Chancellorsville and Gettysburg

A >> Abner Doubleday >> Chancellorsville and Gettysburg

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17

In his desire to reinforce the Fifth Corps at the close of the
conflict with Longstreet, General Meade made the sad mistake of
ordering the Twelfth Corps to abandon its position on the right
and report to General Sykes for duty on the left. General Slocum,
sensible that this would be a suicidal movement, reported that the
enemy were advancing on his front, and begged permission to keep
Geary's division there to defend the position. General Meade
finally allowed him to retain Greene's brigade, and no more, and
thus it happened that Ewell's troops, finding the works on the
extreme right of our line defenceless, had nothing to do but walk
in and occupy them. If Meade was determined to detach this large
force, there seems no good reason why two of Sedgwick's brigades
should not have been sent to take its place, but nothing was done.

Johnson's division, as it came on, deployed and crossed Rock Creek
about half and hour before sunset. It suffered so severely from
our artillery, that one brigade, that of Jones, fell back in
disorder, its commander being wounded. The other, however, advanced
against Wadsworth, and Greene on his right; but as these generals
had their fronts well fortified, the attack was easily repulsed.
Nevertheless, the left of Johnson's line, not being opposed, took
possession of Geary's works about 9 P.M. and thus endangered our
communications.

Gregg's division of cavalry which was posted east of Slocum's
position saw this movement of Johnson. Gregg opened fire on the
column with his artillery and sent out his men dismounted to skirmish
on the flank of the enemy. Johnson detached Walker's brigade to
meet him, and the contest continued until after dark. Greene, in
the meantime, swung his right around on the edge of a ravine,
perpendicular to the main line and fortified it, to avoid being
flanked. He was an accomplished soldier and engineer, having
graduated second in his class at West Point, and knew exactly what
ought to be done and how to do it. He held on strongly, and as it
was dark, and the enemy did not exactly know where they were, or
where our troops were posted, they waited until daylight before
taking any further action. Yet they were now but a short distance
from General Meade's headquarters, and within easy reach of our
reserve artillery. A night attack on the rear of our army, in
conjunction with an advance from the opposite side on Hancock's
front, would have thrown us into great confusion and must have
succeeded.

During the night Ewell sent Smith's brigade to reinforce Johnson.
Geary, after all, did not reach Little Round Top or report to Sykes,
and if he had done so, his troops would have been of no use, as
the battle was over in that part of the field. There was a mystery
about his movements which needs to be cleared up.

To supplement this attack on the extreme right, and prevent
reinforcements from being sent there, Early's division was directed
to carry Cemetery Hill by storm. Before it advanced, a vigorous
artillery fire was opened from four rebel batteries on Benner's
Hill, to prepare the way for the assault, but our batteries on
Cemetery Hill, which were partially sheltered by earthworks, replied
and soon silenced those of the enemy. Then Early's infantry moved
forth, Hays' brigade on the right, Hoke's brigade on the left,
under Colonel Avery, and Gordon's brigade in reserve. It was
supposed Johnson's division would protect Early's left flank, while
Rodes' and Pender's divisions would come forward in time to prevent
any attack against his right. The enemy first struck Von Gilsa's
brigade, which was posted behind a stone fence at the foot of the
hill. Still farther to its left, at the base of the hill, was
Ames' brigade, both enclosing Rickett's and Weidrick's and Stevens'
batteries, which had been a good deal cut up on the first day, were
now brought to bear on the approaching enemy. Colonel Wainwright,
Chief of Artillery of the First Corps, gave them orders not to
attempt to retreat if attacked, but to fight the guns to the last.
The enemy advanced up the ravine which was specially commanded by
Stevens' battery. Weidrick, Ricketts, and Stevens played upon the
approaching line energetically. The rebel left and centre fell
back, but the right managed to obtain shelter from houses and
undulating ground, and came on impetuously, charging over Von
Gilsa's brigade, and driving it up the hill, through the batteries.
In doing so Hays says the darkness and smoke saved his men from a
terrible slaughter. Weidrick's battery was captured, and two of
Ricketts' guns were spiked. The enemy, in making this movement,
exposed their left flank to Stevens' battery, which poured a terrible
fire of double canister into their ranks. The 33d Massachusetts
also opened a most effective oblique fire. The batteries were
penetrated but would not surrender. Dearer than life itself to
the cannoneer is the gun he serves, and these brave men fought hand
to hand with handspikes, rammers, staves, and even stones. They
shouted, _"Death on the soil of our native State rather than lose
our guns."_ Hancock, all this time should have been kept busy on
his own front repelling an attack from Rodes and Pender, but as
they did not come forward, and as he felt that there was great
danger that Howard would lose Cemetery Hill and his own right be
turned, he sent Carroll's brigade to the rescue. Carroll was joined
by the 106th Pennsylvania and some reinforcements from Schurz's
division. For a few minutes, Hays says, there was an ominous
silence and then the tramp of our infantry was heard. They came
over the hill and went in with a cheer. The enemy, finding they
were about to be overwhelmed, retreated, as no one came to their
assistance. When they fell back our guns opened a very destructive
fire. It is said that out of 1,750 men of the organization known
as "The Louisiana Tigers," only 150 returned. Hays attributes his
defeat to the fact that Gordon was not up in time to support him.

