Chancellorsville and Gettysburg

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CHANCELLORSVILLE
AND GETTYSBURG

_CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR.--VI._

CHANCELLORSVILLE
AND
GETTYSBURG

BY
ABNER DOUBLEDAY
BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U.S.A., AND LATE MAJOR-GENERAL U.S.V.;
COMMANDING THE FIRST CORPS AT GETTYSBURG.

NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
743 AND 745 BROADWAY
1882

COPYRIGHT BY
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1882

TROW'S
PRINTING AND BOOKBINDING COMPANY
210-213 _East 12th Street_

NEW YORK

PREFACE.

In writing ths narrative, which relates to the decisive campaign
which freed the Northern States from invasion, it may not be out
of place to state what facilities I have had for observation in
the fulfilment of so important a task. I can only say that I was,
to a considerable extent, an actor in the scenes I describe, and
knew the principal leaders on both sides, in consequence of my
association with them at West Point, and, subsequently, in the
regular army. Indeed, several of them, including Stonewall Jackson
and A. P. Hill, were, prior to the war, officers in the regiment
to which I belonged. As commander of the Defences of Washington
in the spring of 1862, I was, owing to the nature of my duties,
brought into intimate relations with the statesmen who controlled
the Government at the time, and became well acquainted with President
Lincoln. I was present, too, after the Battle of Gettysburg, at
a very interesting Cabinet Council, in which the pursuit of Lee
was fully discussed; so that, in one way and another, I have had
better opportunities to judge of men and measures than usually fall
to the lot of others who have written on the same subject.

I have always felt it to be the duty of every one who held a
prominent position in the great war to give to posterity the benefit
of his personal recollections; for no dry official statement can
ever convey an adequate idea to those who come after us of the
sufferings and sacrifices through which the country has passed.
Thousands of men--the flower of our Northern youth--have gone down
to their graves unheralded and unknown, and their achievements and
devotion to the cause have already been forgotten. It is, therefore,
incumbent upon us, who were their comrades in the field, to do all
in our power to preserve their deeds from oblivion.

And yet it is no easy task to relate contemporaneous events.
Whoever attempts it must be prepared for severe criticism and the
exhibition of much personal feeling. Some of this may be avoided,
it is true, by writing a colorless history, praising everybody,
and attributing all disasters to dispensations of Providence, for
which no one is to blame. I cannot, however, consent to fulfill
my allotted task in this way, for the great lessons of the war are
too valuable to be ignored or misstated. It is not my desire to
assail any of the patriotic men who were engaged in the contest,
but each of us is responsible for our actions in this world, and
for the consequences which flow from them; and where great disasters
have occurred, it is due both to the living and the dead that the
causes and circumstances be justly and properly stated.

Richelieu once exclaimed, upon giving away a high appointment:
"Now I have made one ingrate and a thousand enemies." Every one
who writes the history of the Great Rebellion will often have
occasion to reiterate the statement: For the military critic must
necessarily describe facts which imply praise or censure. Those
who have contributed to great successes think much more might have
been said on the subject, and those who have caused reverses and
defeats are bitter in their denunciations.

Nevertheless, the history of the war should be written before the
facts have faded from the memory of living men, and have become
mere matters of tradition.

In a narrative of this kind, resting upon a great number of voluminous
details, I cannot hope to have wholly escaped error, and wherever
I have misconceived or misstated a fact, it will give me pleasure
to correct the record.

A. D.
NEW YORK, January, 1882.

CONTENTS.

LIST OF MAPS

CHANCELLORSVILLE
CHAPTER I.
THE OPENING OF 1863--HOOKER'S PLANS
CHAPTER II.
FRIDAY, THE FIRST OF MAY
CHAPTER III.
THE DISASTROUS SECOND OF MAY
CHAPTER IV.
THE ROUT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS
CHAPTER V.
JACKSON'S ADVANCE IS CHECKED
CHAPTER VI.
SICKLES FIGHTS HIS WAY BACK--ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST CORPS
CHAPTER VII.
THE BATTLE OF THE THIRD OF MAY
CHAPTER VIII.
MAY FOURTH--ATTACK ON SEDGWICK'S FORCE
CHAPTER IX.
PREPARATIONS TO RENEW THE CONFLICT
CHAPTER X.
BATTLE OF BRANDY STATION (FLEETWOOD)

