Chancellorsville and Gettysburg

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When I arrived there I found General Howard, surrounded by his
staff, awaiting us at the main gate of the cemetery. He made
arrangements to hold the road which led up from the town, and which
diverged to Baltimore and Taneytown, by directing me to post the
First Corps on the left in the cemetery, while he assembled the
Eleventh Corps on the right. Soon after he rode over to ask me,
in case his own men (Steinwehr's division) deserted their guns, to
be in readiness to defend them. General Schurz about this time
was busily engaged in rallying his men, and did all that was possible
to encourage them to form line again. I understood they were told
that Sigel had just arrived and assumed command, a fiction thought
justifiable under the circumstances. It seemed to me that the
discredit that attached to them after Chancellorsville had in a
measure injured their morale and _esprit-de-corps_, for they were
rallied with great difficulty.

About 3.30 P.M., General Hancock arrived with orders from General
Meade to supersede Howard. Congress had passed a law authorizing
the President to put any general over any other superior to rank
if, in his judgment, the good of the service demanded it, and
General Meade now assumed this power in the name of the President.
Owing to the false despatch Howard had sent early in the day, Meade
must have been under the impression that the First Corps had fled
without fighting. More than half of them, however, lay dead and
wounded on the field, and hardly a field officer had escaped.

Hancock being his junior, Howard was naturally unwilling to submit
to his authority and, according to Captain Halstead of my staff,
who was present, refused to do so. Howard stated in a subsequent
account of the battle that he merely regarded General Hancock as
a staff officer acting for General Meade. He says "General Hancock
greeted me in his usual frank and cordial manner and used these
words, 'General Meade has sent me to represent him on the field.'
I replied, 'All right, Hancock. This is no time for talking. You
take the left of the pike and I will arrange these troops to the
right.' I noticed that he sent Wadsworth's division, without
consulting me, to the right of the Eleventh Corps to Culp's Hill,
but as it was just the thing to do I made no objection." He adds
that Hancock did not really relieve him until 7 P.M. Hancock,
however, denies that he told Howard he was merely acting as a staff
officer. He says he assumed absolute command at 3.30 P.M. I know
he rode over to me and told me he was in command of the field, and
directed me to send a regiment to the right, and I sent Wadsworth's
division there, as my regiments were reduced to the size of
companies.

Hancock was much pleased with the ridge we were on, as a defensive
position, and considered it admirably adapted for a battle-field.
Its gentle slopes for artillery, its stone fences and rocky boulders
to shelter infantry, and its ragged but commanding eminences on
either flank, where far-reaching batteries could be posted, were
great advantages. It covered the principal roads to Washington
and Baltimore, and its convex shape, enabling troops to reinforce
with celerity any point of the line from the centre, or by moving
along the chord of this arc, was probably the cause of our final
success. The enemy, on the contrary, having a concave order of
battle, was obliged to move troops much longer distances to support
any part of his line, and could not communicate orders rapidly,
nor could the different corps co-operate promptly with each other.
It was Hancock's recommendation that caused Meade to concentrate
his army on this ridge, but Howard received the thanks of Congress
for selecting the position. He, doubtless, did see its advantages,
and recommended it to Hancock. The latter immediately took measures
to hold it as a battle-ground for the army, while Howard merely
used the cemetery as a rallying point for his defeated troops.
Hancock occupied all the prominent points, and disposed the little
cavalry and infantry he had in such a way as to impress the enemy
with the idea that heavy reinforcements had come up. By occupying
Culp's Hill, on the right, with Wadsworth's brigade, and posting
the cavalry on the left to take up a good deal of space, he made
a show of strength not warranted by the facts. Both Hill and Ewell
had received some stunning blows during the day, and were disposed
to be cautious. They, therefore, did not press forward and take
the heights, as they could easily have done at this time, but not
so readily after an hour's delay, for then Sickles' corps from
Emmetsburg, and Slocum's corps from Two Taverns, began to approach
the position. The two rebel divisions of Anderson and Johnson,
however, arrived about dusk, which would have still given the enemy
a great numerical superiority.

General Lee reached the field before Hancock came, and watched the
retreat of the First and Eleventh Corps, and Hancock's movements
and dispositions through his field-glass. He was not deceived by
this show of force, and sent a recommendation--not an order--to
Ewell to follow us up; but Ewell, in the exercise of his discretion
as a corps commander, did not do so. He had lost 3,000 men, and
both he and Hill were under orders not to bring on a general
engagement. In fact they had had all the fighting they desired
for the time being. Colonel Campbell Brown, of Ewell's staff,
states that the latter was preparing to move forward against the
height, when a false report induced him to send Gordon's brigade
to reinforce Smith's brigade on his extreme left, to meet a supposed
Union advance in that direction.