The failure to carry the hill isolated Johnson's division on our
extreme right. As it could only be reached by a long circuit it
was not easy for Lee to maintain it there, without unduly weakening
other parts of his line. That Rodes' division did not reach Cemetery
Hill in time to co-operate with Early's attack was not owing to
any lack of zeal or activity on the part of that energetic officer.
He was obliged to move out of Gettysburg by the flank, then change
front and advance double the distance Early had to traverse, and
by the time he had done so Early had made the attack and had been
repulsed.

The day closed with the rebels defeated on our left, but victorious
on our right. Fortunately for us, this incited Lee to continue
his efforts. He could not bear to retreat after his heavy losses,
and acknowledge that he was beaten. He resolved to reinforce
Johnson's division, now in rear of our right, and fling Pickett's
troops, the _elite_ of his army, who had not been engaged, against
our centre. He hoped a simultaneous attack made by Pickett in
front and Johnson in rear, would yet win those heights and scatter
the Union army to the winds. Kilpatrick, who had been resting the
tired men and horses of his cavalry division at Abbotsford after
the conflict at Hanover, went on the afternoon of the 2d to circle
around and attack the left and rear of the enemy by way of Hunterstown.
This plan was foiled, however, by the sudden arrival of Stuart's
cavalry from its long march. They reached that part of the field
about 4 P.M. After a fierce combat, in which Farnsworth's and
Custer's brigades and Estes' squadron were principally engaged
against Hampton's brigade supported by the main body, darkness put
an end to the fight. Kilpatrick then turned back and bivouacked
at Two Taverns for the night.

Gregg's division of cavalry left Hanover at noon and took post
opposite and about three miles east of Slocum's Corps on the right.
There, as stated, he saw Johnson's division moving to the attack
and after throwing some shells into their ranks deployed his own
skirmish line and advanced against the one they threw out to meet
him. At 10 P.M. he withdrew and took post on the Baltimore pike
where it crosses Cress Run, near Rock Creek. By so doing he guarded
the right and rear of the army from any demonstration by Stuart's
cavalry.

At night a council of war was held, in which it was unanimously
voted to stay and fight it out. Meade was displeased with the
result, and although he acquiesced in the decision, he said angrily,
"Have it your own way, gentlemen, but Gettysburg is no place to
fight a battle in." The fact that a portion of the enemy actually
prolonged our line on the right and that our centre had been pierced
during the day, made him feel far from confident. He thought it
better to retreat with what he had, than run the risk of losing
all.*

[* Since the above was written, the discussion has been renewed in
the public prints as to whether General Meade did or did not intend
to leave the field. So far as the drawing up of an order of retreat
is concerned, it ws undoubtedly right and proper to do so, for it
is the duty of a general to be prepared for every emergency. It
is easy to criticise, and say what should have been done, after a
battle has been fought, after the position of troops is all laid
down on the maps, and the plans of every commander explained in
official reports; but amid the doubt and confusion of actual combat,
where there has been great loss of men and material, it is not
always so easy to decide. On the night of the 2d the state of
affairs was disheartening. In the combats of the preceding days,
the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps had been almost annihilated;
the Fifth Corps and a great part of the Second were shattered, and
only the Sixth Corps and Twelfth Corps were comparatively fresh.
It was possible therefore that the enemy might gain some great
success the next day, which would stimulate them to extra exertions,
and diminish the spirit of our men in the same proportion. In such
a case it was not improbable that the army might be destroyed as
an organization, and there is a vast difference between a _destroyed_
army and a _defeated_ army. By retiring while it was yet in his
power to do so, General Meade felt that he would assure the safety
of our principal cities, for the enemy were too exhausted to pursue;
and being out of ammunition, and far from their base of supplies,
were not in a condition to do much further damage, or act very
energetically. Whereas our troops could soon be largely reinforced
from the draft which had just been established, and, being in the
centre of their resources, could be supplied with all that was
necessary for renewed effort.