GETTYSBURG
CHAPTER I.
THE INVASION OF THE NORTH
CHAPTER II.
HOOKER'S PLANS--LONGSTREET OCCUPIES THE GAPS IN THE BLUE RIDGE--
ALARM IN RICHMOND--HOOKER SUPERSEDED BY MEADE
CHAPTER III.
STUART'S RAID--THE ENEMY IN FRONT OF HARRISBURG--MEADE'S PLAN
CHAPTER IV.
THE FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, WEDNESDAY, JULY 1, 1863
CHAPTER V.
BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG--THE SECOND DAY
CHAPTER VI.
THE BATTLE OF THE THIRD DAY--JOHNSON'S DIVISION DRIVEN OUT
CHAPTER VII.
GENERAL RETREAT OF THE ENEMY--CRITICISMS OF DISTINGUISHED CONFEDERATE
OFFICERS
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B
INDEX

LIST OF MAPS.

FIELD OF OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA
OPERATIONS ON THE FIRST OF MAY, 1863
JACKSON'S ATTACK ON HOWARD, MAY 1
BATTLE OF THE THIRD OF MAY
SEDGWICK'S POSITION
FROM THE POTOMAC TO HARRISBURG
DIAGRAMS OF POSITIONS IN THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
GETTYSBURG: FINAL ATTACK OF THE FIRST DAY AND BATTLE OF THE SECOND
DAY
DIAGRAM OF THE ATTACK ON SICKLES AND SYKES

CHANCELLORSVILLE.

CHANCELLORSVILLE.

CHAPTER I.
THE OPENING OF 1863.--HOOKER'S PLANS.

After the great disaster of Fredericksburg, General Burnside, the
Commander of the Union Army, was superseded by Major-General Joseph
Hooker, a graduate of West Point, who having formerly held a high
position on the staff of General Gideon J. Pillow in the war with
Mexico, was supposed to be well acquainted with military operations
on a large scale. He had subsequently left the army, and had been
engaged in civil pursuits for several years. He was a man of fine
presence, of great personal magnetism, and had the reputation of
being one of our most efficient and successful corps commanders.

When the campaign of Chancellorsville commenced, the Army of the
Potomac was posted on the left bank of the Rappahannock, opposite
Fredericksburg, among the Stafford hills, in a position which was
considered almost impregnable. It rested upon the Potomac River,
and as all of its supplies came by water, they were not subject to
delay or interruption of any kind; nor were they endangered by the
movements of the enemy.

At the period referred to, General Hooker had under him a force of
about 124,500 men of all arms, 11,500 of which were cavalry.

On the opposite side of the river, the Army of Northern Virginia,
under General Robert E. Lee, numbered, according to their official
reports, about sixty-two thousand men, three thousand of which were
cavalry;* but the difference was amply compensated by the wide
river in front of the enemy, and the fact that every available
point and ford was well fortified and guarded. General Thomas J.
Jackson, commonly called Stonewall Jackson, held the line below
Hamilton's crossing to Port Royal. Two out of four divisions of
Longstreet's corps were absent. The fourth, under Major-General
Lafayette McLaws, was posted from Hamilton's crossing to Banks'
Ford. Still farther up and beyond the front of either army, the
crossing-places were watched by the rebel cavalry under Major-
General J. E. B. Stuart, supported by the Third Division of
Longstreet's corps, that of Anderson.

[* Napoleon says 100,000 men on the rolls are only equivalent to
about 80,000 muskets in action. It is doubtful if Hooker had over
113,000 men for actual combat. Lieut.-Colonel W. T. Forbes,
Assistant Adjutant General, who has had access to the records,
after a careful estimate, places the number as follows. First
Corps, 16,000; Second Corps, 16,000; Third Corps, 18,000; Fifth
Corps, 15,000; Sixth Corps, 22,000; Eleventh Corps, 15,000; Twelfth
Corps, 11,000; total infantry and artillery, 113,000; Pleasanton's
cavalry, 1,500; total effective force, 114,500. He estimates Lee's
army at 62,000, which the Confederate authorities, Hotchkiss and
Allan, place as follows: Anderson's and McLaws' divisions of
Longstreet's Corps, 17,000; Jackson's Corps, 33,500; Stuart's
Cavalry, 2,700; Artillery, 5,000; add 4,000 on engineer, hospital
duty, etc. This estimate is exclusive of Stoneman's force.]