The absence of these two brigades decided him to wait for the
arrival of Johnson's division before taking further action. When
the latter came up, Slocum and Sickles were on the ground, and the
opportunity for a successful attack had passed.

In sending Hancock forward with such ample powers, Meade virtually
appointed him commander-in-chief for the time being, for he was
authorized to say where we would fight, and when, and how. In the
present instance, in accordance with his recommendation, orders
were immediately sent out for the army to concentrate on Cemetery
Ridge. Two-thirds of the Third Corps, and all of the Twelfth came
up, and by six o'clock the position became tolerably secure.
Stannard's Second Vermont brigade also arrived, and as they formed
part of my command, reported to me for duty; a very welcome
reinforcement to my shattered division. Sickles had taken the
responsibility of joining us without orders, knowing that we were
hard pressed. His command prolonged the line of the First Corps
to the left. Slocum's Corps--the Twelfth--was posted, as a reserve,
also on the left.

Hancock now relinquished the command of the field to Slocum and
rode back to Taneytown to confer with Meade and explain his reasons
for choosing the battle-field.

Longstreet's corps soon arrived and joined Ewell and Hill; so that
the whole rebel army was ready to act against us the next morning,
with the exception of Pickett's division.

At the close of the day General John Newton rode up and took charge
of the First Corps by order of General Meade, and I resumed the
command of my division. Several incidents occurred during the
severe struggle of the first day which are worthy of record.

Colonel Wheelock of the 97th New York was cut off during the retreat
of Robinson's division, and took refuge in a house. A rebel
lieutenant entered and called upon him to surrender his sword.
This he declined to do, whereupon the lieutenant called in several
of his men, formed them in line, took out his watch and said to
the colonel, "You are an old gray-headed man, and I dislike to kill
you, but if you don't give up that sword in five minutes, I shall
order these men to blow your brains out." When the time was up
_the Colonel still refused to surrender._ A sudden tumult at the
door, caused by some prisoners attempting to escape, called the
lieutenant off for a moment. When he returned the colonel had
given his sword to a girl in the house who had asked him for it,
and she secreted it between two mattresses. He was then marched
to the rear, but being negligently guarded, escaped the same night
and returned to his regiment.

Another occurrence recalls Browning's celebrated poem of "An Incident
at Ratisbon." An officer of the 6th Wisconsin approached Lieutenant-
Colonel Dawes, the commander of the regiment, after the sharp fight
in the railroad cut. The colonel supposed, from the firm and erect
attitude of the man, that he came to report for orders of some
kind; but the compressed lips told a different story. With a great
effort the officer said, _"Tell them at home I died like a man and
a soldier."_ He threw open his breast, displayed a ghastly wound,
and dropped dead at the colonel's feet.

Another incident was related to me at the time, but owing to our
hurried movements and the vicissitudes of the battle, I have never
had an opportunity to verify it. It was said that during the
retreat of the artillery one piece of Stewart's battery did not
limber up as soon as the others. A rebel officer rushed forward,
placed his hand upon it, and presenting a pistol at the back of
the driver, directed him not to drive off with the piece. The
latter did so, however, received the ball in his body, caught up
with the battery and then fell dead.

We lay on our arms that night among the tombs at the Cemetery, so
suggestive of the shortness of life and the nothingness of fame;
but the men were little disposed to moralize on themes like these
and were too much exhausted to think of anything but much-needed
rest.

CHAPTER V.
BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG--THE SECOND DAY.

The ridge upon which the Union forces were now assembling has
already been partially described. In two places it sunk away into
intervening valleys. One between Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill;
the other lay for several hundred yards north of Little Round Top,
as the lesser of the two eminences on the left was called to
distinguish it from the higher peak called Round Top.

