on
Chancellorsville itself, it seemed as if the total rout of the army
was inevitable.

Just before this attack, Hooker had decided to interpose more force
between the wings of the rebel army, in order to permanently dissever
Jackson from the main body. If Sickles had been allowed to attack
the left flank of the enemy opposite the Furnace, as he requested
permission to do earlier in the afternoon, this co-operative movement
could hardly have failed to produce great results; afterward it
was too late to attempt it. As already stated, Williams' division
struck Anderson in front on Birney's left, and Geary attacked McLaws
across the Plank Road to the right of Hancock. Geary found the
enemy strongly posted, and as he made no progress, returned to his
works. When the rout of the Eleventh Corps took place, Williams
also hastened back, but was fired upon by Jackson's troops, who
now occupied the intrenchments he had left. Sickles thinks if this
had not occurred several regiments of the enemy would have been
cut off from the main body.

CHAPTER V.
JACKSON'S ADVANCE IS CHECKED.

The constantly increasing uproar, and the wild rush of fugitives
past the Chancellorsville House, told Hooker what had occurred,
and roused him to convulsive life. His staff charged on the flying
crowd, but failed to stop them, and it became necessary to form a
line of fresh troops speedily, as Jackson was sweeping everything
before him. It was not easy to find an adequate force for this
emergency. The whole line was now actively engaged, Slocum being
attacked on the south, and Couch and Meade on the east. Fortunately,
Berry's division was held in reserve, and was available. They were
true and tried men, and went forward at once to the rescue. Berry
was directed to form across the Plank Road, drive the rebels back,
and retake the lost intrenchments; an order easy to give, but very
difficult to execute. The most he could do, under the circumstances,
was to form his line in the valley opposite Fairview, and hold his
position there, the enemy already having possession of the higher
ground beyond.

Before Berry went out, Warren had stopped several of the Eleventh
Corps batteries, and had formed them across the Plank Road, behind
the position of the infantry. Winslow's Battery D, of the 1st New
York, and Dimick's Battery H, of the 1st United States, were already
there, with Hooker in person, having anticipated the movement.
These guns were very destructive, and were the principal agent in
checking the enemy. As soon as they had formed in line, Warren
gave orders to Colonel Best, Chief of Artillery to the Twelfth
Corps, to post more batteries on the eminence called Fairview, to
the rear and left of the others.

Few persons appreciate the steadiness and courage required, when
all around is in flight and confusion, for a force to advance
steadily to the post of danger in front and meet the exulting enemy.
Such men are heroes, and far more worthy of honor than those who
fight in the full blaze of successful warfare.

The thickets being unfavorable to cavalry, Sickles had sent Pleasonton
back to Hazel Grove with two mounted regiments, the 8th and 17th
Pennsylvania and Martin's battery, while the 6th New York was
scouting the woods on his right, dismounted. Upon reaching the
open space which he had left when he went to the front, Pleasonton
found the place full of the debris of the combat--men, horses,
caissons, ambulances--all hurrying furiously to the rear. To close
the way he charged on the flying mass, at Sickles' suggestion, who
had ridden in advance of his troops, which were still behind at
the Furnace. Sickles ordered Pleasonton to take command of the
artillery, and the latter took charge of twenty-two guns, consisting
of his own and the Third Corps batteries. The latter had already
been rallied and formed in line by Captain J. F. Huntington, of
the Ohio battery. As senior officer present he assumed command of
the Third Corps artillery. Unfortunately there was not time to
load or aim, for the rebels were close at hand, and their triumphant
yells were heard as they took possession of the works which Buschbeck
had so gallantly defended. This advantageous position, which was
on an eminence overlooking Chancellorsville and the Plank Road,
and which was really the key of the battle-field, was about to be
lost. There was but one way to delay Jackson, some force must be
sacrificed, and Pleasonton ordered Major Peter Keenan, commanding
the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry, to charge the ten thousand men in
front with his four hundred. Keenan saw in a moment that if he
threw his little force into that seething mass of infantry, horses
and men would go down on all sides, and few would be left to tell
the tale. A sad smile lit up his noble countenance as he said,
_"General, I will do it."_ Thus, at thirty-four years of age, he
laid down his life, literally impaled on the bayonets of the enemy,
saving the army from capture and his country from the unutterable
degradation of slave-holding rule in the Northern States. The
service rendered on that occasion is worthy to be recorded in
history with the sacrifices of Arthur Winckelried in Switzerland,
and the Chevalier d'Assas in France.*

[* Major J. R. Carpenter, one of the officers who headed this
charge, asserts that Keenan made it without orders, his only
instructions being to report to General Howard to assist in rallying
the Eleventh Corps. Pleasonton's testimony, however, is positive
on the subject, and is supported by that of his aide, Colonel
Clifford Thompson. Perhaps Carpenter did not hear all the conversation
that passed between Pleasonton and Keenan.]