Both armies had spent the winter in much needed rest, after the
toilsome and exhausting marches and bloody battles which terminated
Lee's first invasion of Maryland. The discipline of our army was
excellent, and it would have been hard to find a finer body of men,
or better fighting material than that assembled on this occasion,
in readiness to open the spring campaign. Hooker was justly popular
with his troops. They had confidence in his ability as a general,
and he had gained their good will by anticipating their wants, and
by generously grating furloughs to those who were pining from home-
sickness; trusting that old associations and the honor of the men
would induce them to rejoin their colors when the leaves of absence
had expired. In this way he almost stopped the desertion which
had been so prevalent under Burnside. Only one portion of the army
was dissatisfied; the position recently occupied by General Franz
Sigel, the favorite commander of the Eleventh Corps, had been given
to General O. O. Howard. The numerous Germans in that corps were
discontented at the change. They cared little for Howard's reputation
as the Havelock of the army; an appellation he had gained from his
zeal as a Congregationalist. They felt, when their countryman
Sigel was deprived of his command, that it was a blow to their
nationality, and therefore lost some of the enthusiasm which always
accompanies the personal influence of a popular leader.

The rainy season was nearly over, the time had come for action,
and it was essential to strike a decisive blow before the term of
service of the nine months' and two years' men had drawn to a close.
Hooker's plan of campaign was simple, efficacious, and should have
been successful. The rebels occupied a long line and could not be
strong everywhere. He resolved to make a pretence of crossing with
three corps, under Major-General Sedgwick, below Fredericksburg,
while the remaining four corps under Major-General Slocum made a
detour and crossed twenty-seven miles above at Kelly's Ford. The
latter were then to march down the river against the left flank of
the rebel army and re-open Banks' Ford; thus re-uniting the two
wings of the army and giving a secure line of retreat in case of
disaster. When this was accomplished it was proposed to give battle
in the open country near the ford, the position there being a
commanding one and taking the whole line of rebel works on the
heights of Fredericksburg in reverse. Owing to his great preponderance
of force, Hooker had little reason to doubt that the result would
be favorable to our arms. To carry out this plan and make it a
complete surprise to the enemy it became necessary to leave Gibbon's
division of Couch's corps behind, for as his encampment at Falmouth
was in full view of the Confederate forces on the opposite side,
to withdraw it would have been to notify them that some unusual
movement was going on. So far the idea was simply to crush the
opposing army, but Hooker's plan went farther and involved the
capture of Lee's entire force. To accomplish this he directed
Stoneman to start two weeks in advance of the main body with ten
thousand cavalry, cross at the upper fords of the Rappahannock,
and sweep down upon Lee's communications with Richmond, breaking
up railroads and canals, cutting telegraph wires, and intercepting
supplies of all kinds. As the rebel commissariat found great
difficulty in keeping more than four days' rations on hand at a
time, Stoneman's raid would almost necessarily force Lee to fall
back on his depots and give up Fredericksburg. One column under
Averell was to attack Culpeper and Gordonsville, the other under
Buford to move to Louisa Court House, and thence to the Fredericksburg
Railroad. Both columns were to unite behind the Pamunkey, and in
case our army was successful Stoneman was directed to plant his
force behind some river in an advantageous position on Lee's line
of retreat, where he could detain the rebel army until Hooker could
again assail it and compel it to surrender. A brave programme!
Let us see how it was carried out.

It was an essential part of Hooker's project that the cavalry should
begin operations two weeks before the infantry. If they did their
work thoroughly, Lee would be out of provisions, and his retreat
would give us all the moral effect of a victory. The rebel cavalry
at the time being reduced to about 3,000 men, it was not supposed
that Stoneman would encounter any serious resistance. He accordingly
started on April 13th to carry out his instructions, but another
rain storm, which made the river unfordable, and very bad roads,
detained him until the 28th. It has been suggested that he might
have crossed higher up, but cavalry officers who were there, tell
me that every ravine had become an impassable river. Hooker became
impatient and refused to wait any longer; so when the water subsided,
all--infantry, artillery, and cavalry--were sent over together.
The result was that the battle was ended before Stoneman got fairly
to work, and his operations had little or no effect in obstructing
Lee's movements.

