Colonel Charles Jean Jacques Joseph Ardant du Picq - "Battle Studies"

W. D. Howells - "The Story of a Play"

Clovis G. Chappell - "Sermons on Biblical Characters"

Rev. E. Donald Carr - "A Night in the Snow"

Annual Bibliography of Commonwealth Literature 2007
This paper argues that discourses of love in Ghanaian market literature for youth offer a view into complex negotiations of agency and empowerment. Drawing on Deborah Durham's notion of youth as "social `shifters'" and Francis Nyamnjoh's conception of the "interconnectedness" of agency, I take Ghanaian market literature as one specific case of how African literature for youth foregrounds questions of continuity and change as African societies enter into increasingly complex global relations. In this literature for youth, received notions of love, often constructed out of impressions from American pop and hip hop music, carry new notions of agency that compete with existing "domesticated" forms. Authors like Ike Tandoh and Evelyn Tay employ discourses of love to offer youth alternative avenues for empowerment in a context of socio-economic disenfranchizement. In a creative process of "straddling", this writing both reveals and reproduces the contradictions that obtain in youth configurations of agency.

Chancellorsville and Gettysburg

A >> Abner Doubleday >> Chancellorsville and Gettysburg




As Pickett's advance came very close to the first line, young
Cushing, mortally wounded in both thighs, ran his last serviceable
gun down to the fence, and said: _"Webb, I will give them one more
shot!"_ At the moment of the last discharge he called out, _"Good-
by!"_ and fell dead at the post of duty.

Webb sent for fresh batteries to replace the two that were disabled,
and Wheeler's 1st New York Independent Battery came up just before
the attack, and took the place of Cushing's battery on the left.

Armistead pressed forward, leaped the stone wall, waving his sword
with his hat on it, followed by about a hundred of his men, several
of whom carried battle-flags. He shouted, "Give them the cold
steel, boys!" and laid his hands upon a gun. The battery for a
few minutes was in his possession, and the rebel flag flew triumphantly
over our line. But Webb was at the front, very near Armistead,
animating and encouraging his men. He led the 72d Pennsylvania
regiment against the enemy, and posted a line of wounded men in
rear to drive back or shoot every man that deserted his duty. A
portion of the 71st Pennsylvania, behind a stone wall on the right,
threw in a deadly flanking fire, while a great part of the 69th
Pennsylvania and the remainder of the 71st made stern resistance
from a copse of trees on the left, near where the enemy had broken
the line, and where our men were shot with the rebel muskets touching
their breasts.

Then came a splendid charge of two regiments, led by Colonel Hall,
which passed completely through Webb's line, and engaged the enemy
in a hand-to-hand conflict.* Armistead was shot down by the side
of the gun he had taken. It is said he had fought on our side in
the first battle at Bull Run, but had been seduced by Southern
affiliations to join in the rebellion; and now, dying in the effort
to extend the area of slavery over the free States, he saw with a
clearer vision that he had been engaged in an unholy cause, and
said to one of our officers who leaned over him: "Tell Hancock I
have wronged him and have wronged my country."

[* Colonel Norman J. Hall, commanding a brigade in Hancock's corps,
who rendered this great service, was one of the garrison who defended
Fort Sumter at the beginning of the war. At that time he was the
Second Lieutenant of my company.]

Both Gibbon and Webb were wounded, and the loss in officers and
men was very heavy; two rebel brigadier-generals were killed, and
more prisoners were taken than twice Webb's brigade; 6 battle-flags,
and 1,463 muskets were also gathered in.

My command being a little to the left, I witnessed this scene, and,
after it was over, sent out stretcher-bearers attached to the
ambulance train, and had numbers of wounded Confederates brought
in and cared for. I was told that there was one man among these
whose conversation seemed to indicate that he was a general officer.
I sent to ascertain his rank, but he replied: "Tell General
Doubleday in a few minutes I shall be where there is no rank." He
expired soon after, and I never learned his name.

The rebels did not seem to appreciate my humanity in sending out
to bring in their wounded, for they opened a savage fire against
the stretcher-bearers. One shell burst among us, a piece of it
knocked me over on my horse's neck, and wounded Lieutenant Cowdry
of my staff.