There is no question in my mind that, at the council referred to,
General Meade did desire to retreat, and expressed fears that his
communications with Taneytown might be endangered by remaining at
Gettysburg.

It has also been stated that both General Gibbon and General Newton
objected to our position at Gettysburg, but this is an error. They
merely recommended some additional precautions to prevent the enemy
from turning our left at Round Top, and thus intervening between
us and Washington. Hancock, in giving his vote, said the Army of
the Potomac had retreated too often, and he was in favor of remaining
now to fight it out.]

CHAPTER VI.
THE BATTLE OF THE THIRD DAY--JOHNSON'S DIVISION DRIVEN OUT.

At dawn on the 3d the enemy opened on us with artillery, but the
firing had no definite purpose, and after some hours it gradually
slackened.

The principal interest early in the day necessarily centred on the
right, where Johnson's position not only endangered the safety of
the army, but compromised our retreat. It was therefore essential
to drive him out as soon as possible. To this end batteries were
established during the night on all the prominent points in that
vicinity. Geary had returned with his division about midnight,
and was not a little astonished to find the rebels established in
the works he had left. He determined to contest possession with
them at daylight. In the meantime he joined Greene and formed part
of his line perpendicular to our main line of battle, and part
fronting the enemy.

On the other hand, Ewell, having obtained a foothold, swore he
would not be driven out, and hastened to reinforce Johnson with
Daniel's and O'Neill's brigades from Rodes' division.

As soon as objects could be discerned in the early gray of the
morning our artillery opened fire. As Johnson, on account of the
steep declivities and other obstacles, had not been able to bring
any artillery with him, he could not reply. It would not do to
remain quiet under this fire, and he determined to charge, in hopes
of winning a better position on higher ground. His men--the old
Stonewall brigade leading--rushed bravely forward, but were as
gallantly met by Kane's brigade of Geary's division and a close
and severe struggle ensued for four hours among the trees and rocks.
Ruger's division of the Twelfth Corps came up and formed on the
rebel left, taking them in flank and threatening them in reverse.
Indeed, as the rest of our line were not engaged, there was plenty
of support for Geary. Troops were sent him, including Shaler's
brigade, which took the front, and was soon warmly engaged in re-
establishing the line.

At about 11 A.M., finding the contest hopeless, and his retreat
threatened by a force sent down to Rock Creek, Johnson yielded
slowly and reluctantly to a charge made by Geary's division, gave
up the position and withdrew to Rock Creek, where he remained until
night.

Our line was once more intact. All that the enemy had gained by
dogged determination and desperate bravery was lost from a lack of
co-ordination, caused perhaps by the great difficulty of communicating
orders over this long concave line where every route was swept by
our fire.

Lee had now attacked both flanks of the Army of the Potomac without
having been able to establish himself permanently on either.
Notwithstanding the repulse of the previous day he was very desirous
of turning the left, for once well posted there he could secure
his own retreat while interposing between Meade and Washington.
He rode over with Longstreet to that end of the line to see what
could be done. General Wofford, who commanded a brigade of McLaws'
division, writes in a recent letter to General Crawford, United
States Army, as follows: "Lee and Longstreet came to my brigade
Friday morning before the artillery opened fire. I told him that
the afternoon before, I nearly reached the crest. He asked if I
could not go there now. I replied, 'No, General, I think not.'
He said quickly, 'Why not?' 'Because,' I said, 'General, the enemy
have had all night to intrench and reinforce. I had been pursuing
a broken enemy and the situation was now very different.'"

