Chancellorsville and Gettysburg
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Abner Doubleday >> Chancellorsville and Gettysburg
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The attack against Humphreys' division which followed the breaking
in of the angle at A will be described further on. The general
result was that Sickles' entire line, together with the reinforcements
sent in at different times to sustain it, were all forced back to
the ridge which was our main line of battle, with the exception of
Crawford's division which maintained a somewhat advanced position.
The details of this contest are full of incident, and too important
to be wholly omitted.
About 3.30 P.M. the rebels commenced the movement against our left,
by sending a flanking force from Hood's division, formed in two
lines, around to attack Sickles' left, held by General J. Hobart
Ward's brigade, which occupied the open ground covering the approaches
to Little Round Top; Ward's line passing in front of the mountain,
and his flank resting on a rocky depression in the ground called
the Devil's Den. The right extended to the minor spur or wooded
ridge beyond the wheat-field. The engagement was furious; commencing
on the rebel right, it extended to the left, until it reached the
Peach Orchard, where it became especially violent. This central
point of Sickles' line was held by eleven regiments of Birney's
and Humphreys' divisions. Birney's two brigades, commanded by
Graham and De Trobriand, held on bravely, for the men who fought
with Kearney in the Peninsula were not easily driven; but the line
was too attenuated to resist the shock very long, and reinforcements
became absolutely necessary to sustain that unlucky angle at the
Peach Orchard. Sickles had authority to call on Sykes, whose corps
was resting from a long and fatiguing march, but the latter wished
his men to get their coffee and be refreshed before sending them
in; and as those who are fighting almost always exaggerate the
necessity for immediate reinforcements, Sykes thought Sickles could
hold on a while longer, and did not respond to the call for three-
quarters of an hour.
It would seem that Lee supposed that Meade's main line of battle
was on the Emmetsburg pike, and that the flank rested on the Peach
Orchard, for he ordered Longstreet to form Hood's division
perpendicular to that road, whereas Sickles occupied an advanced
line, and Sykes the main line in rear. McLaws says that Lee thought
turning the Peach Orchard was turning the Union left. With this
idea, he directed Longstreet to form across the Emmetsburg road,
and push our troops toward Cemetery Hill. Kershaw, after the minor
ridge was taken, reported to Longstreet that he could not carry
out these orders without exposing his right flank to an attack from
Sykes' corps.
Ward fought bravely against Benning's and Anderson's brigades on
the left, driving back two attacks of the latter, but his line was
long and weak, and the enemy overlapped it by the front of nearly
two brigades. Being concealed from view, from the nature of the
ground they could concentrate against any point with impunity. He
attempted to strengthen his forces at the Devil's Den by detaching
the 99th Pennsylvania from his right, and, although De Trobriand
had no troops to spare, he was directed by General Birney to send
the 40th New York, under Colonel Egan, to reinforce that flank.
Egan arrived too late to perform the duty assigned to him, as Ward
had been already driven back, but not too late to make a gallant
charge upon the rebel advance.
The fighting soon extended to the Peach Orchard, but as it commenced
on the left, we will describe that part of the engagement first.
General Warren, who was on Meade's staff as Chief Engineer, had
ridden about this time to the signal station on Little Round Top,
to get a better view of the field. He saw the long line of the
enemy approaching, and about to overlap Ward's left, and perceived
that unless prompt succor arrived Little Round Top would fall into
their hands. Once in their possession they would flank our whole
line and post guns there to drive our troops from the ridge; so
that this eminence was in reality the key of the battle-field, and
must be held at all hazards. He saw Barnes' division, which Sykes
had ordered forward, formed for a charge, and about to go to the
relief of De Trobriand, who held the centre of Birney's line, and
who was sorely beset. Without losing a moment he rode down the
slope, over to Barnes, took the responsibility of detaching Vincent's
brigade, and hurried it back to take post on Little Round Top. He
then sent a staff officer to inform General Meade of what he had
done and to represent the immense importance of holding this
commanding point.