When Pickett--the great leader--looked around the top of the ridge
he had temporarily gained, he saw it was impossible to hold the
position. Troops were rushing in on him from all sides. The Second
Corps were engaged in a furious assault on his front. His men were
fighting with clubbed muskets, and even banner staves were intertwined
in a fierce and hopeless struggle. My division of the First Corps
were on his right flank, giving deadly blows there, and the Third
Corps were closing up to attack. Pettigrew's forces on his left
had given way, and a heavy skirmish line began to accumulate on
that flank. He saw his men surrendering in masses, and, with a
heart full of anguish, ordered a retreat. Death had been busy on
all sides, and few indeed now remained of that magnificent column
which had advanced so proudly, led by the Ney of the rebel army,
and those few fell back in disorder, and without organization,
behind Wright's brigade, which had been sent forward to cover the
retreat. At first, however, when struck by Stannard on the flank,
and when Pickett's charge was spent, they rallied in a little
slashing, where a grove had been cut down by our troops to leave
an opening for our artillery. There two regiments of Rowley's
brigade of my division, the 151st Pennsylvania and the 20th New
York State Militia, under Colonel Theodore R. Gates, of the latter
regiment, made a gallant charge, and drove them out. Pettigrew's
division, it is said, lost 2,000 prisoners and 15 battle-flags on
the left.

While this severe contest was going on in front of Webb, Wilcox
deployed his command and opened a feeble fire against Caldwell's
division on my left. Stannard repeated the manoeuvre which had
been so successful against Kemper's brigade by detaching the 14th
and 16th Vermont to take Wilcox in flank. Wilcox thus attacked on
his right, while a long row of batteries tore the front of his line
to pieces with canister, could gain no foothold. He found himself
exposed to a tremendous cross fire, and was obliged to retreat,
but a great portion of his command were brought in as prisoners by
Stannard* and battle-flags were gathered in sheaves.

[* As Stannard's brigade were new troops, and had been stationed
near Washington, the men had dubbed them _The Paper Collar Brigade_,
because some of them were seen wearing paper collars, but after
this fight the term was never again applied to them.]

A portion of Longstreet's corps, Benning's, Robertson's, and Law's
brigades, advanced against the two Round Tops to prevent reinforcements
from being sent from that vicinity to meet Pickett's charge.
Kilpatrick interfered with this programme, however, for about 2
P.M. he made his appearance on our left with Farnsworth's brigade
and Merritt's brigade of regulars, accompanied by Graham's and
Elder's batteries of the regular army, to attack the rebel right,
with a view to reach their ammunition trains, which were in the
vicinity. The rebels say his men came on yelling like demons.
Having driven back the skirmishers who guarded that flank, Merritt
deployed on the left and soon became engaged there with Anderson's
Georgia brigade, which was supported by two batteries. On the
right Farnsworth, with the 1st Vermont regiment of his brigade,
leaped a fence, and advanced until he came to a second stone fence,
where he was checked by an attack on his right flank from the 4th
Alabama regiment of Law's brigade, which came back for that purpose
from a demonstration it was making against Round Top. Farnsworth
then turned and leaping another fence in a storm of shot and shell,
made a gallant attempt to capture Backman's battery, but was unable
to do so, as it was promptly supported by the 9th Georgia regiment
of Anderson's brigade. Farnsworth was killed in this charge, and
the 1st Vermont found itself enclosed in a field, with high fences
on all sides, behind which masses of infantry were constantly rising
up and firing. The regiment was all broken up and forced to retire
in detachments. Kilpatrick after fighting some time longer without
making much progress, fell back on account of the constant
reinforcements that were augmenting the force opposed to him.
Although he had not succeeded in capturing the ammunition train,
he had made a valuable diversion on the left, which doubtless
prevented the enemy from assailing Round Top with vigor, or detaching
a force to aid Pickett.