A large part of his command were lost, but the short interval thus
gained was of priceless value. Pleasonton was enabled to clear a
space in front of him, and twenty-two guns, loaded with double
canister, were brought to bear upon the enemy. They came bursting
over the parapet they had just taken with loud and continuous yells,
and formed line of battle within three hundred yards. All his guns
fired into their masses at once. The discharge seemed fairly to
blow them back over the works from which they had just emerged.
Their artillery, under Colonel Crutchfield, which had been brought
up, was almost annihilated by the fire of the battery on the Plank
Road. This gave time to reload the guns.

The enemy rallied and opened a furious musketry fire from the woods
against Pleasonton and Berry. Both stood firm, and then came two
charges in succession which reached almost to the muzzles of
Pleasonton's guns, which were only supported by two small regiments
of cavalry--the 6th New York, and a new and untried regiment, the
17th Pennsylvania. The whole did not amount to over 1,000 men.
Archer's brigade, on Jackson's left, which had not been stayed by
Keenan's charge, gained the woods and the Plank Road, and opened
a severe enfilading fire. Huntington changed front with his own
battery and repelled the assault. The 110th Pennsylvania regiment,
of Whipple's division, arrived in time to strengthen the cavalry
support, and many of the Eleventh Corps men fell into line also.
The last charge of the enemy was baffled by the opportune arrival
of Birney's and Whipple's divisions, and Barlow's brigade.

By this time, too (about 9 P.M.), Hays' brigade of French's corps
had been posted on the right, in rear and oblique to Berry's second
line. The latter had greatly strengthened his position with log
breastworks, etc. Captain Best, of the 4th United States Artillery,
in the meantime had exerted himself to collect forty or fifty guns
belonging to the Twelfth, Third, and some he had stopped from the
Eleventh Corps, and had arranged them at Fairview, to fire over
the heads of Berry's troops into the thicket where the enemy were
posted and along the Plank Road.

Hooker was so disheartened at the unexpected success of the enemy,
that when the first shock came he sent word to Sickles to save his
command if he could. There is little doubt that at one time he
thought of retreating and leaving the Third Corps to its fate; for
when the enemy charged there was an awful gap in our lines; Birney's,
Whipple's, and Williams' divisions and Barlow's brigade were all
absent. Fortunately Jackson was unable to press his advantage.
The ardor of the charge, the darkness, the thickets and the abattis
in which his forces became entangled, caused Rodes' and Colston's
divisions to be all intermingled, creating such disorder and
confusion that military organization was suspended, and orders
could neither be communicated nor obeyed. Jackson therefore halted
his men in the edge of the woods, about a mile and a half from
Chancellorsville, posted two brigades on the two roads that came
in from the south, and sent for Hill's division, which was in rear
and which had not been engaged, to take the front, while the other
two divisions fell back to the open space at Dowdall's Tavern to
reform their lines. Pending this movement he rode out on the Plank
Road with part of his staff and a few orderlies to reconnoitre,
cautioning his pickets not to fire at him on his return. When he
came back new men had been posted, and his approach was mistaken
for the advance of Pleasonton's cavalry. His own troops fired into
him with fatal effect. Nearly all his escort were killed or wounded
and he received three balls, which shattered both arms. His horse
ran toward the Union lines, and although he succeeded in turning
him back, he was dashed against the trees and nearly unhorsed. He
reached the Confederate lines about the time our artillery again
opened up on the Plank Road with a fire that swept everything from
its front. Several of his attendants were killed and others wounded.
The rebels found the utmost difficulty in keeping their men in line
under this tremendous fire. Sentries had to be posted, and great
precautions taken to prevent the troops from giving way. General
Pender recognized Jackson as he was carried past, and complained
of the demoralizing effect of this cannonade, but Jackson replied
sharply and sternly, "You must hold your ground, General Pender."
He was removed to the Wilderness Tavern, and as General Lee was in
some fear that Averell's cavalry, then at Elley's Ford, would make
a dash and capture him, he was sent on to Guiney's Station, on the
Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, where he died on the 10th of
May. Whether the rebels killed him, or whether some of his wounds
came from our own troops, the 1st Massachusetts or 73d New York,
who were firing heavily in that direction, is a matter of some
doubt. While leaning over him and expressing his sympathy, A. P.
Hill was also wounded by the fire from a section of Dimick's battery,
posted in advance in the Plank Road,* and the command of his corps
was assigned at his request to the cavalry general, J. E. B. Stuart.

When our artillery fire ceased, Hill's troops took position in
front of the others.

[* Young Dimick was the son of a distinguished general of the
regular army. Though wounded on this occasion he refused to leave
the field. The next day he again sought the post of danger and
was mortally wounded while holding the Plank Road.]

CHAPTER VI.
SICKLES FIGHTS HIS WAY BACK.--ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST CORPS.