Having failed at each extremity, it only remained to Lee to retreat,
or attack the centre. Such high expectations had been formed in
the Southern States in regard to his conquest of the North that he
determined to make another effort. He still had Pickett's division,
the flower of Virginia, which had not been engaged, and which was
full of enthusiasm. He resolved to launch them against our centre,
supported on either flank by the advance of the main portion of
the army. He had hoped that Johnson's division would have been
able to maintain its position on the right, so that the Union centre
could be assailed in front and rear at the same time, but Johnson
having been driven out, it was necessary to trust to Pickett alone,
or abandon the whole enterprise and return to Virginia.

Everything was quiet up to 1 P.M., as the enemy were massing their
batteries and concentrating their forces preparatory to the grand
charge--the supreme effort--which was to determine the fate of the
campaign, and to settle the point whether freedom or slavery was
to rule the Northern States.

It seems to me there was some lack of judgment in the preparations.
Heth's division, now under Pettigrew, which had been so severely
handled on the first day, and which was composed in a great measure
of new troops, was designated to support Pickett's left and join
in the attack at close quarters. Wilcox, too, who one would think
had been pretty well fought out the day before, in his desperate
enterprise of attempting to crown the crest, was directed to support
the right flank of the attack. Wright's brigade was formed in
rear, and Pender's division on the left of Pettigrew, but there
was a long distance between Wilcox and Longstreet's forces on the
right.

At 1 P.M., a signal gun was fired and one hundred and fifteen guns
opened against Hancock's command, consisting of the First Corps
under Newton, the Second Corps under Gibbon, the Third Corps under
Birney, and against the Eleventh Corps under Howard. The object
of this heavy artillery fire was to break up our lines and prepare
the way for Pickett's charge. The exigencies of the battle had
caused the First Corps to be divided, Wadsworth's division being
on the right at Culp's Hill, Robinson on Gibbon's right, and my
own division intervening between Caldwell on the left and Gibbon
on the right. The convex shape of our line did not give us as much
space as that of the enemy, but General Hunt, Chief of Artillery,
promptly posted eighty guns along the crest--as many as it would
hold--to answer the fire, and the batteries on both sides suffered
severely in the two hours' cannonade. Not less than eleven caissons
were blown up and destroyed; one quite near me. When the smoke
went up from these explosions rebel yells of exultation could be
heard along a line of several miles. At 3 P.M. General Hunt ordered
our artillery fire to cease, in order to cool the guns, and to
preserve some rounds for the contest at close quarters, which he
foresaw would soon take place.

My own men did not suffer a great deal from this cannonade, as I
sheltered them as much as possible under the crest of the hill,
and behind rocks, trees, and stone fences.

The cessation of our fire gave the enemy the idea they had silenced
our batteries, and Pickett at once moved forward, to break the left
centre of the Union line and occupy the crest of the ridge.* The
other forces on his right and left were expected to move up and
enlarge the opening thus made, so that finally, the two wings of
the Union Army would be permanently separated, and flung off by
this entering wedge in eccentric directions.

[* The attack was so important, so momentous, and so contrary to
Longstreet's judgment, that when Pickett asked for orders to advance
he gave no reply, and Pickett said proudly, "I shall go forward,
sir!"]

This great column of attack, it was supposed, numbered about
seventeen thousand men, but southern writers have a peculiar
arithmetic by which they always cipher down their forces to nothing.
Even on the left, on the preceding day, when our troops in front
of Little Round Top were assailed by a line a mile and a half long,
they figure it almost out of existence. The force that now advanced
would have been larger still had it not been for a spirited attack
by Kilpatrick against the left of Longstreet's corps, detaining
some troops there which otherwise might have co-operated in the
grand assault against our centre.

It necessarily took the rebels some time to form and cross the
intervening space, and Hunt took advantage of the opportunity to
withdraw the batteries that had been most injured, sending others
in their place from the reserve artillery, which had not been
engaged. He also replenished the ammunition boxes, and stood ready
to receive the foe as he came forward--first with solid shot, next
with shell, and lastly, when he came to close quarters, with
canister.