The Confederate General Benning states that the prompt action of
General Law in posting the artillery in the road and the 7th and
9th Georgia regiments on each side, was all that saved the train
from capture. "There was nothing else to save it." He also says
that two-thirds of Pickett's command were killed, wounded, or
captured. Every brigade commander and every field officer except
one fell. Lee and Longstreet had seen from the edge of the woods,
with great exultation, the blue flag of Virginia waving over the
crest occupied by the Union troops. It seemed the harbinger of
great success to Lee. He thought the Union army was conquered at
last. The long struggle was over, and peace would soon come,
accompanied by the acknowledgment of the independence of the Southern
Confederacy. It was but a passing dream; the flag receded, and
soon the plain was covered with fugitives making their way to the
rear. Then, anticipating an immediate pursuit, he used every effort
to rally men and officers, and made strenuous efforts to get his
artillery in position to be effective.

The Confederate General A. R. Wright criticises this attack and
very justly says, "The difficulty was not so much in reaching
Cemetery Ridge or taking it. My brigade did so on the afternoon
of the 2d, but the trouble was to hold it, for the whole Federal
army was massed in a sort of horse shoe, and could rapidly reinforce
the point to any extent; while the long enveloping Confederate line
could not support promptly enough." This agrees with what I have
said in relation to the convex and concave orders of battle.

General Gibbon had sent Lieutenant Haskell of his staff to Power's
Hill to notify General Meade that the charge was coming. As Meade
approached his old headquarters he heard firing on the crest above,
and went up to ascertain the cause. He found the charge had been
repulsed and ejaculated "Thank God!"

When Lee learned that Johnson had yielded his position on the right,
and therefore could not co-operate with Pickett's advance, he sent
Stuart's cavalry around to accomplish the same object by attacking
the right and rear of our army. Howard saw the rebel cavalry moving
off in that direction, and David McM. Gregg, whose division was
near White's Creek where it crosses the Baltimore pike, received
orders about noon to guard Slocum's right and rear.

Custer had already been contending with his brigade against portions
of the enemy's force in that direction, when Gregg sent forward
McIntosh's brigade to relieve him, and followed soon after with J.
Irvin Gregg's brigade. Custer was under orders to join Kilpatrick's
command, to which he belonged, but the exigencies of the battle
soon forced Gregg to detain him. McIntosh, having taken the place
of Custer, pushed forward to develop the enemy's line, which he
found very strongly posted, the artillery being on a commanding
ridge which overlooked the whole country, and covered by dismounted
cavalry in woods, buildings, and behind fences below. McIntosh
became warmly engaged and send back for Randol's battery to act
against the rebel guns on the crest, and drive the enemy out of
the buildings. The guns above were silenced by Pennington's and
Randol's batteries, and the force below driven out of the houses
by Lieutenant Chester's section of the latter. The buildings and
fences were then occupied by our troops. The enemy attempted to
regain them by a charge against McIntosh's right flank, but were
repulsed. In the meantime Gregg came up with the other brigade,
and assumed command of the field. The battle now became warm, for
W. H. F. Lee's brigade, under Chambliss, advanced to support the
skirmish line, and the 1st New Jersey, being out of ammunition,
was charged and routed by the 1st Virginia. The 7th Michigan, a
new regiment which came up to support it, was also driven in; for
the enemy's dismounted line reinforced the 1st Virginia. The latter
regiment, which had held on with desperate tenacity, although
attacked on both flanks, was at last compelled to fall back by an
attack made by part of the 5th Michigan. The contending forces
were now pretty well exhausted when, to the dismay of our men, a
fresh brigade under Wade Hampton, which Stuart had kept in reserve,
made its appearance, and new and desperate exertions were required
to stem its progress. There was little time to act, but every
sabre that could be brought forward was used. As Hampton came on,
our artillery under Pennington and Randol made terrible gaps in
his ranks. Chester's section kept firing canister until the rebels
were within fifty yards of him. The enemy were temporarily stopped
by a desperate charge on their flank, made by only sixteen men of
the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, under Captains Triechel and Rogers,
accompanied by Captain Newhall of McIntosh's staff. This little
band of heroes were nearly all disabled or killed, but they succeeded
in delaying the enemy, already shattered by the canister from
Chester's guns, until Custer was able to bring up the 1st Michigan
and lead them to the charge, shouting "Come on, you wolverines!"
Every available sabre was thrown in. General McIntosh and his
staff and orderlies charged into the _melee_ as individuals.
Hampton and Fitz Lee headed the enemy, and Custer our troops.
Lieutenant Colonel W. Brooke-Rawle, the historian of the conflict,
who was present, says, "For minutes, which seemed like hours, amid
the clashing of the sabres, the rattle of the small arms, the
frenzied imprecations, the demands to surrender, the undaunted
replies, and the appeals for mercy, the Confederate column stood
its ground." A fresh squadron was brought up under Captain Hart
of the 1st New Jersey, and the enemy at last gave way and retired.
Both sides still confronted each other, but the battle was over,
for Pickett's charge had failed, and there was no longer any object
in continuing the contest.