At 1 A.M. Meade arrived from Taneytown. When I saw him, soon after
daylight, he seemed utterly worn out and hollow-eyed. Anxiety and
want of sleep were evidently telling upon him. At dawn he commenced
forming his line by concentrating his forces on the right with a
view to descend into the plain and attack Lee's left, and the
Twelfth Corps were sent to Wadsworth's right to take part in the
movement. It seems to me that this would have been a very hazardous
enterprise, and I am not surprised that both Slocum and Warren
reported against it. The Fifth and Sixth Corps would necessarily
be very much fatigued after making a forced march. To put them in
at once, and direct them to drive a superior force of Lee's veterans
out of a town where every house would have been loop-holed, and
every street barricaded, would hardly have been judicious. If we
had succeeded in doing so, it would simply have reversed the battle
of Gettysburg, for the Confederate army would have fought behind
Seminary Ridge, and we would have been exposed in the plain below.
Nor do I think it would have been wise strategy to turn their left,
and drive them between us and Washington, for it would have enabled
them to threaten the capital, strengthen and shorten their line of
retreat, and endanger our communications at the same time. It is
an open secret that Meade at that time disapproved of the battle-
ground Hancock had selected.

Warren and Slocum having reported an attack against Lee's left as
unadvisable, Meade began to post troops on our left, with a view
to attack the enemy's right. This, in my opinion, would have been
much more sensible. Lee, however, solved the problem for him, and,
fortunately for us, forced him to remain on the defensive, by
ordering an assault against each extremity of the Union line.

There has been much discussion and a good deal of crimination and
recrimination among the rebel generals engaged as to which of them
lost the battle of Gettysburg.

I have already alluded to the fact that universal experience
demonstrates that columns converging on a central force almost
invariably fail in their object and are beaten in detail. Gettysburg
seems to me a striking exemplification of this; repeated columns
of assault launched by Lee against our lines came up in succession
and were defeated before the other parts of his army could arrive
in time to sustain the attack. He realized the old fable. The
peasant could not break the bundle of fagots, but he could break
one at a time until all were gone.

Lee's concave form of battle was a great disadvantage, for it took
him three times as long as it did us to communicate with different
parts of his line, and concentrate troops. His couriers who carried
orders and the reinforcements he sent moved on the circumference
and ours on the chord of the arc.

The two armies were about a mile apart. The Confederates--Longstreet
and Hill--occupied Seminary Ridge, which runs parallel to Cemetery
Ridge, upon which our forces were posted. Ewell's corps, on the
rebel left, held the town, Hill the centre, and Longstreet the
right.

Lee could easily have manoeuvred Meade out of his strong position
on the heights, and should have done so. When he determined to
attack, he should have commenced at daybreak, for all his force
was up except Pickett's division; while two corps of the Union
army, the Fifth and Sixth, were still far away, and two brigades
of the Third Corps were also absent.

The latter were marching on the Emmetsburg road, and as that was
controlled by the enemy, Sickles felt anxious for the safety of
his men and trains, and requested that the cavalry be sent to escort
them in. This was not done, however. The trains were warned off
the road, and the two brigades were, fortunately, not molested.

There has been a great deal of bitter discussion between Longstreet,
Fitz Lee, Early, Wilcox, and others as to whether Lee did or did
not order an attack to take place at 9 A.M., and as to whether
Longstreet was dilatory, and to blame for not making it. When a
battle is lost there is always an inquest, and a natural desire on
the part of each general to lay the blame on somebody else's
shoulders. Longstreet waited until noon for Law's brigade to come
up, and afterward there was a good deal of marching and countermarching
to avoid being seen by our troops. There was undoubtedly too much
delay. The fact is, Longstreet saw we had a strong position and
was not well pleased at the duty assigned him, for he thought it
more than probable his attempt would fail. He had urged Lee to
take up a position where Meade would be forced to attack him, and
was not in very good humor to find his advice disregarded. The
rebel commander, however, finding the Army of the Potomac in front
of him, having unbounded confidence in his troops, and elated by
the success of the first day's fight, believed he could gain a
great victory then and there, and end the war, and determined to
attempt it. He was sick of these endless delays and constant
sacrifices, and hoped one strong sword-thrust would slay his
opponent, and enable the South to crown herself queen of the North
American continent.

By 9 A.M. our skirmish line, in front of the Peach Orchard, was
actively engaged with that of the enemy, who were making a
reconnoissance toward the Emmetsburg road. No serious affair,
however, occurred for some hours. Meade, as stated, was forming
his lines on the right of the position he afterward occupied. The
Fifth Corps, which came up about 1 P.M., was posted, as a reserve,
south of the Twelfth Corps, with a view to the attack which has
already been referred to. About 3 P.M. the Sixth Corps began to
arrive from its long and toilsome march of thirty-four miles, and
its tired troops were placed on the Taneytown road in the rear of
Round Top, to reinforce the other corps in case our troops made an
attack on the left. Lee, however, did not wait for Meade to advance
against him, but boldly directed that each flank of the Union army
should be assailed at the same time, while constant demonstrations
against our centre were to be kept up, to prevent either wing from
being reinforced. It was another attempt to converge columns with
an interval of several miles between them upon a central force,
and, like almost all such enterprises, failed from want of proper
co-operation in the different fractions of his line.