Sickles, with his ten thousand men heaped up at Hazel Grove, was
still cut off from the main body and could only communicate with
Hooker's headquarters by means of bypaths and at great risk. The
last orders he received, at 5 P.M., had been to attack Jackson's
right flank and check his advance. He determined to do this and
force his way back, and with the co-operation of Williams' and
Berry's divisions, retake the Plank Road with the bayonet. Ward's
brigade was posted in the front line and Hayman's and Graham's
brigades a hundred yards in rear. A special column, under Colonel
Egan of the 40th New York, was formed on the extreme left. The
muskets were uncapped and at midnight the command moved silently
against the enemy, and in spite of a terrific outburst of musketry
and artillery from the open space at Dowdall's, the Plank Road and
the works which Buschbeck had defended were regained. Berry at
once moved forward his line to hold them. Many guns and caissons
taken from Howard's corps, and Whipple's ammunition train of pack
mules were also recovered. The confusion into which the enemy were
thrown by this assault against their right, enabled Berry to easily
repulse the attack on him, and he continued to hold the position.
The result of this brilliant movement was the reoccupation of a
great part of the works Howard had lost, and the capture of two
guns and three caissons from the enemy. It is said that in this
conflict some of Sickles' men, in consequence of the thickets and
confusion, finding themselves surrounded, surrendered as they
supposed to the enemy, but to their delight found themselves in
Berry's division, among their old comrades.

Soon after this fight was over Mott's brigade of the Third Corps,
which had been on duty at the Ford, rejoined the main body.

Both sides now rested on their arms and prepared to renew the
struggle at daylight. Hooker, in view of a possible defeat, directed
his engineer officers to lay out a new and stronger line, to cover
his bridges, to which he could retreat in case of necessity.

At sunset the First Corps went into bivouac on the south side of
United States Ford, about four miles and a half from Chancellorsville.
The men were glad enough to rest after their tedious march on a
hot day, loaded down with eight days' rations. General Reynolds
left me temporarily in charge of the corps, while he rode on to
confer with Hooker. We heard afar off the roar of the battle caused
by Jackson's attack, and saw the evening sky reddened with the
fires of combat, but knowing Hooker had a large force, we felt no
anxiety as to the result, and took it for granted that we would
not be wanted until the next day. I was preparing a piece of india-
rubber cloth as a couch when I saw one of Reynolds' aids, Captain
Wadsworth, coming down the road at full speed. He brought the
startling news that the Eleventh Corps had fled, and if we did not
go forward at once, the army would be hopelessly defeated. We were
soon on the road, somewhat oppressed by the news, but not dismayed.
We marched through the thickening twilight of the woods amid a
silence at first only broken by the plaintive song of the whip-poor-
will, until the full moon rose in all its splendor. As we proceeded
we came upon crowds of Eleventh Corps fugitives still hastening to
the rear. They seemed to be wholly disheartened. We halted for
a time, in order that our position in line of battle might be
selected, and then moved on. As we approached the field a midnight
battle commenced, and the shells seemed to burst in sparkles in
the trees above our heads, but not near enough to reach us. It
was Sickles fighting his way home again. When we came nearer and
filed to the right to take position on the Elley's Ford road, the
men struck up John Brown's song, and gave the chorus with a will.
Their cheerful demeanor and proud bearing renewed the confidence
of the army, who felt that the arrival of Reynolds' corps, with
its historic record, was no ordinary reinforcement.

We were now on the extreme right of the other forces, on the Elley's
Ford road, with the right flank thrown back behind Hunting Creek.

Hooker was very much discouraged by the rout of the Eleventh Corps.
An occurrence of this kind always has a tendency to demoralize an
army and render it less trustworthy; for the real strength of an
armed force is much more in _opinion_ than it is in _numbers_. A
small body of men, if made to believe the enemy are giving way,
will do and dare anything; but when they think the struggle is
hopeless, they will not resist even a weak attack, for each thinks
he is to be sacrificed to save the rest. Hence Hooker did not feel
the same reliance on his men as he did before the disaster. He
determined, nevertheless, to continue the battle, but contract his
lines by bringing them nearer to Chancellorsville. The real key
of the battle-field now was the eminence at Hazel Grove. So long
as we held it the enemy could not advance without presenting his
right flank to our batteries. If he obtained possession of it he
could plant guns which would enfilade Slocum's line and fire directly
into our forces below. Birney's division at this time was posted
in advance of Best's guns on the left, Berry was on the right, with
Williams' division of the Twelfth Corps behind Birney, and Whipple's
division in rear of Berry.

The position of Hazel Grove commanded Chancellorsville, where all
the roads met, and which it was vital to Hooker to hold. For if
he lost that, he could not advance in any direction, and only his
line of retreat to the Ford would remain open to him. Pleasonton
spent the night in fortifying this hill, and placed forty guns in
position there; but it was of no avail, for it was outside of the
new line Sickles was directed to occupy at daylight, and Hooker
was not aware of its importance. A request was sent to the latter
to obtain his consent to hold it, but he was asleep, and the staff-
officer in charge, who had had no experience whatever in military
matters, positively refused to awaken him until daylight, and then
it was too late, for that was the time set for the troops to fall
back to the new line.

At 9 P.M., Hooker sent an order to Sedgwick, who was supposed to
be at Falmouth and to have 26,000 men, to throw bridges over, cross,
drive away Early's 9,000, who held the heights of Fredericksburg,
and then to come forward on the Plank Road, and be ready at daylight
on the 3d to take Lee's force in reverse, while Hooker attacked it
in front.

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