Stuart was undoubtedly baffled and the object of his expedition
frustrated; yet he stated in his official report that he was in a
position to intercept the Union retreat in case Pickett had been
successful. At night he retreated to regain his communications
with Ewell's left.

This battle being off of the official maps has hardly been alluded
to in the various histories which have been written; but its results
were important and deserve to be commemorated.

When Pickett's charge was repulsed, and the whole plain covered
with fugitives, we all expected that Wellington's command at
Waterloo, of _"Up, guards, and at them!"_ would be repeated, and
that a grand counter-charge would be made. But General Meade had
made no arrangements to give a return thrust. It seems to me he
should have posted the Sixth and part of the Twelfth Corps in rear
of Gibbon's division the moment Pickett's infantry were seen emerging
from the woods, a mile and a half off. If they broke through our
centre these corps would have been there to receive them, and if
they failed to pierce our line and retreated, the two corps could
have followed them up promptly before they had time to rally and
reorganize. An advance by Sykes would have kept Longstreet in
position. In all probability we would have cut the enemy's army
in two, and captured the long line of batteries opposite us, which
were but slightly guarded. Hancock, lying wounded in an ambulance,
wrote to Meade, recommending that this be done. Meade, it is true,
recognized in some sort the good effects of a counter-blow; but to
be effective the movement should have been prepared beforehand.
It was too late to commence making preparations for an advance when
some time had elapsed and when Lee had rallied his troops and had
made all his arrangements to resist an assault. It was ascertained
afterward that he had twenty rounds of ammunition left per gun,
but it was not evenly distributed and some batteries in front had
fired away all their cartridges. A counter-charge under such
circumstances is considered almost imperative in war; for the beaten
army, running and dismayed, cannot, in the nature of things, resist
with much spirit; whereas the pursuers, highly elated by their
success, and with the prospect of ending the contest, fight with
more energy and bravery. Rodes says the Union forces were so long
in occupying the town and in coming forward after the repulse of
the enemy that it was generally thought they had retreated. Meade
rode leisurely over to the Fifth Corps on the left, and told Sykes
to send out and see if the enemy in his front was firm and holding
on to their position. A brigade preceded by skirmishers was
accordingly sent forward, but as Longstreet's troops were well
fortified, they resisted the advance, and Meade--finding some hours
had elapsed and that Lee had closed up his lines and was fortifying
against him--gave up all idea of a counter-attack.



CHAPTER VII.
GENERAL RETREAT OF THE ENEMY--CRITICISMS OF DISTINGUISHED CONFEDERATE
OFFICERS.

Lee was greatly dispirited at Pickett's failure, but worked with
untiring energy to repair the disaster.

There was an interval of full a mile between Hill and Longstreet,
and the plain was swarming with fugitives making their way back in
disorder. He hastened to get ready to resist the counter-charge,
which he thought was inevitable, and to plant batteries behind
which the fugitives could rally. He also made great personal
exertions to reassure and reassemble the detachments that came in.
He did not for a moment imagine that Meade would fail to take
advantage of this golden opportunity to crush the Army of Virginia
and end the war.

The most distinguished rebel officers admit the great danger they
were in at this time, and express their surprise that they were
not followed up.

The fact is, Meade had no idea of leaving the ridge. I conversed
the next morning with a corps commander who had just left him. He
said: "Meade says he thinks he can hold out for part of another
day here, if they attack him."