The victorious column of the enemy was subjected to the fire of a
battery on Little Round Top, and to another farther to the right;
but it kept on, went around Ward's brigade and rushed eagerly up
the ravine between the two Round Tops to seize Little Round Top
which seemed to be defenceless. Vincent's brigade rapidly formed
on the crest of a small spur which juts out from the hill, and not
having time to load, advanced with the bayonet, in time to save
the height. The contest soon became furious and the rocks were
alive with musketry. General Vincent sent word to Barnes that the
enemy were on him in overwhelming numbers, and Hazlett's regular
battery, supported by the 140th New York under Colonel O'Rorke of
Weed's brigade, was sent as a reinforcement. The battery was
dragged with great labor to the crest of Little Round Top, and the
140th were posted on the slope on Vincent's right. They came upon
the field just as the rebels, after failing to penetrate the centre,
had driven back the right. In advancing to this exposed position,
Colonel O'Rorke, a brilliant young officer who had just graduated
at the head of his class at West Point, was killed and his men
thrown into some confusion, but Vincent rallied the line and repulsed
the assault. In doing so he exposed himself very much and was soon
killed by a rebel sharpshooter. General Weed, who was on the crest
with the battery, was mortally wounded in the same way; and as
Hazlett leaned over to hear his last message, a fatal bullet struck
him also and he dropped dead on the body of his chief. Colonel
Rice of the 44th New York now took command in place of Vincent.
The enemy having been foiled at the centre and right, stole around
through the woods and turned the left of the line; but Chamberlain's
regiment--the 20th Maine--was folded back by him, around the rear
of the mountain, to resist the attack. The rebels came on like
wolves, with deafening yells, and forced Chamberlain's men over
the crest; but they rallied and drove their assailants back in
their turn. This was twice repeated and then a brigade of the
Pennsylvania Reserves and one of the Fifth Corps dashed over the
hill. The 20th Maine made a grand final charge and drove the rebels
from the valley between the Round Tops, capturing a large number
of prisoners. Not a moment too soon, for Chamberlain had lost a
third of his command and was entirely out of ammunition. Vincent's
men in this affair took two colonels, fifteen officers, and five
hundred men prisoners, and a thousand stand of arms. Hill in his
official report says "Hood's right was held as in a vise."
We will now return to the Peach Orchard. In answer to a shot from
Clark's battery a long line of guns opened from the eleven batteries
opposite. Graham's infantry were partially sheltered from this
iron hail, but the three batteries with him in the beginning, which
were soon reinforced by four more from the reserve artillery, under
Major McGilvery, were very much cut up; and at last it became
necessary to sacrifice one of them--that of Bigelow--to enable the
others to retire to a new line in the rear. Graham still held the
Peach Orchard, although he was assailed on two fronts, by Barksdale's
brigade on the north and Kershaw's brigade on the west. A battery
was brought forward to enfilade Sickles' line on the Emmetsburg
road, and under cover of its fire Barksdale carried the position,
but was mortally wounded in doing so.* Sickles lost a leg about
this time (5.30 P.M.), and Graham, who was also badly wounded, fell
into the enemy's hands. The command of the Third Corps now devolved
upon General Birney.
[* Barksdale soon after was brought into my lines and died like a
brave man, with dignity and resignation. I had known him as an
officer of volunteers in the Mexican war. As a member of Congress
he was very influential in bringing on the Rebellion.]
The batteries under Major McGilvery, which lined the cross road
below the Peach Orchard, were very effective, but were very much
shattered. Kershaw captured them at one time but was driven off
temporarily by a gallant charge of the 141st Pennsylvania of Graham's
brigade, who retook the guns, which were then brought off by hand.
Bigelow was ordered by Major McGilvery to sacrifice his battery to
give the others time to form a new line. He fought with _fixed
prolonge_ until the enemy were within six feet of him, and then
retired with the loss of three officers and twenty-eight men.
Phillips' battery, which adjoined his, had a similar experience.
McLaws bears testimony to the admirable manner with which this
artillery was served. He says one shell killed and wounded thirty
men, out of a company of thirty-seven.
The capture of the Peach Orchard necessarily brought the enemy
directly on Humphreys' left flank and De Trobriand's right. The
disaster then became irremediable, because every force thrown in
after this period, had to contend with a direct fire in front, and
an enfilading fire from the right.