To confuse the enemy as much as possible, demonstrations had been
made at both ends of the line. On April 21st a small infantry
force was sent to threaten Kelly's Ford. On the same day, I went
with part of my division down the river to Port Conway, opposite
Port Royal, twenty miles below Fredericksburg, made a pretence of
crossing in pontoons, and built fires in every direction at night,
to give the impression of a large force. On the 24th General
Wadsworth went on an expedition to the same place, and two regiments
under Colonel Morrow, 24th Michigan, crossed over in boats, and
returned. Those movements caused Jackson to strengthen his force
in that quarter. On the 27th, the storm having abated, Meade's
corps (the Fifth), Howard's corps (the Eleventh), and Slocum's
corps (the Twelfth), the whole being under the command of General
Slocum, left camp for Kelly's Ford, each accompanied by three
batteries. A detachment was thrown over, in boats, on the evening
of the 28th, which dispersed the picket guard; and by the next
morning the entire force was across the river and on their way to
the Rapidan, the Fifth Corps taking the direction of Elley's Ford
and the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps that of Germania Ford. Stoneman's
cavalry crossed at the same time with the others, and moved to
Culpeper, where he halted for a time to reorganize his force, and
get rid of surplus horses, baggage, etc., which were sent to the
rear. The next day Averell kept on to Rapidan Station with 4,000
sabres, to engage W. H. F. Lee's rebel brigade, so that it could
not interfere with the operations of the main body, which moved
southeast across Morton's Ford and Raccoon Ford to Louisa Court
House, where the work of destruction was to begin. Stoneman's
further movements will be related hereafter. One small brigade of
three regiments with two batteries was placed under the command of
General Pleasonton and directed to report to General Slocum, to
precede the infantry on the different roads.

Stuart, who commanded two brigades of rebel cavalry, under Fitz
Hugh Lee and W. H. F. Lee, and whose duty it was to watch these
upper fords, received news of the crossing at 9 P.M., on the 28th.

The turning column reached Chancellorsville with but little
opposition, as both Lee and Stuart thought it was making for
Gordonsville and the Virginia Central Railroad. In consequence of
this miscalculation, Stuart planted himself at Brandy Station.
When he found that he was out of position and that it was too late
to prevent the crossing at Germania Ford, he made a circuit with
Fitz Hugh Lee's brigade to get between Slocum and Lee, and sent W.
H. F. Lee's brigade to impede Stoneman's operations. The passage
of Germania Ford turned Elley's Ford and United States Ford, and
Mahone's and Posey's brigades, who were on guard there, retreated
on Chancellorsville, where Anderson had come up with Wright's
brigade too late to prevent the crossing.

By 6 P.M. on the 30th, Hooker found himself in command of four
corps at Chancellorsville, with another--that of Sickles--near at
hand. Anderson fell back to Tabernacle Church as our troops
advanced, and began to fortify a line there. Stuart sent Fitz Hugh
Lee's brigade, which was very much exhausted, to Todd's Tavern for
the night, while he started with a small escort, to explain the
situation to General Lee at Fredericksburg. On the road, not far
from Spottsylvania, he came unexpectedly upon one of Pleasonton's
regiments, the 6th New York Cavalry, numbering about 200 men, which
was returning from a reconnoissance it had made in that direction.
He avoided the encounter and sent back to Todd's Tavern, at first
for a regiment, but subsequently for the entire brigade. When
there reinforcements came up a furious cavalry contest took place,
with charges and counter-charges, and hand to hand combats. It
was not without an element of romance, in that lonely spot, far
from either army, under the resplendent light of the full moon;
recalling, in the words of a Southern chronicler, some scene of
knightly glory. Our troops were surrounded, but cut their way out
with the loss of their gallant commander, Lieutenant-Colonel McVicar,
who led them in the charge.

Meanwhile the other portion of the contemplated movement had also
been going forward. On the 28th, the Sixth Corps, under Sedgwick,
and the First Corps, under Reynolds, were moved down near the river,
three or four miles below Fredericksburg, and bivouacked there in
a pouring rain. As it was possible that the two corps might be
attacked when they reached the other side, the Third Corps, under
Sickles, was posted in the rear as a reserve.