This language satisfied me that Meade would not go forward if he
could avoid it, and would not impede in any way the rebel retreat
across the Potomac. Lee began to make preparations at once and
started his trains on the morning of the 4th. By night Rodes'
division, which followed them, was in bivouac two miles west of
Fairfield. It was a difficult task to retreat burdened with 4,000
prisoners, and a train fifteen miles long, in the presence of a
victorious enemy, but it was successfully accomplished as regards
his main body. The roads, too, were bad and much cut up by the
rain.

While standing on Little Round Top Meade was annoyed at the fire
of a rebel battery posted on an eminence beyond the wheat-field,
about a thousand yards distant. He inquired what troops those were
stationed along the stone fence which bounded the hither side of
the wheat-field. Upon ascertaining that it was Crawford's division
of the Fifth Corps, he directed that they be sent forward to clear
the woods in front of the rebel skirmishers, who were very annoying,
and to drive away the battery, _but not to get into a fight that
could bring on a general engagement._ As Crawford unmasked from
the stone fence the battery opened fire on his right. He sent
Colonel Ent's regiment, deployed as skirmishers, against the guns,
which retired as Ent approached. McCandless, who went forward with
his brigade, moved too far to the right, and Crawford ordered him
to change front and advance toward Round Top. He did so and struck
a rebel brigade in flank which was behind a temporary breastwork
of rails, sods, etc. When this brigade saw a Union force apparently
approaching from their own lines to attack them in flank, they
retreated in confusion, after a short resistance, and this disorder
extended during the retreat to a reserve brigade posted on the low
ground in their rear. Their flight did not cease until they reached
Horner's woods, half a mile distant, where they immediately intrenched
themselves. These brigades belonged to Hood's division, then under
Law.

Longstreet says, "When this (Pickett's) charge failed, I expected
that, of course, the enemy would throw himself against our shattered
ranks and try to crush us. I sent my staff officers to the rear
to assist in rallying the troops, and hurried to our line of
batteries as the only support that I could given them." . . . "I
knew if the army was to be saved these batteries must check the
enemy." . . . "For unaccountable reasons the enemy did not pursue
his advantage."

Longstreet always spoke of his own men as invincible, and stated
that on the 2d they did the best three hours' fighting that ever
was done, but Crawford's* attack seemed to show that they too were
shaken by the defeat of Picket's grand charge.

[* Crawford was also one of those who took a prominent part in the
defence of Fort Sumter, at the beginning of the war. We each
commanded detachments of artillery on that occasion.]

In regard to the great benefit we would have derived from a pursuit,
it may not be out of place to give the opinion of a few more
prominent Confederate officers.

Colonel Alexander, Chief of Longstreet's artillery, says in a
communication to the "Southern Historical Papers":

"I have always believed that the enemy here lost the greatest
opportunity they ever had of routing Lee's army by a prompt offensive.
They occupied a line shaped somewhat like a horseshoe. I suppose
the greatest diameter of this horseshoe was not more than one mile,
and the ground within was entirely sheltered from our observation
and fire, with communications by signals all over it, and they
could concentrate their whole force at any point and in a very
short time without our knowledge. Our line was an enveloping semi-
circle, over four miles in development, and communication from
flank to flank, even by courier, was difficult, the country being
well cleared and exposed to the enemy's view and fire, the roads
all running at right angles to our lines, and, some of them at
least, broad turnpikes where the enemy's guns could rake for two
miles. Is it necessary now to add any statement as to the superiority
of the Federal force, or the exhausted and shattered condition of
the Confederates for a space of at least a mile in their very
centre, to show that a great opportunity was thrown away? I think
General Lee himself was quite apprehensive the enemy would _riposte_,
and that it was that apprehension which brought him alone out to
my guns, where he could observe all the indications."

General Trimble, who commanded a division of Hill's corps, which
supported Pickett in his advance, says, "By all the rules of warfare
the Federal troops should (as I expected they would) have marched
against our shattered columns and sought to cover our army with an
overwhelming defeat."