General Meade's headquarters was in the centre of this cannonade,
and as the balls were flying very thickly there, and killing the
horses of his staff, he found it necessary temporarily to abandon
the place. Where nothing is to be gained by exposure it is sound
sense to shelter men and officers as much as possible. He rode
over to Power's Hill, made his headquarters with General Slocum,
and when the firing ceased rode back again. During his absence
the charge took place. He has stated that it was his intention to
throw the Fifth and Sixth Corps on the flanks of the attacking
force, but no orders to this effect were issued, and it is questionable
whether such an arrangement would have been a good one. It would
have disgarnished the left, where Longstreet was still strong in
numbers, and in forming perpendicular to our line of battle the
two corps would necessarily have exposed their own outer flanks to
attack. Indeed, the rebels had provided for just such a contingency,
by posting Wilcox's brigade and Perry's brigade under Colonel Lang
on the left, both in rear of the charging column under Pickett and
Pettigrew. Owing to a mistake or misunderstanding, this disposition,
however, did not turn out well for the enemy. It was not intended
by Providence that the Northern States should pass under the iron
rule of the slave power, and on this occasion every plan made by
Lee was thwarted in the most unexpected manner.

The distance to be traversed by Pickett's column was about a mile
and a half from the woods where they started, to the crest of the
ridge they desired to attain. They suffered severely from our
artillery, which opened on them with solid shot as soon as they
came in sight; when half way across the plain they were vigorously
shelled; double canisters were reserved for their nearer approach.

At first the direction of their march appeared to be directly toward
my division. When within five hundred yards of us, however, Pickett
halted and changed direction obliquely about forty-five degrees,
so that the attack passed me and struck Gibbon's division on my
right. Just here one of those providential circumstances occurred
which favored us so much, for Wilcox and Lang, who guarded Pickett's
right flank, did not follow his oblique movement, but kept on
straight to the front, so that soon there was a wide interval
between their troops and the main body, leaving Pickett's right
fully uncovered.

The rebels came on magnificently. As fast as the shot and shell
tore through their lines they closed up the gaps and pressed forward.
When they reached the Emmetsburg road the canister began to make
fearful chasms in their ranks. They also suffered severely from
a battery on Little Round Top, which enfiladed their line. One
shell killed and wounded ten men. Gibbon had directed his command
to reserve their fire until the enemy were near enough to make it
very effective. Pickett's advance dashed up to the fence occupied
by the skirmishers of the Second Corps, near the Emmetsburg road,
and drove them back; then the musketry blazed forth with deadly
effect, and Pettigrew's men began to waver on the left and fall
behind; for the nature of the ground was such that they were more
exposed than other portions of the line. They were much shaken by
the artillery fire, and that of Hays' division sent them back in
masses.*

[* The front line of Hays' division, which received this charge,
was composed of the 12th New Jersey, 14th Connecticut, and 1st
Delaware. The second line was composed of the 111th, 125th, 126th,
and 39th New York.]

Before the first line of rebels reached a second fence and stone
wall, behind which our main body was posted, it was obliged to pass
a demi-brigade under Colonel Theodore B. Gates, of the 20th New
York State Militia, and a Vermont brigade under General Stannard,
both belonging to my command. When Pickett's right became exposed
in consequence of the divergence of Wilcox's command, Stannard
seized the opportunity to make a flank attack, and while his left
regiment, the 14th, poured in a heavy oblique fire, he changed
front with his two right regiments, the 13th and 16th, which brought
them perpendicular to the rebel line of march. In cases of this
kind, when struck directly on the flank, troops are more or less
unable to defend themselves, and Kemper's brigade crowded in toward
the centre in order to avoid Stannard's energetic and deadly attack.
They were closely followed up by Gates' command, who continued to
fire into them at close range. This caused many to surrender,
others to retreat outright, and others simply to crowd together.
Simultaneously with Stannard's attack, the 8th Ohio, which was on
picket, overlapping the rebel left, closed in on that flank with
great effect. Nevertheless, the next brigade--that of Armistead--
united to Garnett's brigade, pressed on, and in spite of death-
dealing bolts on all sides, Pickett determined to break Gibbon's
line and capture his guns.

Although Webb's front was the focus of the concentrated artillery
fire, and he had already lost fifty men and some valuable officers,
his line remained firm and unshaken. It devolved upon him now to
meet the great charge which was to decide the fate of the day. It
would have been difficult to find a man better fitted for such an
emergency. He was nerved to great deeds by the memory of his
ancestors, who in former days had rendered distinguished services
to the Republic, and felt that the results of the whole war might
depend upon his holding of the position. His men were equally
resolute. Cushing's battery, A, 4th United States Artillery, which
had been posted on the crest, and Brown's Rhode Island Battery on
his left, were both practically destroyed by the cannonade. The
horses were prostrated, every officer but one was struck, and
Cushing had but one serviceable gun left.

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17