The next day two bridges were laid down at Franklin's old crossing
for the Sixth Corps, and two more a mile below for the First Corps.
Men in rifle-pits on the other side impeded the placing of the
pontoons for a while, but detachments sent over in boats stormed
their intrenchments, and drove them out. Brooks' division of the
Sixth Corps and Wadsworth's division of the First Corps then crossed
and threw up _tete du ponts_. The enemy made no other opposition
than a vigorous shelling by their guns on the heights, which did
but little damage. A considerable number of these missiles were
aimed at my division and at that of General J. C. Robinson, which
were held in reserve on the north side of the river; but as our
men were pretty well sheltered, there were but few casualties.

It soon became evident that the enemy would not attack the bridge
heads, they being well guarded by artillery on the north bank, so
Sickles' corps was detached on the 30th and ordered to Chancellorsville.

Sedgwick used the remainder of his men to great advantage by marching
them back and forth among the hills in such a way as to lead Lee
to suppose that a very large force confronted him. As, however,
Sedgwick did not advance, and more accurate reports were furnished
by Stuart in relation to what had taken place up the river, Lee
saw, on the night of the 30th, that the movement in front of
Fredericksburg was a feint, and his real antagonist was at
Chancellorsville. He had previously ordered Jackson's corps up
from Moss Creek and now advanced with the main body of his army to
meet Hooker, leaving Early's division of Jackson's corps and
Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division of Longstreet's corps to
hold the heights of Fredericksburg against Sedgwick. Jackson, who
was always prompt, started at midnight, and at 8 A.M. the next day
stood by the side of Anderson at Tabernacle Church. McLaws' division
had already arrived, having preceded him by a few hours.

The error in the movement thus far made is plain. It is a maxim
in war that a single hour's delay, when an enemy is strengthening
his position or when reinforcements are coming up, will frequently
cost the lives of a thousand men. In the present instance it was
simply suicidal for Hooker to delay action until Anderson had
fortified his lines and Lee had come forward with the main body to
join him. Hooker should have pressed on immediately to seize the
objective. Banks' Ford was almost within his grasp, and only a
portion of Anderson's division barred the way. The possession of
that ford would have brought Sedgwick twelve miles nearer to him,
and would have forced Lee to fight at a great disadvantage both as
to position and numbers. Hooker knew from a captured despatch
which Pleasonton placed in his hands, that Lee was still in
Fredericksburg on the 30th, uncertain how to act; for he did not
know the strength of Sedgwick's column, and feared that the main
attack might come from that direction. The four corps at
Chancellorsville amounted to about forty-six thousand men; and
18,000 more were close at hand under Sickles. The troops had made
but a short march, and were comparatively fresh. Four miles further
on lay the great prize for which Hooker was contending. He had
only to put out his hand to reach it, but he delayed action all
that long night and until eleven o'clock of the next morning. When
he did make the effort the line he was about to occupy was well
fortified and held by all but one division and one brigade of Lee's
army.

CHAPTER II.
FRIDAY, THE FIRST OF MAY.

There are two excellent roads leading from Chancellorsville to
Fredericksburg--one a plank road, which keeps up near the sources
of the streams along the dividing line between Mott Run on the
north and Lewis Creek and Massaponax Creek on the South, and the
other called the old turnpike, which was more direct but more
broken, as it passed over several ravines. There was still a third
road, a very poor one, which ran near the river and came out at
Banks' Ford.

On May 1st, at 11 A.M., Hooker moved out to attack Lee in four
columns.

Slocum's corps, followed by that of Howard, took the plank road on
the right.

Sykes' division of Meade's corps, followed by Hancock's division
of Couch's corps, went by the turnpike in the centre.

The remainder of Meade's corps--Griffin's division, followed by
that of Humphreys--took the river road.

Lastly, French's division of Couch's corps was under orders to turn
off and march to Todd's Tavern.

Each column was preceded by a detachment of Pleasonton's cavalry,
which, in fact, had been close to Anderson's pickets all the
morning.

Before these troops started, Sickles' corps arrived, after a short
march, from Hartwood Church, and were posted in rear of the
Chancellorsville House as a reserve, with one brigade thrown out
to Dowdall's Tavern, otherwise known as Melzi Chancellor's house.
Another brigade was left at the Ford to guard the passage against
Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry.