Colonel Simms, who commanded Semmes' Georgia brigade in the fight
with Crawford just referred to, writes to the latter, "There was
much confusion in our army so far as my observation extended, and
I think we would have made but feeble resistance, if you had pressed
on, on the evening of the 3d."

General Meade, however, overcome by the great responsibilities of
his position, still clung to the ridge, and fearful of a possible
disaster would not take the risk of making an advance. And yet if
he could have succeeded in crushing Lee's army then and there, he
would have saved two years of war with its immense loss of life
and countless evils. He might at least have thrown in Sedgwick's
corps, which had not been actively engaged in the battle, for even
if it was repulsed the blows it gave would leave the enemy little
inclination to again assail the heights.

At 6.30 P.M. the firing ceased on the part of the enemy, and although
they retained their position the next day, the battle of Gettysburg
was virtually at an end.

The town was still full of our wounded, and many of our surgeons,
with rare courage, remained there to take charge of them, for it
required some nerve to run the risk of being sent to Libby prison
when the fight was over, a catastrophe which has often happened to
our medical officers. Among the rest, the chief surgeons of the
First Corps, Doctor Theodore Heard and Doctor Thomas H. Bache,
refused to leave their patients, and in consequence of the hasty
retreat of the enemy were fortunately not carried off.

After the battle Meade had not the slightest desire to recommence
the struggle. It is a military maxim that to a flying enemy must
be given a wall of steel or a bridge of gold. In the present
instance it was unmistakably the bridge of gold that was presented.
It was hard to convince him that Lee was actually gone, and at
first he thought it might be a device to draw the Union army from
its strong position on the heights.

Our cavalry were sent out on the 4th to ascertain where the enemy
were, and what they were doing. General Birney threw forward a
reconnoitering party and opened fire with a battery on a column
making their way toward Fairfield, but he was checked at once and
directed _on no account to bring on a battle._ On the 5th, as it
was certain the enemy were retreating, Sedgwick received orders to
follow up the rear of the rebel column. He marched eight miles to
Fairfield Pass. There Early, who was in command of the rear guard,
was endeavoring to save the trains, which were heaped up in great
confusion. Sedgwick, after a distant cannonade, reported the
position too strong to be forced. It was a plain, two miles wide,
surrounded by hills, and it would not have been difficult to take
it, but Sedgwick knew Meade favored the "bridge of gold" policy,
and was not disposed to thwart the wishes of his chief. In my
opinion Sedgwick should have made an energetic attack, and Meade
should have supported it with his whole army, for our cavalry were
making great havoc in the enemy's train in rear; and if Lee, instead
of turning on Kilpatrick, had been forced to form line against
Meade, the cavalry, which was between him and his convoys of
ammunition, in all probability might have captured the latter and
ended the war. Stuart, it is true, was following up Kilpatrick,
but he took an indirect route and was nearly a day behind. I do
not see why the force which was now promptly detached from the
garrisons of Washington and Baltimore and sent to Harper's Ferry
could not have formed on the Virginia side of the Potomac opposite
Williamsport, and with the co-operation of General Meade have cut
off the ammunition of which Lee stood so much in need. As the
river had risen and an expedition sent out by General French from
Frederick had destroyed the bridge at Falling Waters, everything
seemed to favor such a plan. The moment it was ascertained that
Lee was cut off from Richmond and short of ammunition the whole
North would have turned out and made a second Saratoga of it. As
it was, he had but few roads for his cannon, and our artillery
could have opened a destructive fire on him from a distance without
exposing our infantry. It was worth the effort and there was little
or no danger in attempting it. Meade had Sedgwick's fresh corps
and was reinforced by a division of 11,000 men under General W. F.
Smith (Baldy Smith). French's division of 4,000 at Frederick, and
troops from Washington and Baltimore were also available to assist
in striking the final blow. The Twelfth Corps was also available,
as Slocum volunteered to join in the pursuit. Meade, however,
delayed moving at all until Lee had reached Hagerstown and then
took a route that was almost twice as long as that adopted by the
enemy. Lee marched day and night to avoid pursuit, and when the
river rose and his bridge was gone, so that he was unable to cross,
he gained six days in which to choose a position, fortify it, and
renew his supply of ammunition before Meade made his appearance.

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