While the Peach Orchard was assailed, several combats took place
in the vicinity, which had a general relation to the defence of
Sickles' line. A little stream runs through a ravine parallel to
the cross road, and about five hundred yards south of it, and then
turns abruptly to the south at the corner of a wheat-field, passing
through a rocky wooded country, to empty in Plum Run. De Trobriand
held the north bank of this stream with a very insufficient force
--a front of two regiments--and his contest with Semmes' brigade
in front and Kershaw's brigade, which was trying to penetrate into
the Peach Orchard, on his right, was at very close range and very
destructive. At the same time as Ward's left was turned and driven
back the enemy came in on the left and rear of De Trobriand, and
occupied the wheat-field. Barnes' division of the Fifth Corps,
composed of Sweitzer's and Tilton's brigades, soon came to his
assistance. The former, by wheeling to the left and retaining
several lines, kept up the fight successfully against the enemy
who came up the ravine, but the latter was flanked and obliged to
give way. De Trobriand's two regiments in front had a most determined
fight, and would not yield the ground. When relieved by Zook's
force they fell back across the wheat-field. There Birney used
them as a basis of a new line, brought up two fresh regiments,
charged through the field, and drove the enemy back to the stone
fence which bounded it.
Caldwell's division of Hancock's corps now came on to renew the
contest. Caldwell formed his men with the brigades of Cross and
Kelly in front, and those of Zook and Brooke in rear. In the
advance Colonel Cross was killed, and the front line being enfiladed
in both directions, was soon so cut up that the rear line came
forward in its place. Zook was killed, but Brooke made a splendid
charge, turning Kershaw's right and driving Semmes back through
the supporting batteries. Sweitzer's brigade then came up a second
time to aid Brooke, but it was useless, for there was still another
line of batteries beyond, and as the Peach Orchard by this time
was in possession of the enemy, Brooke's advanced position was
really a disadvantage, for both his flanks were turned. Semmes'
brigade, together with parts of Benning's and Anderson's brigades,
rallied behind a stone wall, again came forward, and succeeded in
retaking the knoll and the batteries they had lost. Caldwell,
under cover of our artillery, extricated his division with heavy
loss, for both Zook's and Kelly's brigades were completely
surrounded.
Then Ayres,* who had been at the turning-point of so many battles,
went in with his fine division of regulars, commanded by Day and
Burbank, officers of courage and long experience in warfare. He
struck the enemy in flank who were pursuing Caldwell, and who would
have renewed the attack on Little Round Top, doubled them up, and
drove them back to the position Caldwell had left; but his line,
from the nature of things, was untenable, for a whole brigade with
ample supports had formed on his right rear, so that nothing remained
but to face about and fight his way home again. This was accomplished
with the tremendous loss of fifty per cent. of his command in killed
and wounded. His return was aided by the artillery on Little Round
Top, and by the advance of part of the Sixth Corps. When the troops
were all gone, Winslow's battery still held the field for a time,
and withdrew by piece.
[* General Ayres, whose service in the war commenced with the first
Bull Run and ended at Appomattox, may almost be called an impersonation
of the Army of the Potomac, as he took part in nearly all its
battles and minor engagements.]
The enemy, Wofford's, Kershaw's, and Anderson's brigades, now
swarmed in the front of our main line between the wheat-field and
Little Round Top. General S. Wiley Crawford, who commanded a
division composed of two brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps,
was ordered to drive them farther back. This organization, which
at one time I had the honor to command, were veterans of the
Peninsula, and were among the most dauntless men in the army.
Crawford called upon them to defend the soil of their native State,
and headed a charge made by McCandless' brigade, with the colors
of one of the regiments in his hand. The men went forward with an
impetus nothing could withstand. The enemy took shelter behind a
stone fence on the hither side of the wheat-field, but McCandless
stormed the position, drove them beyond the field, and then, as it
was getting dark, both sides rested on their arms. The other
brigade of Crawford's division--that of Fisher--had previously been
sent to reinforce Vincent in his desperate struggle on the slope
of Little Round Top. The enemy retired before it, so that it was
not engaged, and it then took possession of the main Round Top on
the left of Little Round Top and fortified it.
As Crawford charged, two brigades of Sedgwick's corps, those of
Nevin and Eustis, formed under Wheaton on the right and below Little
Round Top. The sight of the firm front presented by these fresh
troops thoroughly discouraged Longstreet, who went forward to
reconnoitre, and he gave up all attempts at making any farther
advance.