Hooker, who was a very sanguine man, expected to be able to form
line of battle by 2 P.M., with his right resting near Tabernacle
Church, and his left covering Banks' Ford. It did not seem to
occur to him that the enemy might be there before him and prevent
the formation, or that he would have any difficulty in moving and
deploying his troops; but he soon found himself hampered in every
direction by dense and almost impenetrable thickets, which had a
tendency to break up every organization that tried to pass through
them into mere crowds of men without order or alignment. Under
these circumstances concert of action became exceedingly difficult,
and when attempts were made to communicate orders off the roads,
aids wandered hopelessly through the woods, struggling in the thick
undergrowth, without being able to find any one. It was worse then
fighting in a dense fog.* The enemy, of course, were also impeded
in their movements, but they had the advantage of being better
acquainted with the country, and in case they were beaten they had
a line at Tabernacle Church already intrenched to fall back upon.
The ravines also, which crossed the upper roads at right angles,
offered excellent defensive positions for them.

[* One brigade of Griffin's division was out all night trying to
find its way through the thickets, and did not reach the main army
until 4 A.M. Wilcox's brigade, which came the next day from Banks'
Ford to reinforce the enemy, had a similar experience.]

McLaws, who had advanced on the turnpike, managed to form line of
battle with his division on each side of the pike, against Sykes,
who had now come forward to sustain his cavalry detachment, which,
in spite of their gallantry--for they rode up and fired in the
faces of the enemy--were driven in by the 11th Virginia Infantry
of Mahone's brigade. Jackson on his arrival, had stopped the
fortifying which Anderson had commenced, and according to his
invariable custom to find and fight his enemy as soon as possible,
had moved forward; so that the two armies encountered each other
about two and half miles from Chancellorsville. Sykes indeed, met
the advance of McLaws' division only a mile out, and drove it back
steadily a mile farther, when it was reinforced by Anderson's
division, and Ramseur's brigade of Rodes' division. Anderson gave
Sykes a lively fight and succeeded in getting in on his flanks;
for, owing to the divergence of the roads, neither Slocum on the
right nor Meade's two divisions on the left were abreast with him.
He tried to connect with Slocum by throwing out a regiment deployed
as skirmishers, but did not succeed. As the enemy were gaining
the advantage he fell back behind Hancock, who came to the front
and took his place. Slocum now formed on the right, with his left
resting on the plank road, and his right on high ground which
commanded the country around. Altogether the general line was a
good one; for there were large open spaces where the artillery
could move and manoeuvre, and the army were almost out of the
thickets. The reserves could have struggled through those in the
rear, and have filled the gaps, so that there is no reason to
suppose our forces could have not continued to advance, or at all
events have held the position, which, from its elevation and the
other advantages I have stated, was an important one, especially
as the column on the river road was in sight of Banks' Ford, which
it could have seized and held, or have struck the right flank of
the enemy with great effect. The troops had come out to obtain
possession of Banks' Ford, and all the surplus artillery was waiting
there. To retreat without making any adequate effort to carry out
his plans made the General appear timid, and had a bad effect on
the morale of the army. It would have been time enough to fall
back in case of defeat; and if such a result was anticipated, the
engineers with their 4,000 men, aided by Sickles' corps, could
easily have laid out a strong line in the rear for the troops to
fall back upon. General Warren, the Chief Engineer on Hooker's
staff, thought the commanding ridge with the open space in front,
upon which Hancock was posted, a very advantageous position for
the army to occupy, and urged Couch not to abandon it until he
(Warren) had conferred with Hooker. After the order came to retire,
Couch sent to obtain permission to remain, but it was peremptorily
refused. Hooker soon afterward changed his mind and countermanded
his first order, but it was then too late; our troops had left the
ridge and the enemy were in possession of it. There was too much
vacillation at headquarters. Slocum, who was pressing the enemy
back, was very much vexed when he received the order, but obeyed
it, and retreated without being molested. It is true, Wright's
brigade had formed on his right, but the advance of the Eleventh
Corps would have taken that in flank, so that the prospect was
generally good at this time for an advance. The column on the
river road also retired without interference. As Couch had waited
to hear from Hooker, Hancock's right flank became somewhat exposed
by the delay, but he fell back without serious loss. French also,
who had started for Todd's Tavern, returned. He encountered the
enemy, but was ordered in and did not engage them.

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