[Map]
GETTYSBURG.--Final Attack of the First Day, and Battle of the Second
Day.*
[* The first day's battle is represented north of the Fairfield
and Hanover roads. The second day's battle south of the same
roads.]

REFERENCES TO THE FIRST DAY'S BATTLE.
_Union Troops,_ [filled rectangle]
MAJOR GENERAL O. O. HOWARD commanding the First and Eleventh Corps.
FIRST CORPS.
MAJOR-GENERAL ABNER DOUBLEDAY commanding.
FIRST DIVISION--MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES S. WADSWORTH commanding.
_a. First Brigade._ Colonel Henry A. Morrow, 24th Michigan.
_b. Second Brigade._ Brigadier-General Lysander Cutler.
SECOND DIVISION--MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN C. ROBINSON.
_c. First Brigade._ Brigadier-General Gabriel R. Paul.
_d. Second Brigade._ Brigadier-General Henry Baxter.
THIRD DIVISION--BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOS. A. ROWLEY.
_e. First Brigade._ Colonel Chapman Biddle, 121st Pennsylvania.
_f. Second Brigade._ Colonel Roy Stone, 149th Pennsylvania.
ELEVENTH CORPS.
MAJOR-GENERAL CARL SCHURZ commanding.
FIRST DIVISION--BRIGADIER-GENERAL F. C. BARLOW commanding.
_g. First Brigade._ Colonel Von Gilsa.
_h. Second Brigade._ Brigadier-General Adelbert Ames.
SECOND DIVISION--BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALEXANDER SCHIMMELPFENNIG.
_k. First Brigade._ Colonel Von Arnsberg.
_l. Second Brigade._ Colonel Kryzanowski.
_m. Coster's Brigade,_ of Steinwehr's Division.

_Confederate Troops,_ [open rectangle]
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL A. P. HILL commanding Third Corps.
MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY HETH commanding Division.
1. Archer's Brigade. 3. Brockenborough's Brigade.
2. Davis' Brigade. 4. Pettigrew's Brigade.
MAJOR-GENERAL W. D. PENDER commanding Division.
6. McGowan's Brigade. 8. Thomas' Brigade.
7. Scales' Brigade. 9. Lane's Brigade.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BENJ. EWELL commanding Second Corps.
MAJOR-GENERAL R. E. RODES commanding Division.
10. Daniel's Brigade. 12. Iverson's Brigade.
11. Ramseur's Brigade. 13. O'Neill's Brigade.
14. Doles' Brigade.
MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY commanding Division.
15. Gordon's Brigade. 17. Hoke's Brigade.
16. Hays' Brigade. 18. Smith's Brigade.

Longstreet's attack was over before Ewell came into action, and
although Ewell succeeded in temporarily establishing himself on
our extreme right, it was due to an unfortunate order given by
General Meade, by which the force in that part of the field was
withdrawn just as Ewell advanced against it. But we are anticipating
our narrative.

Hood, who commanded the division on the right of Longstreet's corps,
complains that he was not allowed to go past Round Top and flank
us on the south, as he might have done, but was required by his
orders to break in at the Peach Orchard and drive Sickles' line
along the Emmetsburg road toward Cemetery Hill; but it seems to
me, as he started late in the afternoon, if he had made the detour
which would have been necessary in order to attack us on the south,
he would have met Sedgwick in front, while Sickles and Sykes might
have interposed to cut him off from the main body.