The enemy at night took post at the western base of the ridge, and
held a fortified line as far south as the Devil's Den, in which
rocky cavern they took shelter.
It remains now to describe the effect of the loss of the Peach
Orchard and the wounding of Sickles and Graham--which took place
soon after--upon the fate of Humphreys' division, posted on the
right along the Emmetsburg road. When Sickles lost his leg, Birney
assumed command of the corps, and ordered Humphreys to move his
left wing back to form a new oblique line to the ridge, in connection
with Birney's division. Humphreys, up to the loss of the Peach
Orchard, had not been actively engaged, as the enemy had merely
demonstrated along his front; but now he was obliged, while executing
the difficult manoeuvre of a change of front to rear, to contend
with Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division on his left at the
Peach Orchard, and enfilading batteries there also, while his entire
front was called upon to repel a most determined assault from
Anderson's division, which hitherto had not been engaged, and which
now pressed with great force on his right, which still clung to
the road. Four regiments were thrown in by Hancock to support that
part of the line, but the attack was so sudden and violent that
they only had time to fire a few volleys before Humphreys received
orders to give up his advanced position and fall back to the ridge
itself. There he turned at bay. Hancock, who had been placed in
command of the First, Second, and Third Corps, was indefatigable
in his vigilance and personal supervision, "patching the line"
wherever the enemy was likely to break through. His activity and
foresight probably preserved the ridge from capture. Toward the
last Meade brought forward Lockwood's Maryland brigade from the
right and sent them in to cover Sickles' retreat. Humphreys was
followed up by the brigades of Wilcox, Perry, and Wright--about
the best fighting material in the rebel army. Perry was driven
back by the fire of our main line, and as his brigade was between
the other two, his retreat left each of them in a measure unsupported
on the flanks. Posey's and Mahone's brigades were to advance as
soon as the others became actively engaged, but failed to do so,
and therefore Pender, who was to follow after them, did not move
forward. Hence the great effort of Wilcox and Wright, which would
have been ruinous to us if followed up, was fruitless of results.
Both were repulsed for lack of support, but Wright actually reached
the crest with his Georgians and turned a gun, whose cannoneers
had been shot, upon Webb's brigade of the Second Corps. Webb gave
him two staggering volleys from behind a fence, and went forward
with two regiments. He charged, regained the lost piece, and turned
it upon them. Wright, finding himself entirely isolated in this
advanced position, went back again to the main line, and Wilcox
did the same. On this occasion Wright did what Lee failed to
accomplish the next day at such a heavy expense of life, _for he
pierced our centre,_ and held it for a short time, and had the
movement been properly supported and energetically followed up, it
might have been fatal to our army, and would most certainly have
resulted in a disastrous retreat. It was but another illustration
of the difficulty of successfully converging columns against a
central force. Lee's divisions seemed never to strike at the hour
appointed. Each came forward separately, and was beaten for lack
of support.
Wright attained the crest and Wilcox was almost on a line with him.
The latter was closely followed up and nearly surrounded, for troops
rushed in on him from all sides. He lost very heavily in extricating
himself from his advanced position. Wilcox claims to have captured
temporarily twenty guns and Wright eight.
As they approached the ridge a Union battery limbered up and galloped
off. The last gun was delayed and the cannoneer, with a long line
of muskets pointing at him within a few feet, deliberately drove
off the field. The Georgians manifested their admiration for his
bravery by crying out "Don't shoot," and not a musket was fired at
him.* I regret that I have not been able to ascertain the man's
name.
[* As it is well to verify these incidents, I desire to state that
this is a reminiscence of Dr. J. Robie Wood, of New York, a Georgian,
a relative of Wendell Phillips, who was in the charge with Wright.
Wood fell struck by six bullets, but recovered.]
In the morning General Tidball, who was attached to the cavalry as
Chief of Artillery, rode along the entire crest from Little Round
Top to Culp's Hill to make himself familiar with the line. As he
passed by headquarters he noticed some new troops, the Second
Vermont brigade under General Stannard, which formed part of my
command. They were a fine-looking body of men, and were drawn up
in close column by division, ready to go to any part of the field
at a moment's notice. After inquiring to what corps they belonged
he passed over to the right. On his return late in the day he saw
Sickles' whole line driven in and found Wright's rebel brigade
established on the crest barring his way back. He rode rapidly
over to Meade's headquarters and found the general walking up and
down the room, apparently quite unconscious of the movements which
might have been discerned by riding to the top of the hill, and
which should have been reported to him by some one of his staff.
Tidball said, "General, I am very sorry to see that the enemy have
pierced our centre." Meade expressed surprise at the information
and said, "Why, where is Sedgwick?" Tidball replied, "I do not
know, but if you need troops, I saw a fine body of Vermonters a
short distance from here, belonging to the First Corps, who are
available." Meade then directed him to take an order to Newton
and put the men in at once; the order was communicated to me and
I went with my division at double quick to the point indicated.
There we pursued Wright's force as it retired, and retook, at
Hancock's instigation, four guns taken by Wright earlier in the
action. When these were brought in I sent out two regiments, who
followed the enemy up nearly to their lines and retook two more
guns. I have been thus particular in narrating this incident as
Stannard's Vermont brigade contributed greatly to the victory of
the next day and it is worthy of record to state how they came to
be located in that part of the field.
It is claimed that unless Sickles had taken up this advanced position
Hood's division would have turned our left, have forced us from
the shelter of the ridge, and probably have intervened between us
and Washington. The movement, disastrous in some respects, was
propitious as regards its general results, for the enemy had wasted
all their strength and valor in gaining the Emmetsburg road, which
after all was of no particular benefit to them. They were still
outside our main line. They pierced the latter it is true, but
the gallant men who at such heavy expense of life and limb stood
triumphantly on that crest were obliged to retire because the
divisions which should have supported them remained inactive. I
must be excused for thinking that the damaging resistance these
supports encountered on the first day from the men of my command
exerted a benumbing influence on the second day.
It is said, that Hood being wounded, Longstreet led the last advance
against Little Round Top in person, but when he saw Sedgwick's
corps coming into line he gave up the idea of capturing the heights
as impracticable. This eminence should have been the first point
held and fortified by us early in the day, as it was the key of
the field, but no special orders were given concerning it and
nothing but Warren's activity and foresight saved it from falling
into the hands of the enemy.
Meade was considerably startled by the fact that the enemy had
pierced our centre. He at once sent for Pleasonton and gave him
orders to collect his cavalry with a view to cover the retreat of
the army. Indeed, in an article on the "Secret History of Gettysburg,"
published in the "Southern Historical Papers," by Colonel Palfrey,
of the Confederate army, he states that the movement to the rear
actually commenced, and that Ewell's pickets heard and reported
that artillery was passing in that direction. After a short time
the noise of the wheels ceased. He also says that in a conversation
he had with Colonel Ulric Dahlgren of our cavalry, who had lost a
leg, and was a prisoner in Richmond, he was told that while the
battle of Gettysburg was going on he (Dahlgren) captured a Confederate
scout with a despatch from Jefferson Davis to General Lee, in which
the former wrote of the exposed condition of Richmond owing to the
presence of a large Union force at City Point. Dahlgren said a
retreat had been ordered, but when Meade read this despatch, he
looked upon it as a sign indicating the weakness of the enemy, and
perhaps thinking it would not do to supplement the probable capture
of Richmond by a retreat of the Army of the Potomac, countermanded
the order. Sedgwick, who was high in the confidence of General
Meade, told one of his division commanders that the army would
probably fall back on Westminster. General Pleasonton testifies
that he was engaged, by order of General Meade, until 11 P.M. in
occupying prominent points with his cavalry, to cover the retreat
of the army. Nevertheless it has been indignantly denied that such
a movement was contemplated.
Although it was General Lee's intention that both flanks of the
Union army should be assailed at the same time, while the intermediate
forces made demonstrations against the centre, Ewell did not move
to attack the right of our line at Culp's Hill until Longstreet's
assault on the left had failed. Longstreet attributes it to the
fact that Ewell had broken his line of battle by detaching two
brigades up the York road. There is always some reason why columns
never converge in time. Johnson's division, which was on the
extreme left of the rebel army, and had not been engaged, made
their way, sheltered by the ravine of Rock Creek, to assail the
right at Culp's Hill, held by Wadsworth's division of the First
Corps, and that part of the line still farther to the right where
Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps was posted.
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