Before describing Longstreet's attack we will give the final
disposition made by General Meade when it became necessary to fight
a defensive battle. The ridge was nearly in the shape of a horseshoe.
The Twelfth Corps was on the extreme right; next came one division
of the First Corps on Culp's Hill, then the Eleventh Corps on
Cemetery Hill, with two divisions of the First Corps at the base;
next the Second Corps; then the Third, and the Fifth Corps on the
extreme left, the Sixth Corps being posted in rear of Round Top as
a general reserve to the army. Sickles, however, denies that any
position was ever marked out for him. He was expected to prolong
Hancock's line to the left, but did not do so for the following
reasons: _First,_ because the ground was low, and _second,_ on
account of the commanding position of the Emmetsburg road, which
ran along a cross ridge oblique to the front of the line assigned
him, and which afforded the enemy an excellent position for their
artillery; _third,_ because the ground between the valley he was
expected to occupy, and the Emmetsburg road constituted a minor
ridge, very much broken and full of rocks and trees, which afforded
excellent cover for an enemy operating in his immediate front. He
had previously held an interview with General Meade and asked that
an experienced staff officer be sent with him to assist in locating
a suitable position for his corps. At his request, General Hunt,
the Chief of Artillery, was sent for that purpose. They rode out
to the ridge and Sickles directed that his troops should be posted
along that road, with his centre at the Peach Orchard, which was
about a mile from and nearly opposite to Little Round Top; his
right wing, under Humphreys, extending along the road, while his
left wing, under Birney, made a right angle at the Peach Orchard
with the other part of the line, and bent around, so as to cover
the front of Little Round Top at the base. The disadvantages of
this position are obvious enough. It is impossible for any force
to hold its ground when attacked at once on both sides which
constitute the right angle. The diagram shows that the force _A_
will have both its lines _a1_ and _a2_ enfiladed by batteries at
_b1 b2_, and must yield. The ground, however, may be such that
the enemy cannot plant his guns at _b1_ or _b2_; but under any
circumstances it is a weak formation and the enemy easily penetrate
the angle. When that is the case, and it was so in the present
instance--each side constituting the angle is taken in flank, and
the position is no longer tenable.

[Diagram]
_________________________
| _b2_
|
|_b1_ _________________
| | _a1_
| |
| | _A_
| |_a2_
| |
| |

If one side of the right angle lies behind a ridge where it cannot
be enfiladed, a temporary formation of this kind is sometimes
permissible.

Sickles claimed that he acted with the implied sanction of General
Meade, who, however, censured the movement afterward. As soon as
Sickles took position, General Buford's division of cavalry was
sent to the rear at Westminster, to guard the trains there; and
Kilpatrick's division was ordered to Hunterstown to attack the
rebel left.

Sykes' corps--the Fifth--came up from the right about 5 P.M., soon
after Longstreet's attack on Sickles was fairly under way, and
formed along the outer base of Little Round Top, with Crawford's
Pennsylvania Reserves at their right and front.

There had been a Council of War, or Conference of Corps Commanders,
called at Meade's headquarters, and it was universally agreed to
remain and hold the position. As the Third Corps, in answer to
the guns of Clark's battery, was suddenly assailed by a terrible
concentrated artillery fire, General Sickles rode back to his
command and General Meade went with him. The latter objected to
Sickles' line, but thought it was then too late to change it.

The severe artillery fire which opened against the two sides of
the angle at the Peach Orchard was a prelude to a furious attack
against Ward's brigade on the left. This attack soon extended to
the Peach Orchard. The fight became very hot against Birney's
division from the left to the centre, but the troops on the right
of the centre--Humphreys' division--were not at first actively
engaged, and Humphreys reinforced Birney with one of his brigades,
and subsequently with a regiment.

The battle which now raged among these trees, rocks, and ravines
was so complicated that it is hard to follow and difficult to
describe the movements of the contestants. Some idea of it can
probably be gained by an examination of the following diagram:

It will be seen that a long line of rebel batteries bears upon A,
and that one of them was brought up to enfilade the side AB. The
angle at A, attacked by Barksdale on the north and Kershaw on the
west, was broken in. In consequence of this, several batteries on
the line EF were sacrificed, and Wofford's brigade soon came forward
and took the position DE.

The Confederate line being very long, and overlapping Ward's brigade
on the left, the latter was forced back, and the exulting rebels
advanced to seize Little Round Top. They attacked the force there
with great fury, assailing it in front and rear, but they were
ultimately repulsed, and finally took up the line GL. Two divisions
of the Fifth Corps and one of the Second Corps were sent in, one
after the other, to drive back the strong rebel force posted from
D to G, but each one had a bitter contest in front, and was flanked
by the rebel line at DE, so that ultimately all were obliged to
retreat, although each performed prodigies of valor. Indeed,
Brooks' brigade charged almost up to the enemy's line of batteries,
HI. The rebels gained the position LG, confronting our main line
and close to it; but a fine charge made by Crawford's division of
the Pennsylvania Reserves drove them farther back, and as part of
the Sixth Corps came up and formed to support Crawford, the rebels
gave up the contest for the night as regards this part of the field.

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